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    Abstract 
 
Important doctrines in diverse areas of law employ structured decision procedures 
requiring, in rough terms, that the plaintiff first make some demonstration of harm; 
if but only if that is done, the defendant must make some showing of benefit; and if 
but only if that occurs, balancing is performed. In-depth analysis of such protocols 
reveals them to be inferior to unconstrained balancing with respect to the quality of 
final decisions and the guidance they provide for the collection of information and 
thus the conduct of adjudication. This Article applies this analysis to the rule of reason 
and merger regulation under antitrust law, Title VII disparate impact law, and the 
practices of strict scrutiny and proportionality analysis in constitutional law. 
Longstanding controversies are addressed and unappreciated deficiencies are 
discovered. In all three domains, existing law is cast in a substantially different light, 
both descriptively and normatively. 
 
 
 
 
†Harvard Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Steve Churchill, John Donohue, Richard Fallon, James Greiner, Vicki Jackson, 
Benjamin Sachs, Holger Spamann, Matthew Stephenson, Adrian Vermeule, and workshop 
participants at Berkeley, Chicago, Harvard, Northwestern, and Stanford for helpful discussions and 
comments; Tracy Cui, Carys Johnson, Kevin Keller, Carsten Koenig, Iacopo Lash, Andrea Lowe, 
Asher Lowenstein, Clarissa Lu, Junesoo Seong, and Aluma Zernik for research assistance; and 
Harvard Law School's John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business for financial support. 
Disclaimer: I occassionally consult on antitrust cases, and my spouse is in the legal department of a 
financial services firm.  
1376 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1375 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1376 
I. BALANCING VERSUS STRUCTURED DECISION PROCEDURES ...... 1381 
A. Final Decision Rule .................................................................... 1381 
1. Analysis .............................................................................. 1381 
2. Additional Considerations .................................................. 1384 
B. Information Gathering ................................................................ 1387 
1. Analysis .............................................................................. 1387 
2. Conduct of Legal Proceedings ............................................ 1389 
II. ANTITRUST ............................................................................. 1391 
A. Rule of Reason ........................................................................... 1391 
B. Mergers .................................................................................... 1410 
III. TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT .............................................. 1420 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ......................................................... 1438 
A. Strict Scrutiny ........................................................................... 1438 
B. Proportionality Analysis ............................................................... 1451 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 1459 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Balancing is a familiar mode of decisionmaking in the law and beyond. 
When one consideration favors a particular decision (say, liability) and 
another opposes it, it seems to be the essence of reason that the superior 
decision reflects the balance of the competing forces, taking into account the 
weight of the evidence and the importance of each factor. Many legal rules, 
such as the negligence test for tort liability, operate in this fashion. 
Sometimes, however, structured decision procedures are used instead for 
these types of decisions. As a benchmark for comparison with balancing, this 
Article takes the following stylized version as a point of departure: 
(1) The plaintiff must show that the harm of the defendant’s act exceeds    
      some threshold. If not, there is no liability. If so: 
(2) The defendant must show that the benefit of its act exceeds some other    
      threshold. If not, there is liability. If so: 
(3) The harm and benefit are balanced, and there is liability if and only if   
      the harm is greater. 
Similar or related schemes are thought to characterize some existing legal 
decision procedures or have been proposed in antitrust law (rule of reason, 
mergers), discrimination law (Title VII disparate impact), and constitutional law 
(strict scrutiny, proportionality analysis). Yet structured decision procedures of 
this sort are neither used nor advocated in most other areas of law. 
It is natural to ask when and why legal rules should employ structured 
decision procedures in lieu of balancing. And, when they are used, it is 
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necessary to set the two decision thresholds, for their height is critical to the 
procedure’s bite and, in particular, its difference from unconstrained 
balancing. This Article aims to answer these questions and others, with a 
particular emphasis on the descriptive and normative implications in the 
aforementioned legal domains. 
Part I presents a general, abstract comparison of structured decision 
procedures to unconstrained balancing in order to frame the analysis of the 
substantive doctrines examined in the next three parts.1 Part I begins by 
comparing the two approaches as final decision rules when all of the 
information that will be considered is before the decisionmaker. In many cases, 
including all those that reach step 3 under the structured protocol, the 
decisions will be the same. In important settings, however, the outcomes will 
differ. Moreover, in all such cases the outcome under the structured rule is 
necessarily inferior in the sense that such cases involve either the assignment 
of liability when the benefit exceeds the harm or a failure to assign liability 
when the harm exceeds the benefit. In addition, the purported virtue of 
structured rules in avoiding difficult balancing turns out to be misleading. 
They avoid balancing in many easy cases, but neither effort nor error is 
reduced. And they avoid balancing in some hard cases, but that is precisely 
when they stop short of the balancing performed in step 3 even though the 
resulting outcome from step 1 or step 2 may well be incorrect. Moreover, they 
sometimes require close comparisons with the thresholds even though 
balancing would have been easy. On reflection, it is remarkable that structured 
decision procedures are believed to prevail in important areas of law and are 
advanced as replacements for balancing in some others without even having 
asked the basic question of how outcomes under the two methods differ. 
Part I then compares the two approaches as guides to information 
gathering, which is sometimes advanced as a virtue of structured decision 
procedures because stopping early (at step 1) economizes on effort. This 
advantage proves to be largely illusory. Optimal, unconstrained information 
gathering, which is what one ideally would do under a balancing approach, 
involves a number of principles that are sharply violated by the structured 
protocol, stemming from the latter’s sequential separation of the investigation 
of the harm and the benefit of a challenged practice. First, much evidence is 
expressly comparative; indeed, characterization evidence is relevant precisely 
to the extent that it bears differentially on competing understandings of the 
defendant’s alleged act. Attempting to separate the two is artificial and 
fraught, somewhat like using scissors, disjoined, one blade at a time. Second, 
evidence often naturally clumps by source rather than by subject: internal 
 
1This abbreviated presentation draws on the extensive analysis in Louis Kaplow, On the Design 
of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992 (2019). 
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documents, witnesses, and experts; not harm and benefit. Third, even if all 
evidence bore only on harm or only on benefit and naturally clustered in 
single-issue bundles, it is a priori unlikely that the optimal order of gathering 
and assessing evidence would be to do first all of one type (harm), followed 
by all of the other (benefit). Instead, it is (roughly) sensible to collect first, 
second, and so forth whatever bundle has the highest diagnosticity to cost 
ratio; at any given point, the most promising bundle may just as plausibly 
involve benefit as harm. Indeed, since there tend to be diminishing returns 
with respect to the exploration of each issue, it is unlikely that all of the most 
promising avenues would concern only one and all of the least promising only 
the other. A final subsection explains that neither of the two approaches 
actually governs the conduct of U.S. civil litigation, which has a structure of 
its own—a fact that casts a curious light on many doctrinal and policy 
discussions of structured decision procedures. 
Parts II–IV, the core of this Article, apply this general analysis of 
balancing versus structured decision procedures to three areas of law. The 
reader should note that the analysis is qualified in a number of ways: 
Constraints of space result in partial analysis, mainly to illuminate core 
ideas. Each area of law is different from the others and from the stylized 
three-step protocol that is analyzed in Part I. Moreover, doctrine in each area 
is to a degree murky, and the foregoing analysis sometimes calls into 
question whether common descriptions of the rules reflect actual practice. 
Rather than repeating these caveats throughout, I will simply proceed, often 
presenting points in blunt terms for purposes of brevity and clarity, at some 
expense to fidelity. Despite these qualifications, the general framework and 
analysis powerfully illuminate and in important ways reshape our 
understanding of the law in each of the three domains. 
Part II examines antitrust law. The Supreme Court’s canonical 
statements of the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, which span a century, 
present it as a pure balancing test: liability turns on whether the challenged 
practice overall suppresses rather than promotes competition. Setting to the 
side some categorical carve-outs—such as the per se illegality of price 
fixing—commentators and courts increasingly restate this rule as a 
structured protocol that resembles the three-step stylization examined here. 
To that extent, the foregoing criticisms are apt. 
For mergers, the structure is similar, although not often explicitly stated 
as such. Even though most nontrivial horizontal mergers a priori generate 
some upward pricing pressure, few mergers are challenged and some 
challenges fail in court, and this is so (according to conventional lore) without 
reaching the question of whether there are offsetting efficiencies (akin to step 
2). This suggests a distinct step 1 with a high threshold. On those occasions 
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in which that hurdle is overcome, government guidelines and practice then 
move to step 2 but in turn find that it usually fails, suggesting a significant 
threshold there as well—particularly because it is commonly accepted that 
many mergers are motivated by greater efficiency (which is the rationale for 
challenging so few). Once placed in this Article’s framework, merger 
assessments can better be understood, criticized, and improved. One suspects, 
however, that regarding both information collection and decisionmaking, 
government agencies’ internal analysis reflects a less constrained balancing 
process than official pronouncements suggest. 
Part III turns to disparate impact cases under Title VII. Under prevailing 
Supreme Court precedent and the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 
they are governed by a structured decision procedure that has some 
resemblance to that examined here.2 The first step of disparate impact 
inquiries, which focuses on the plaintiff ’s prima facie case (typically proved 
with statistics), suffers greatly from the problem of attempting to separate 
harm from justification, in a way that few have recognized. The second step 
(in some respects collapsed with the third, as will be discussed), on the 
defendant’s business justification, is understood to raise a serious question 
regarding the threshold: specifically whether it is essentially zero (“job 
related” is taken to mean that any connection whatsoever between the 
discriminatory employment practice and productivity is sufficient), massive 
(“business necessity” is the operative phrase, and “necessity” means 
necessity!), or somewhere in between (which could be more akin to 
balancing). These steps, the role of alternative employment practices, 
queasiness about balancing in this context, and other matters are illuminated 
by this Article’s framework. 
Part IV considers the doctrine of strict scrutiny—and proportionality 
analysis (employed in many countries and proposed by some for the United 
States)—which likewise has a structure that bears some similarity to the 
stylized inquiry examined here. (Strict scrutiny omits step 3, but may in part 
introduce balancing through its step 2 or its less restrictive alternatives 
analysis, referred to as narrow tailoring.) Central questions concern the two 
thresholds: their height and their nature. Specifically, the first threshold is 
largely taken to be qualitative and categorical rather than quantitative, 
essentially limiting the domain of review. Particularly with constitutional 
provisions, it sometimes makes sense to employ constraints on balancing, here 
by the legislative and executive branches, and to focus judicial review on realms 
in which other governmental actors cannot be trusted. However, once the first 
step is triggered, the second step’s requirement of a compelling state interest 
 
2This Article does not address disparate treatment doctrine that employs a superficially similar 
regime, although some of the lessons developed here may be applicable. 
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seems to entail a threshold that mixes qualitative and quantitative features in 
a manner that is difficult to interpret or justify. The combination of the two 
steps is thus obscure on the extent to which balancing by the court is avoided, 
and any such deviation seems difficult to square with the purposes of review. 
Proportionality analysis, in some incarnations, involves a number of 
steps that are even more suggestive of the structured decision procedures 
considered here. Yet the stance taken toward the height of the thresholds 
seems inconsistent. Some of the elucidation and rationalization proceeds as 
though certain thresholds are tough, which allows cases to be disposed of 
before reaching proportionality review’s final balancing step. If so, there are 
potentially significant costs and essentially no benefits (because, as noted 
earlier, the balances avoided are either easy or are ones that may well have 
favored an opposite conclusion). Other descriptions, seeming to sense the 
problem that early truncation may involve erroneous outcomes based on 
incomplete analysis, imply that the thresholds are instead negligible, in 
which event one essentially has unconstrained balancing that renders all but 
the final step moot. Matching these protocols against this Article’s stylized 
procedure and accompanying analysis makes more apparent these 
inconsistencies and illuminates the costs if structured proportionality 
review substantially deviates from unconstrained balancing. 
These applications concretize and clarify the Article’s more general 
analysis and indicate its usefulness. This Article neither advances definitive 
claims regarding the actual state of doctrine in any of these areas of law nor 
suggests what doctrinal formulations would be best. Instead, it seeks to 
provide a general framework for understanding the operation and 
implications of an important aspect of legal rule design. Along the way, it 
illuminates a number of broad questions about the legal system, including 
information collection as a central input to adjudication, various dimensions 
of balancing (quantification, commensurability, and constraints), less 
restrictive alternatives, and overlooked mismatches between stated legal 
doctrine and practice. 
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I. BALANCING VERSUS STRUCTURED DECISION PROCEDURES3 
A. Final Decision Rule 
1. Analysis 
Let us begin with a precise statement of the stylized setting that will be 
used as a benchmark for analysis in Parts II–IV. As we will see, this bare-
bones description of structured decision procedures does not fully depict any 
of the legal doctrines examined below; those doctrines are in various respects 
murky and contested, differ from each other, and (depending on the 
interpretation) diverge in various ways from this baseline. The stark 
formulation offered here is chosen for clarity, and it indeed will enhance our 
understanding of each application.  
A legal decisionmaker—an agency, court, or other tribunal—is confronted 
by a case.4 Its ultimate choice is whether or not to assign liability, which for 
ease of exposition will be taken to involve injunctive relief (the application to 
ex ante behavior is elaborated in the margin).5 The imposition of liability, 
relative to a finding of no liability, results in the avoidance of a harm of H 
and forgoes a benefit of B. Either value might be zero, each may be highly 
uncertain, and part of the task (elaborated in Section B) involves the 
gathering of information to sharpen these estimates.6 
 
3This Part is a brief sketch of the ideas developed in much greater depth in Kaplow, supra note 
1. Rather than restating numerous qualifications, elaborations, and subtleties, the reader is referred 
there for further discussion. 
4Most of the discussion abstracts from the fact that the flow of cases is itself endogenous to the 
decision procedure. One important dimension concerns screening, including discouraging the filing 
of frivolous cases and avoiding the suppression of valid, valuable cases—a topic addressed briefly at 
the end of subsection B.1. 
5In many legal settings, a significant, even primary function of liability is to deter harmful 
conduct while avoiding the chilling of beneficial behavior. The harm (H) and benefit (B) introduced 
below and employed throughout this Article can be interpreted as stand-ins for deterrence benefits 
and chilling costs, although there are important (but subtle) differences between this function of 
liability and settings in which the decision concerns the prohibition or permission of an act, going 
forward (which is nominally true for merger review, zoning decisions, drug approval, and injunctions 
more broadly). For a formal analysis of the differences, see Louis Kaplow, On the Optimal Burden of 
Proof, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1104 (2011). Informal analysis and substantial elaboration appear in Louis 
Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) [hereinafter Kaplow, Burden of Proof], and Louis 
Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 5-10 (2014) 
[hereinafter Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests]. The analysis is extended to multistage decisionmaking in 
Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179 (2013) [hereinafter Kaplow, Multistage 
Adjudication], and Louis Kaplow, Optimal Multistage Adjudication, 33 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 613 (2017). 
6Much of the discussion in this Article abstracts from administrative costs, although Section B’s 
analysis of information gathering addresses a significant aspect of this subject. 
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Under balancing,7 liability is assigned if and only if H > B. (Ties are 
largely ignored, with conventional tie-breaking norms employed without 
further comment.) Because there is often uncertainty, which may remain 
significant even after information gathering is complete, H and B are best 
interpreted as expected values (with risk adjustments, as appropriate). 
Under a structured decision procedure, it will be assumed that liability is 
determined by the following three-step protocol: 
(1) If H > H*, proceed to step 2. Otherwise, assign no liability and stop. 
(2) If B > B*, proceed to step 3. Otherwise, assign liability and stop. 
(3) If H > B, assign liability. Otherwise, assign no liability. And stop. 
Let us now compare this stylized structured decision procedure to 
balancing as a final decision rule, taking as given that there is some set of 
information before the tribunal. The structured rule can, and sometimes will, 
err in two ways. First, it may call for no liability even though the harm 
exceeds the benefit. This possibility is a direct consequence of step 1’s decision 
threshold. No liability is assigned whenever H ≤ H*. This outcome, moreover, 
is determined without regard to the magnitude of B, so it is possible that 
H > B. This happens whenever B falls in the range from 0 to H, that is, when 
we have 0 ≤ B < H ≤ H*. The only way to eliminate this possibility is to set 
H* to zero, guaranteeing that the first step never matters.8 
Second, the structured protocol can result in liability even though the 
benefit exceeds the harm. This arises in some cases in which step 2 is binding. 
There, liability is assigned when, having found that H > H* in step 1 (which 
is required to reach step 2), we also have B ≤ B*. This outcome does depend 
on the magnitude of both B and H, but it is not determined by a direct 
comparison of the two as it would be under balancing. A divergence in 
outcomes can arise when B* is sufficiently large because then it is possible 
that H < B even though step 2 fails. This happens whenever B falls in the 
range from H to B*, that is, when we have H* < H < B ≤ B*. 
In reflecting on this result, it is useful to focus on the possible 
relationships between H* and B*. As is clear from the sequence of 
inequalities, this problem can occur when H* < B*. By contrast, when H* > B*, 
we can see that this situation cannot arise. Interestingly, the impossibility of 
mistakenly assigning liability in this case occurs precisely because step 2 is 
rendered redundant: If, after step 1, we went straight to balancing, we would 
assign liability only when H > B. But we already know from step 1 that 
 
7To avoid excessive verbiage, the term “balancing,” standing alone, refers to pure or 
unconstrained balancing, in contrast to a structured decision procedure, unless the context clearly 
indicates otherwise (notably, when reference is being made to the balancing that occurs in step 3 of 
such a structured procedure). 
8Subsection B.1 briefly explores whether setting H* somewhat above zero may be useful to 
screen cases. 
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H > H*, and we are assuming that our protocol sets H* > B*, which implies 
that, as we leave step 1, we know that H > B*. It is pointless to ask first whether 
B is at least as high as B* when, if it is, we will then immediately ask whether 
it is at least as high as H, a more demanding test. 
Anticipating the discussion of applications in parts II–IV, it is sometimes 
suggested in particular legal contexts that structured decision procedures are 
appealing because they save effort by avoiding difficult balancing. But the 
balancing of H and B is hardly difficult in this case; instead, we may 
sometimes be making extra work for ourselves. When it is a close question 
whether B > B*, we struggle with step 2 even though the final outcome would 
be obvious if we peeked ahead to the balance required in step 3, which in this 
instance is not as close a call.9 
It is also useful to examine step 2 from another perspective, asking what 
is the relationship between B* and H rather than between B* and H*. If 
B* > H, we know that we can get the wrong outcome. After all, step 2 asks 
whether B > B*, knowing full well that B* > H. On the other hand, if B* < H, 
we cannot err. Here, we are asking a pointless question because the 
assessment of whether B > B* will immediately be followed (if it passes) by 
the more stringent test of whether B ≥ H. And, when the step 2 test, B > B*, 
fails, it would have been clearer that the more stringent test of whether B ≥ H 
would have failed, so we are hardly easing the decision task. 
The implication is that setting B* = H avoids these problems. But it does 
so by converting the second step into step 3’s balancing inquiry. After all, 
asking whether B > B* and whether B > H are the same questions when B* = H. 
Summarizing this subsection, if in step 1 we always set H* = 0, and then 
in step 2 we always set B* = H, all the shortcomings of the structured decision 
procedure as a final decision rule are avoided—because we have converted it 
into an unconstrained balancing test. The most significant point, however, is 
that, whenever the two decision methods generate different results, the 
outcome under the structured decision procedure is always the one that is in 
error. Moreover, such errors can be made even when all the information 
required for balancing has already been processed (which occurs when errors 
are made at step 2). Perhaps most remarkable, structured protocols are 
thought to prevail in important areas of law, and are sometimes proposed as 
 
9This point about possible added effort also applies to step 1, if one now thinks ahead two steps 
from there: Even when step 1 passes, that is, H > H*, we then have to determine B, which we would 
have to do under balancing as well. Also, if step 1 was close, we may have had to undertake extra 
effort even if it would ultimately turn out that the H > B balancing in step 3 would have been easy 
because B was notably lower than H. Of course, step 1 sometimes does save work, namely, the need 
to examine B at all when step 1 fails—but this savings arises precisely in the cases in which we may 
be reaching the wrong outcome on account of step 1’s decision threshold, as already explained. 
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replacements for balancing in others, without having even asked how the 
outcomes under the two approaches differ. 
2. Additional Considerations 
This subsection examines less restrictive alternatives and offers some 
reflections on balancing as a decision rule. Beginning with the former, it is 
common under structured decision procedures to append in some fashion an 
inquiry into less restrictive alternatives, using here the terminology of 
antitrust law10 for the sort of supplement that is referred to in Title VII 
disparate impact law as alternative employment practices and in 
constitutional law’s strict scrutiny as narrow tailoring (or, in proportionality 
analysis, as minimal impairment). The central idea is that, when a defendant 
purports to justify an action by reference to its producing B, we should 
consider whether some or all of that B might be achieved through an 
alternative arrangement that causes less H. 
Under unconstrained balancing, suppose that a proffered less restrictive 
alternative would generate its own levels of harm and benefit, which here will be 
denoted H ′  and B ′ , respectively. If the alternative is indeed less restrictive, 
H ′  < H. For it to be more desirable, the net social harm must be less than that 
from the defendant’s original action: H ′– B ′  < H – B. Note that because this 
inquiry into less restrictive alternatives only matters when H ≤ B, we can further 
state that H ′– B ′  < H – B ≤ 0. In considering this series of inequalities, one 
performs two balancing tests: the original one (which, if it had been H > B, 
would have resulted in an assignment of liability with no need to inquire into 
less restrictive alternatives) and a second one (comparing the alternative to 
the original practice). 
It is also helpful to restate the less restrictive alternatives test as a 
“delta/delta” test. Starting with H ′– B ′  < H – B from just above, we can 
rearrange terms to express this equivalently as H – H ′  > B – B ′. That is, a less 
restrictive alternative is superior to the original action when it reduces the 
harm by more than it reduces the benefit. Introducing the further notation 
ΔH = H – H ′  and ΔB = B – B ′ , this rearranged version can also be written as 
the requirement that ΔH > ΔB. Instead of performing a second balancing test, 
we can compute the two deltas and see which is greater. 
Consider next how less restrictive alternatives analysis fits into structured 
decision procedures. The inquiry is usually placed in or (more often) after 
step 2 (and sometimes, as we will see in Parts III and IV, this inquiry is 
 
10This is the rubric under the rule of reason, as will be developed in Section II.A. For mergers, 
examined in Section II.B, the test is phrased as a requirement that purported efficiencies (B) be 
“merger specific.” 
2019] Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures 1385 
undertaken instead of step 3’s balancing inquiry). The core oddity is that, as 
we have seen, the proper way to examine less restrictive alternatives involves 
quantifying H, B, H ′ , and B ′ , in order to perform the second balancing test 
or the delta/delta test. Yet, as ordinarily imagined, this analysis is performed 
before undertaking any explicit comparison of H and B. So the decisionmaker 
must do all that is required for full balancing, and more, even though the 
balancing step has not yet been reached (or, under some protocols, is not even 
undertaken).11 Another surprising feature is that the effort involved with less 
restrictive alternatives analysis seems to be mandated even if H > B to begin 
with, in which case it seems pointless—and this may well become apparent 
in the course of analyzing a case. Worse, under protocols that consider less 
restrictive alternatives but have no step 3, a defendant may be found not liable 
when the less restrictive alternative fails even though the analysis thereof 
made clear that B < H despite step 2 having passed. In summary, although the 
consideration of less restrictive alternatives improves structured decision 
rules, the resulting mechanism is clumsy and fails to eliminate either 
important type of error. 
Turn now to some perennial questions raised by the use of balancing as a 
decision rule. The reluctance to engage in explicit balancing in many legal 
settings seems to be part of the explanation for the embrace of structured decision 
procedures. Queasiness about balancing is often created by the difficulty of 
quantifying one or both of the desiderata that need to be balanced or from the 
felt inappropriateness of expressing the two in a common metric (often referred 
to as incommensurability). The core response is that, however great the 
challenges, something akin to balancing is the only plausible way to proceed 
when there are competing considerations, each sometimes powerful enough 
relative to the other to be decisive. 
As a matter of logic, if there should be liability when harm vastly exceeds 
the benefit in some appropriate sense, but no liability when the harm is 
minuscule and the benefit immense, then consistent, coherent 
decisionmaking requires quantification (even if hunches and guesstimates 
may be required) and comparison. Regarding the latter, even if the 
decisionmaker does not consciously or explicitly state two quantified factors 
in a common denominator, the decisions can be viewed as if determined by 
balancing as long as greater harm, all else equal, always favors liability and 
greater benefit, all else equal, always opposes liability. 
Note also that, as a practical matter, such balancing is routinely employed 
in many settings in which both quantification and comparison may be 
 
11Sometimes, however, it will be possible to apply the delta/delta test directly, without separately 
assessing the harm and benefit of each practice relative to the situation with neither, by comparing 
the two practices to each other. 
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extremely difficult. Consider medical decisionmaking. Diagnosis is often 
uncertain, evidence is limited, each patient is unique, and the stakes often 
involve life, quality of life, and cost, all of which must be somehow weighed 
in reaching a treatment decision. Would any sensible individual follow a 
doctor’s advice that eschewed quantification or harm, benefit, or both? And, 
whatever the challenge, can one really decide whether the benefit of treatment 
is worth the risk without considering the relative importance of each? 
Finally, observe that structured decision procedures hardly avoid these 
problems. H must be quantified at step 1, and B as well if step 2 is reached. 
Moreover, not only must comparisons be made when at step 3, but any 
plausible attempt to set the two thresholds, H* and B*, inevitably involves 
judgments about the relative importance of harms and benefits.12 
A different type of objection to balancing concerns the virtue in some 
settings of designing rules to constrain balancing, particularly by agents with 
limited institutional competence or who may be untrustworthy. In the case of 
government actors, who are constrained by constitutions (see Part IV) and 
myriad other rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures, one may 
be concerned in some settings about the abuse of power (notably, to entrench 
incumbents) and under- (or negative-) weighting of certain groups’ interests. 
The relevant question for present purposes is the extent to which structured 
decision rules may be helpful in this regard. On reflection, the fit is imperfect. 
Often it is the primary actor rather than the reviewer that needs to be controlled. 
And when the reviewer itself cannot be trusted—perhaps it would manipulate 
the reported H and B to distort the balancing decision—similar efforts would 
often circumvent structured decision rules. Indeed, the matter can be worse, for 
even if the manipulation of H and B might sometimes be detected, the 
decisionmaker has the further degree of freedom of manipulating H* and B* 
since both are usually stated in fuzzy rather than explicit, quantitative terms. 
Nevertheless, aspects of structured decision rules might sometimes be helpful,13 
and employing a categorical (rather than quantitative) inquiry at step 1 to limit 
the reviewer’s jurisdiction might be regarded to be appropriate in some settings, 
as suggested in Part IV’s discussion of constitutional law. 
 
12In operation, structured decision procedures may succeed in allowing decisionmakers (such as 
judges) to avoid having to state any of their quantitative conclusions because, at step 1 and step 2, 
they can merely announce whether the (unquantified) thresholds are exceeded. Moreover, even if 
they believe that both steps pass so that balancing is required, they can obfuscate by adjusting one 
of their conclusions at an earlier step—for example, by stating that step 2 fails if they believe that 
H > B, thereby avoiding the need to articulate how they balanced H and B. 
13The most promising situation is one in which H is externally observable to some extent and 
H* is set explicitly, whereas B is externally inscrutable. Then step 1 could be helpful in this regard 
(but not step 2). 
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B. Information Gathering 
1. Analysis 
Section A examines final decisionmaking, taking as given the information 
(evidence) before the decisionmaker. This section focuses on information 
gathering, a critical but under-analyzed feature of legal decision processes.14 
Moreover, structured decision procedures are sometimes favored on the 
ground that they economize on information costs because they consider first 
only information on H and, when step 1 fails, proceedings are terminated 
without having to examine information on B. 
Let us begin with how information should optimally be collected—the 
procedure that ideally would be followed under unconstrained balancing. 
Whether to collect some clump of information is determined by what is called 
the value of information.15 One assesses what decisions would be made in 
light of what one might learn, determines the net of expected harm and 
benefit under each, and weights these outcomes by their respective 
probabilities. That total expected value is then compared to the expected 
value that would be generated if one made the best possible decision, liability 
or no liability, as currently informed. The excess of the former over the latter 
is the value of information, and the information should be collected if this 
overall value exceeds the cost. Favoring the collection of additional 
information are low information costs and high diagnosticity of the 
information. This latter notion reflects how close of a call is the initial 
decision, how much uncertainty is present, and how informative is the 
information one contemplates collecting. 
When considering more complex settings with many possible clumps of 
information that might be collected, three key principles offer guidance. 
First, one prioritizes information with the highest diagnosticity to cost ratio. 
Second, which clump to collect next (and so forth) depends on what is learned 
along the way. Third, whether to collect, say, two clumps together rather than 
sequentially depends on a tradeoff of synergies from simultaneous collection 
and option value (the likelihood that what is learned from the first clump will 
render collection of the second suboptimal, and the cost savings therefrom, 
net of any information loss from stopping). 
 
14For further discussion of a number of related issues concerning information and adjudication, 
see Louis Kaplow, Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
1303 (2015); Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, supra note 5; and Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in 
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994). 
15For a simple exposition and illustration aimed at a legal audience, see HOWELL E. JACKSON 
ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 13-19 (3d ed. 2017). 
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Each of these principles is intuitive and can be understood by 
contemplating medical diagnosis. One begins with the cheapest, least 
invasive, and most informative tests. Whether to stop and decide (initiate 
treatment or send the patient home), and what if anything to learn next (a 
scan? a biopsy?) depends on the initial test results; hence, the full plan is not 
determined a priori. And one might, say, do multiple blood tests 
simultaneously because of savings in cost and time, whereas one might hold 
off on an expensive and painful biopsy that would be unnecessary if the blood 
test is negative. 
Turn now to structured decision procedures. In principle, they would collect 
first all (but only) information pertaining to H and then proceed to B if but 
only if step 1 passes. Despite some superficial appeal, this preset plan grossly 
violates the above principles and is subject to additional, significant infirmities. 
Its first major deficiency arises from the implicit supposition that most 
evidence pertains only to H or only to B, whereas in fact much illuminates 
both. A notable case, which is quite important in many of the applications 
considered below, concerns characterization evidence. If the question is 
whether the defendant’s act is of the harmful or the beneficial type—and 
suppose for ease of exposition that there are only two, mutually exclusive 
possibilities—then by definition any evidence that affects the probability that 
it is of the harmful type also affects the probability that it is instead beneficial 
(indeed, by precisely the same amount, although in the opposite direction). 
The predicate that inquiries into harm and benefit are distinct is thus 
incoherent. To illustrate this problem, ask how one could interpret an 
arguably ambiguous internal document if allowed to consider only one of the 
possible meanings. Or, anticipating Section II.A on antitrust’s rule of reason, 
how can one assess whether a practice is anticompetitive (of a type causing 
H) when that is typically defined as action other than “competition on the 
merits” (of a type causing B).16 
Second, in practice information often clumps by source (sets of 
documents, particular witnesses) rather than by issue. There would be huge 
synergy loss from making two passes: for example, reviewing the same sets 
of documents twice, first for H and later, if step 1 passes, for B. In medical 
diagnosis, it would be like taking a blood sample and only collecting enough 
to run one test, waiting for the result, and then resampling to run the other 
test. (That may sometimes be appropriate, but often not.) Observe that an 
implication of these first two problems is that, in applying step 1, the 
decisionmaker may already have in hand much information pertaining to B, 
which may indicate that B < H, yet it is supposed to determine whether 
 
16See infra note 45. 
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H > H* and, furthermore, to assign no liability (and stop) if it does not—
without any regard for B. 
Third, and going to the heart of the foregoing analysis of the value of 
information, the structured procedure’s sequencing is usually wrong, often 
dramatically so, even if one ignores the first two defects. Sometimes, the 
information cluster with the highest diagnosticity to cost ratio will pertain to 
B. Due to diminishing returns, it would be atypical for all of the information 
pertaining to H to rank higher than any pertaining to B. Also, as explained, 
the optimal sequence is contingent, depending on what is learned at each step, 
not preset in advance. And the tradeoff of synergy and option value across 
information pertaining to H and to B is entirely ignored. In every respect, 
structured decision procedures would often lead decisionmakers badly astray 
with regard to information gathering. 
Before leaving this subject, consider the implications of these three points 
for setting H* modestly above zero, as a first step, in order to screen cases.17 
On one hand, in light of administrative costs and the prospect that, otherwise, 
many low-merit cases might be filed, this approach has some appeal. On the 
other hand, in light of the foregoing, unconstrained balancing—perhaps 
requiring an early indication that H nontrivially exceeds B—seems to be a 
superior screening strategy.18 After all, if much information concerns both H 
and B in any event, and if any distinct information that is readily obtainable 
may often pertain to B rather than H, then screening based on whatever may 
be known about both H and B makes more sense than straitjacketing the 
decisionmaker to screen based only on H. 
2. Conduct of Legal Proceedings 
The actual conduct of U.S. civil litigation (focusing here on federal courts) 
follows neither these structured protocols (when applying doctrines under 
which they are applicable) nor optimal ones. By contrast, one suspects that 
specialized agencies often proceed roughly in accordance with the latter, 
particularly in cases that they choose at some point to terminate without 
liability. This may be significantly so even when structured decision rules 
govern, although agencies may need to “repackage” their analysis in issuing an 
opinion or seeking enforcement in court when they do seek to impose liability. 
Once a government agency or a private plaintiff is in court, the game 
changes substantially. If a complaint’s adequacy is challenged at a motion to 
dismiss, the only question before the court is whether the challenger has 
 
17See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1043-47. 
18If it was thought desirable to maintain a stronger hurdle, a screening inquiry could assess 
whether, based on preliminary indications, H nontrivially exceeds B rather than zero. 
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stated a plausible claim.19 Under a pure balancing test, the plaintiff must 
allege that H > B, whereas under the structured decision procedure the 
plaintiff must instead allege that H > H*. It is unclear how much this 
difference matters in practice or, when it does, which hurdle would be easier 
to overcome (which, among other things, depends on the magnitude of H*). 
When a motion to dismiss is denied or none was filed, the case proceeds 
to discovery. Ordinarily, the scope of discovery covers all issues and all types 
of evidence, subject to limits regarding burdensomeness, what is now called 
“proportional to the needs of the case.”20 The key point is that, unless a judge 
chooses to engage in substantial case management, the ordinary conduct of 
discovery does not involve sequencing. It does not adhere to the principles of 
optimal information collection, which would require interim assessments and 
stopping decisions that are associated with a particular decision regarding 
liability. Nor does discovery follow the dictates of structured information 
protocols, which would call for discovery only on H, followed by a 
determinative resolution of whether H > H*, which would have to be 
answered affirmatively (requiring complete factfinding) before proceeding to 
discovery pertaining to B. Thus, when some advance structured decision 
procedures because they sometimes save the costs of collecting information 
on B in the course of civil litigation, it is mysterious what they have in mind. 
After discovery, a party may move for summary judgment. Under either 
balancing or a structured decision procedure, this would ordinarily involve a 
motion by the defendant, typically claiming in essence that there is a negligible 
evidentiary basis (sufficient to create a “genuine dispute”) for believing that 
H is nontrivial.21 Note that, as just explained, at this point discovery would 
ordinarily have been completed on all issues, so even if the motion is granted, 
resulting in no liability, all information gathering pertaining to B will have 
occurred even under a structured decision procedure. 
If a case goes to trial, any decision under either balancing or a structured 
decision procedure will typically not be made until the end. (The exception 
involves a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the plaintiff ’s 
case, which relates to the core situation in which a defendant should prevail 
on a motion for summary judgment.22) In that event, even under a structured 
decision procedure, in a case in which there is no liability because step 1 fails 
(that is, the factfinder ultimately concludes that H ≤ H*), there will not even 
be a savings in trial costs (and, as noted, certainly not in discovery costs) as 
 
19See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
20FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
21FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
22Under Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, the standard for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. 
P. 56 is the same as that for judgment as a matter of law under FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
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long as there had been a genuine dispute about whether this was so. The only 
savings would be in the factfinder’s final deliberation efforts, for a judge or a 
jury may enter a finding of no liability if it concludes that step 1 fails, without 
deciding steps 2 and 3. As a practical matter, verdicts and (with bench trials) 
opinions often complete all of the steps, in part because of the possibility of 
an appeal. The belief that structured decision rules economize substantially 
on litigation costs seems to be a mirage. 
II. ANTITRUST 
Parts II–IV, the core of this Article, apply Part I’s analysis to several legal 
settings. The characterizations of various legal doctrines are simplified for 
present purposes, often stating them bluntly at the expense of various 
subtleties. Moreover, there is significant ambiguity surrounding all of them, 
and each differs from the others and from the stylized structured decision 
procedure just examined. Indeed, some of the benefit of applying this 
Article’s framework is to bring these ambiguities and variations into focus, 
raising new questions in addition to suggesting answers to some familiar ones. 
A. Rule of Reason 
This section focuses on what is sometimes called a “structured” rule of 
reason. Challenges to restraints of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act23 
 
2315 U.S.C. § 1. In a broad sense, the rule of reason also governs Section 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2, and 
some suggestions have been made regarding the deployment of a structured rule of reason inquiry 
in this monopolization context as well. The rule of reason, as announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), was explicitly directed at interpreting Sherman Act § 1, but the Court 
indicated that the inquiry is the same under § 2. See id. at 61-62; see also United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (suggesting a “similar balancing 
approach” under the two sections and citing Standard Oil). Nevertheless, much of the development 
of the rule of reason, under that phraseology, as a formal test, has occurred under Section 1, growing 
out of Chicago Board, as discussed later in this section. The development of the law of 
monopolization, interpreting Section 2, also post-dates Standard Oil. Courts examining particular 
practices under Section 2 tend not to mention the rule of reason as such. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (not mentioning the rule of reason in 
its decision on predatory pricing); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(same, for exclusive dealing, in an opinion examining the practice under Section 2). But some do. 
See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing the burden-shifting 
technique as “a structured, ‘rule of reason’-style approach” (emphasis added)); see also Mark S. 
Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle 
Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 437 (2006) (“[T]he few clear guideposts in 
Section 2 case law demonstrate that courts properly apply different Section 2 legal tests to different 
conduct. The unifying principle is that each Section 2 legal test reflects a specific expression of the 
same underlying ‘rule of reason.’ Although courts usually describe the rule of reason as a particular  
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have been governed for over a century by the rule of reason, which is 
understood to impose liability when anticompetitive effects (H) exceed 
procompetitive effects (B), essentially a balancing test.24 In recent decades, 
 
step-wise test for assessing the legality of concerted action, the rule of reason more generally 
provides a principle for generating antitrust liability tests in a common-law fashion.”). 
Additional suggestions on the use of a structured rule of reason for Section 2 cases appear in 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER 
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, at viii (2008) (The executive summary of the section on 
“General Conduct Standards” in the monopolization context begins as follows: “The plaintiff should 
have the initial burden of establishing that challenged conduct harms the competitive process and 
therefore has a potentially anticompetitive effect. If plaintiff carries that burden, defendant should 
have the opportunity to proffer and substantiate a procompetitive justification for the challenged 
conduct. If defendant does so, plaintiff then should have the burden of establishing that the 
challenged conduct is anticompetitive under the applicable standard.”) (this report was not joined 
by the Federal Trade Commission, which had participated jointly in the hearings and other work 
leading up to the report (see Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Commissioners React to 
Department of Justice Report, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/09/ftc-
commissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-and), and the report was withdrawn 
the next year when the administration changed (see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-withdraws-report-antitrust-monopoly-law); it 
appears that most of the disagreement concerned the report’s statement of substantive rules 
governing single-firm conduct in a manner that objectors regarded to be too lenient, such as being 
too generous in safe-harboring behavior or requiring that anticompetitive effects significantly 
outweigh procompetitive ones, with no suggestion that the overall framework was problematic). See 
also Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 543-51 (2013) 
(arguing that the sequenced, multi-element, burden-shifting framework under Section 1’s rule of 
reason is increasingly being applied to exclusion claims, including under Section 2). In addition, 
similar decisionmaking rubrics have been proposed by academics to address particular exclusionary 
practices. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2262-85 (2000) (proposing a sequential, burden-
shifting rule to govern predatory pricing cases). 
For analogous statements and advocacy in the European Union, see, for example, Communication 
from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, ¶ 31 
[hereinafter Guidance on Article 82] (concluding its statement on procompetitive justifications by 
stating: “It is incumbent upon the dominant undertaking to provide all the evidence necessary to 
demonstrate that the conduct concerned is objectively justified. It then falls to the Commission to 
make the ultimate assessment of whether the conduct concerned is not objectively necessary and, 
based on a weighing-up of any apparent anti-competitive effects against any advanced and 
substantiated efficiencies, is likely to result in consumer harm.”), and Miguel de la Mano & Benoît 
Durand, A Three-Step Structured Rule of Reason to Assess Predation Under Article 102 (DG Competition, 
European Commission, Office of the Chief Economist Discussion Paper, 2010) (proposing a 
structured rule for predatory pricing). For criticism, see Hans W. Friederiszick & Linda Gratz, 
Hidden Efficiencies: The Relevance of Business Justifications in Abuse of Dominance Cases, 11 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 671 (2015). 
24The per se rule and variations such as the “quick look” are examined at the end of this section. 
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however, courts and several commentators,25 as well as model jury 
instructions,26 increasingly state or advocate formulations involving a three-
 
25As an illustration, consider the formulation presented in 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 61-62 (Darren S. Tucker et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017) 
(emphasis added, footnotes omitted) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]: 
Since the early 1980s, lower courts have imposed greater structure on rule of reason 
analysis by casting it in terms of shifting burdens of proof. Although the precise 
formulation varies from circuit to circuit, the approaches are generally similar. Under 
the more structured rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of 
proving that an agreement has had or is likely to have a substantially adverse effect on 
competition. If the plaintiff meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant 
to produce evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the conduct. If the defendant does 
produce evidence of procompetitive virtues, then the plaintiff must show that the 
challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective or that 
the anticompetitive effects nonetheless outweigh the procompetitive virtues. The 
ultimate issue, then, is whether the restraint’s anticompetitive effect substantially 
outweighs the procompetitive effect for which the restraint is reasonably necessary. 
The emphasized language highlights features (not shared by all formulations) that will be discussed 
below: the plaintiff ’s initial burden is one of proving (suggesting a persuasion burden) 
anticompetitive effects that are substantial (suggesting H* > 0); if that is done, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to produce evidence (suggesting a production burden) of procompetitive effects; if (but 
only if) that is done, the plaintiff must show (suggesting a persuasion burden) either that the restraint 
is unnecessary (phraseology often associated with less restrictive alternatives analysis) or that the 
anticompetitive effects outweigh the procompetitive ones (note the lack of a modifier to “outweigh” 
and the lack of explicit mention of direct rebuttal even though only a production burden regarding 
B has been met); and that the ultimate issue involves a balancing test, and it requires that the 
anticompetitive effect substantially outweighs the procompetitive effect. But see id. at 79 (stating an 
equipoised balance). 
Consider another, seemingly similar version (which cites an earlier edition of the preceding 
source in support and which, in turn, is quoted as the exemplar of the structured rule of reason in 
Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND 
POLICY 125, 146 (Wayne Dale Collins ed., 2008), a survey chapter on the operation of burdens of 
proof in U.S. antitrust law): 
Courts have imposed a consistent structure on rule of reason analysis by casting it in 
terms of shifting burdens of proof. . . . Under this approach, the plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of showing that an agreement had a substantially adverse effect on competition. . . . 
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with 
evidence of the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct. . . . If the 
defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive effects, the plaintiff then must prove that 
the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives or 
that those objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. . . . Ultimately, if 
these steps are met, the harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to 
judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable. 
Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). There are some notable 
differences. First, although step 2 refers to the defendant coming forward with evidence, this is then 
referenced as the defendant having been able to demonstrate procompetitive effects. Second, if that is 
done (and with no reference to an opportunity to rebut or whether the demonstrated B exceeds H), the 
plaintiff must prove either that the conduct is not necessary or that there exists a less restrictive manner 
of achieving them, which is to say that the plaintiff apparently loses if it cannot—even if it can directly 
rebut B or show that H > B, because, as stated next, the balancing step is reached only if these steps are 
met. Third, the ultimate balancing itself is stated as a final step and not as the ultimate and thus perhaps 
superseding question. Fourth, the final balance is unweighted, even though at step 1 the plaintiff had 
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to show a substantially adverse effect on competition (meaning that it is possible for the plaintiff to lose 
at step 1 even though it would win if it had reached the final balance). Finally, it is not clear why 
balancing would ever be required if the only way one can reach this step is when plaintiff has 
demonstrated a substantial H and it has shown that the challenged restraint is not necessary to achieve 
the defendant’s B. It is worth reflecting on how many and substantial are the differences, particularly 
since this is a decision that repeatedly (in the ellipsed portions) cites the previous version in support. 
Moreover, as noted, this version is quoted in a survey essay as the exemplar. 
Having already taken substantial space, I will at this point merely assert that, if one reviews 
such statements by every federal circuit court and in other sources, including the treatise by Phillip 
Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, one will see rough similarity from ten thousand feet but many 
such critical differences on close examination. These differences also appear within authorities: a 
single circuit may state the formulation differently across cases, and this treatise has multiple, 
conflicting formulations. Compare 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 1507a (4th ed. 2017), with id. at ¶ 1507c. But see id. at ¶ 1507f (concluding, in spite of the prior 
discussion advancing structured, multi-step inquiries, with a more flexible, case-specific approach). 
As best I can tell, no one seems to have noticed that apparently canonical formulations regarded to 
be largely the same are critically different in multiple ways and that many single statements have 
sharp internal conflicts. (In addition to those noted above, see, for example, id. at 443-44 (stating 
that if the plaintiff establishes, in their first step, that “the challenged practice arguably threaten[s] 
either to reduce output or raise price”, and in their third step, that market power is “plausible”—the 
requirements ordinarily associated with surviving a defendant’s motion to dismiss or perhaps for 
summary judgment—the defendant will then lose the case, in their step 4, unless “there [is] strong 
evidence that the challenged practice creates substantial efficiencies” (emphasis added)).) So even 
putting aside other issues raised in this section—notably the apparent conflict with Supreme Court 
precedent and the fact that nearly all such language is dicta given the procedural posture of the cases 
involved—it seems truly difficult to state what the law on this matter actually is. (In Law v. NCAA, 
quoted and discussed earlier in this footnote, the court rejected all of the defendant’s procompetitive 
justifications—in a “quick look” rule of reason decision—so none of the subsequent steps were 
material to its decision. More often, the cases involve defendants’ motions to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, so all of the action is at step 1.) Likewise, it is difficult to interpret commentators’ 
references to this so-called structured rule of reason. 
26See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL 
ANTITRUST CASES, 2005 EDITION, at A-4 (2005) [hereinafter MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS] 
(“Instruction 3A Rule of Reason – Overview. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a restraint of 
trade is illegal only if it is found to be unreasonable. . . . [Y]ou must first determine whether the 
plaintiff has proven that the challenged restraint has resulted in [or is likely to result in] a substantial 
harm to competition in a relevant product and geographic market. If you [do], then you must consider 
whether the restraint produces countervailing competitive benefits. If you find that it does, then you 
must balance the competitive harm against the competitive benefit.” (emphasis added)); id. at A-10 
(“3C Rule of Reason – Evidence of Competitive Benefits. . . . The defendant has the burden of 
producing evidence regarding the existence of competitive benefits, and if the defendant produces such 
evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the restraint was not reasonably necessary to 
achieve the benefits.” (emphasis added)); id. at A-12 (“3D Rule of Reason – Balancing the 
Competitive Effects. If you find that the challenged restraint was reasonably necessary to achieve 
competitive benefits, then you must balance those competitive effects against the competitive harm 
resulting from the same restraint. If the competitive harm substantially outweighs the competitive 
benefits, then the challenged restraint is unreasonable.” (emphasis added)). Comparison of the 
italicized phrases with those from the exemplars in the preceding footnotes reveals many similarities 
but also key differences, including that these instructions have both internally inconsistent and 
nonsensical aspects. Interestingly, this source also remarks in a footnote that is not part of the 
instruction itself: “In an effort to make the rule of reason instruction less confusing, it has been 
separated into four separate, but interrelated, instructions.” Id. at A-4 n.1. This statement suggests 
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step structured decision procedure27 of the sort sketched in subsection I.A.1 
and examined throughout this Article.28 (The structured rule of reason under 
discussion here should be contrasted with the use of checklists of sorts that 
serve merely to remind the decisionmaker of pertinent considerations.29) 
The main rationales offered for this structured rule of reason are to 
economize on the conduct of litigation30 and to avoid the need for difficult 
 
that the drafters do not in fact view the sequenced structure to be part of the formal legal rule but 
rather as merely an aid in communicating the essence of the rule to juries, although the drafters also 
chose to withhold this explanation, including about the interrelationships, from the jury. (The more 
recent edition of these Model Jury Instructions, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MODEL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES, 2016 EDITION (2016), is nearly identical. The only 
differences are the omission of the aforementioned note and that instruction 3C on competitive 
benefits omits mention of any burden shift to the defendant, although the notes that follow, 
seemingly not part of the instruction, do state that the defendant has a production burden in this 
regard. See id. at 8.) 
27For previous advocacy of a structured rule of reason, see William F. Baxter, The Viability of 
Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 933 (1987), and Howard H. Chang, David S. Evans & 
Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Towards Joint Ventures, 1998 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223. In the European Union’s analysis of horizontal agreements that restrain 
competition under TFEU Article 101 (formerly Article 81), there is a two-step approach (wherein 
the latter two steps outlined in this Article appear to be combined). See Guidelines on the Applicability 
of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements 
(2011/C 11/01) ¶ 20 (“The assessment under Article 101 consists of two steps. The first step, under 
Article 101(1), is to assess whether an agreement between undertakings, which is capable of affecting 
trade between Member States, has an anti-competitive object or actual or potential restrictive effects 
on competition. The second step, under Article 101(3), which only becomes relevant when an 
agreement is found to be restrictive of competition within the meaning of Article 101(1), is to 
determine the pro-competitive benefits produced by that agreement and to assess whether those 
pro-competitive effects outweigh the restrictive effects on competition.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Communication from the Commission—Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 2004 
O.J. (C 101/08), 8, ¶ 11 (same, nearly verbatim). 
28Often inquiries into market power, including determination of the relevant market, are 
included in step 1 or inserted, up front, as an additional step. This important feature will be 
abstracted from here, although it is important to emphasize that much of this Article’s criticism of 
structured decision procedures applies to this separation as well. See Louis Kaplow, On the Relevance 
of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (2017) [hereinafter Kaplow, Market Power]. In addition, the 
particular role of market definition is highly problematic regardless of how the inquiry is structured. 
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010) [hereinafter 
Kaplow, Market Definition]. 
29Cf. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“. . . I would 
not simply ask whether the restraints at issue are anticompetitive overall. Rather, like the Court of 
Appeals (and the Commission), I would break that question down into four classical, subsidiary 
antitrust questions: (1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive 
effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have sufficient 
market power to make a difference?”). Interestingly, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 
58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam)—one of the cases often cited to illustrate circuit 
courts’ adoption of a structured rule of reason (in this instance, in the monopolization context)—
introduces the listed items by describing them as “several principles,” id. at 58, even though their 
phrasing suggests a structured protocol. 
30See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at viii (“This allocation can enable courts to 
resolve cases more quickly and efficiently.”); id. at 36 (“Requiring plaintiffs to make a showing of 
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balancing,31 considerations taken to be important given the complexity of 
many antitrust cases. 
 
harm to the competitive process at the outset facilitates the disposition of non-meritorious 
claims. . . . Likewise, requiring a defendant, upon a prima facie showing of harm to the competitive 
process, to come forward with a nonpretextual justification for its conduct enables courts and juries 
to condemn patently anticompetitive conduct without any weighing of offsetting effects. These steps 
can spare courts and juries difficult questions.”). 
31See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 442 (“Because both theory and data are 
usually insufficient, and because quantification in terms of a common denominator is usually 
impossible, balancing will inevitably be crude and should be avoided unless absolutely necessary.”); 
see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(Bork, J.) (“[T]hough it is sometimes said that, in the case of restraints like these, it is necessary to 
weigh procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects, we do not think that a useable formula 
if it implies an ability to quantify the two effects and compare the values found. . . . Weighing effects 
in any direct sense will usually be beyond judicial capabilities . . . .”); id. (presenting, as an 
alternative to quantifying and balancing the supposedly noncomparable effects, that courts should 
instead “draw[] inferences from market share and structure,” noting that “[a]ntitrust adjudication 
has always proceeded through inferences about market power drawn from market shares,” but failing 
to state what is inferred (presumably anti- and procompetitive effects), how the relevant inferences 
are to be quantified, and how the thus-inferred and quantified effects are then to be weighed when 
it is said to be impossible to do so when they are known explicitly); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 370 (2016) (“‘Balancing’ requires values that can be cardinally 
measured and weighed against each other. The factors that are supposedly balanced in Sherman Act 
cases almost never fit this description. Even if the things requiring balancing did come in cardinal 
units, most times the courts would not have the tools necessary to make and apply the 
measurements.”). Paradoxically, Areeda and Hovenkamp seek to avoid balancing because of the 
insufficiency of “both theory and data,” yet seek to replace it with “tentative presumptions drawn 
from theory, experience, and the evidence at hand.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 442. 
As another means of avoidance, they later suggest: 
If possible, we would quantify the magnitude, discounted by the probability, of the 
negative harm and positive benefit in terms of statutory values and hold conduct 
reasonable when the net is positive or unreasonable when negative. Because we almost 
never know enough to do this, we must find another way. The possibilities are to rule 
generally that harm always condemns or that benefit always saves, to delegate 
balancing to the jury, or to ask the judge to make a qualitative judgment guided by 
theory and experience. In most cases, the last course is the most sensible, but even it 
has significant limitations. 
Id. at 448. Taken literally, it seems that, in cases in which a jury has found both a positive H and a 
positive B, they would have the judge then step in and perform the balance (see also id. (“Although 
juries have sometimes been left to do the balancing, this is clearly wrong.”)), which, moreover, would 
be done qualitatively, whatever that means, and, again, guided by the “theory and experience” that 
they previously stated does not exist. See also 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651e3 (4th ed. 2015) (subparagraph entitled “Balancing generally to be avoided; 
burden-shifting.”); id. at 124 (stating that “[a] burden-shifting analysis should enable courts to avoid 
‘close’ balancing in most situations,” but, as explained earlier in Section I.A, when the measurements 
required for the earlier steps are sufficiently clear that the proper outcome is obvious, the balancing 
required by step 3 would not in fact be difficult, and when the balancing would be difficult, it can 
only be avoided at the prior steps if the pertinent decision thresholds are set in ways that may often 
generate suboptimal liability determinations); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1912i 
(4th ed. 2018) (subparagraph entitled “‘Balancing’ generally to be avoided”); Rebecca Haw 
Allensworth, The Commensurability Myth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that 
antitrust law suppresses value judgments involved in comparing different types of competitive 
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Analysis.—Step 1 requires that the plaintiff show, demonstrate, or establish 
the existence of anticompetitive effects. Such language ordinarily indicates a 
burden of persuasion, which would be applicable only at the end of a trial,32 
yet these articulations are usually offered in the context of deciding motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment. As such, they would translate into a 
plaintiff ’s need, respectively, to plausibly allege and to have sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine dispute on the issue. Thus understood, this 
requirement does not depart from a plaintiff ’s general need to allege or 
produce evidence of a prima facie case under a balancing test, so it is unclear 
how the structured rule of reason differentially economizes on litigation or 
avoids difficult balancing.33 
Step 1 has differential oomph only if, in our earlier terminology, H* is set 
nontrivially above zero. Some formulations of the structured rule of reason 
suggest that this is so, notably, in demanding that demonstrated 
anticompetitive effects be substantial.34 Then, as explored in Section I.A, it 
is important to know how significant they must be, that is, how high H* is 
set. Like in most areas of law, such questions are not given quantitative 
answers, making the force of step 1 unclear. A demand of significance might 
merely convey that effects need to be nontrivial, or it could be taken to require 
much more. Even if the latter, it would only increase early terminations if the 
translation into plausible allegations or evidence requisite to create a genuine 
dispute retained significant bite. Considering another dimension, if the 
requisite significance is contextual, and the context includes some looking 
ahead to procompetitive effects—the likely magnitude of B in the case at 
hand—then we really have relaxed the structured rule, morphing it toward a 
balancing test. In any event, as explained in subsection I.B.2, it is unclear 
whether requiring that H > H* at a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment is more or less stringent than requiring H > B. 
Step 2 demands that the defendant advance a procompetitive justification 
(B) for its action. This component of the structured rule of reason is notably 
 
effects); Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and Free Speech, 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 35 (2015) (advocating balancing despite challenges relating to commensurability). 
32A burden of persuasion can also be applied at step 1 to find no liability at the close of a 
plaintiff ’s case in a bench trial. 
33This point would hold even at the very end of a trial, because, even under balancing, a judge may 
choose not to address a defendant’s procompetitive justifications if the plaintiff ’s prima facie case fails. 
34See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 62 (stating that “[t]he 
cases reflect the additional consensus that the restraint’s anticompetitive effect must be significant 
to support liability under the rule of reason,” but leaving it unclear the extent to which this 
requirement merely rules out de minimus effects or demands something more); sources quoted supra 
note 25. Note that a balancing test would impose a similar demand if a plaintiff must show that 
anticompetitive effects significantly outweighed (rather than merely outweighed) procompetitive 
effects, which is sometimes stated to be the case. 
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more mysterious, beginning with its trigger—that is, the predicate for 
shifting the burden to the defendant, which appears in virtually all 
formulations. As suggested by the analysis in subsection I.B.2, such shifting 
is moot at motions to dismiss and largely so at summary judgment and even 
at motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of a plaintiff ’s case at 
trial.35 And neither judge nor jury announces during a trial whether and when 
such a shift transpires. So step 2 can really only be operative during a 
factfinder’s deliberations, after it resolves step 1 in the plaintiff ’s favor. 
Therefore, as previously noted, any economization from the structured rule 
is at most limited to not having to address procompetitive justifications in a 
final decision. But if none are offered in any substantial manner, such would 
be easy, and if it is a close question it must be addressed in any event. In 
addition, no difficult balancing is avoided because, under unconstrained 
balancing, a factfinder who finds that anticompetitive effects have been 
demonstrated and procompetitive effects are absent will hardly find it 
arduous to balance the two. 
Suppose now that step 2 is triggered and the defendant does advance 
procompetitive justifications. Two more puzzles arise. First, in most 
formulations of the structured rule of reason, the defendant has a mere 
production burden. As will be noted momentarily, this renders obscure 
suggestions that a plaintiff must counter with less restrictive alternatives or a 
demonstration that anticompetitive effects outweigh procompetitive effects, 
for procompetitive effects have not actually been established. Also, usually 
omitted from the list is the more straightforward response of directly 
rebutting the proffered procompetitive justifications and arguing that, in any 
event, the defendant’s proffer is not sufficiently convincing. 
Second, the requisite magnitude of the proffered procompetitive 
justifications is usually not mentioned. Echoing subsection I.A.1’s analysis, 
we can ask whether they must merely be above zero, larger than some B* (and 
what is that?), or greater than the H demonstrated by the plaintiff. If the 
former—and even if they were proved (under a persuasion burden), we would 
have no idea whether they exceeded H, so it would not be clear why a plaintiff 
would then need to respond at all. One might think that, to make sense, a 
defendant could only purport to justify its action by reference to 
procompetitive effects if the B it advances exceeds H. But what then is the 
 
35See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1034-43. Keep in mind the simple point that, when a judge rules 
for the plaintiff on a defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff ’s 
case, this does not mean that the plaintiff has met its persuasion burden but only that there is a 
genuine dispute about whether this is so. Furthermore, even if the persuasion burden was announced 
to be satisfied at that point, the defense may and ordinarily does offer direct rebuttal; hence, only 
when the factfinder actually concludes, at the end of trial, that the plaintiff prevails at step 1 can any 
burden of justification be deemed to have shifted to the defendant. 
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balancing that is required in step 3? And why does everyone say that, when 
step 2 fails, we have avoided the need to make a difficult balance if step 2 is 
the very balance we sought to avoid?36 Note the tension (as well as the 
obscurity): if the B need not exceed H, then it is unclear how any burden shifts 
to the plaintiff, but if we require that B exceed H, then we have necessarily 
balanced. As best one can tell, these questions have been overlooked by all 
courts and commentators. The step 2 demand on the defendant regarding 
magnitude—what is here called the level of B*—is unknown. 
Referencing the stylized structured decision procedure presented here 
makes it obvious that one has not fully stated the rule without stating the 
thresholds, H* and B*. And, as we also saw in subsection I.A.1, as a final 
decision rule these thresholds are everything. If both are essentially zero, we 
have unconstrained balancing (even if we do not seem to notice this). And if 
they are not, various burdens are indeed higher, and, importantly, outcomes 
will differ—undesirably, on account of the deviations from pure balancing.37 
Step 3’s balancing test is clear enough. The main questions, already noted, 
concern what it means to have reached step 3. How large of an H was 
established? (Was a particular conclusion reached, or only that H > H*? If the 
latter, what was H*?) Was B merely advanced or proved? Was the plaintiff ’s 
rebuttal already considered or not? (In other words, did the factfinder, at the 
end of the trial, first ignore all the plaintiff ’s evidence on B, construe all the 
defendant’s evidence most favorably to it, and conclude that there was a 
genuine dispute on B—that is, that the production burden was met, as the 
rule asks—and only then take a separate pass at deciding whether it believes 
B? If at a bench trial, would the judge’s opinion have separate parts, following 
 
36If instead the B required in step 2 is much below H (and keeping in mind as well that the 
defendant is only said to have a production burden at step 2), how can it be that a difficult balance 
has been avoided? When the defendant cannot even muster modest evidence of a low B, just how 
difficult would the balance have been? 
37To this observer, it appears that the failure to specify the rule with precision has enabled many 
to simultaneously hold multiple views regarding the structured rule of reason that rest on 
inconsistent assumptions. Notably, in imagining that steps 1 and 2 avoid many difficult balances, it 
really must be that H* and B* are high and often decisive. But the rules are not described or 
advocated in this fashion and, if they were, it would be clear (as subsection I.A.1 elaborates) that one 
would often be recommending incorrect outcomes, which would be particularly stark at step 2 since 
one would realize, for example, that one was assigning liability when it may well be (or even is 
known) that H < B. In addition, as discussed, it seems common to state step 2 as placing only a 
production burden on the defendant whereas much discussion that follows in step 3, regarding less 
restrictive alternatives and balancing, seems to assume that the defendant has proven B. Compare 
ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 62 (requiring only a production burden), 
and id. at 77 (“[T]he defendant must produce evidence . . . .” (emphasis added)), with id. (“If the 
defendant demonstrates that the restraint produces procompetitive effects, then the plaintiff . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). And some discussions, notably on less restrictive alternatives, make sense only 
if B has been proved to exceed H, whereas the remaining need to balance presumes that no such 
comparison has taken place. 
 
1400 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1375 
the structured rule, or would this aspect of the rule be ignored—even though 
this is the only point in the proceedings at which it can matter?) Was B also 
quantified? (Above zero? B*? Or H?) Consider as well the corresponding 
questions on less restrictive alternatives, to which we will turn in a moment. 
Taking all of this together, although the meaning of balancing at step 3 is 
clear, what analysis is actually conducted in step 3 itself or earlier on is not. 
For the reasons developed in subsection I.B.1 and elaborated below, attempts 
to sort and separate information collection and assessment in any such 
prespecified manner are largely counterproductive in any event. Despite 
decades of statements—by every circuit court and some leading 
commentators—we have little idea what the structured rule of reason means 
along several basic dimensions. 
Consideration of less restrictive alternatives38 under the rule of reason 
throws another monkey wrench39 into the operation.40 Whether inserted as 
part of step 2’s consideration of B, as an additional, intermediate step after 
step 2 but before step 3’s balancing, or as a part of step 3’s balancing (but, 
regardless, generally understood to precede the act of balancing itself), we 
have the conundrum explained in subsection I.A.2 that the proper 
methodology for assessing less restrictive alternatives itself requires 
balancing: one must perform the second balance or, equivalently, the 
delta/delta test, both of which require knowing H, B, H ′ , and B ′—and thus 
all that is needed to perform the final balance. Therefore, the common 
understanding that less restrictive alternatives analysis precedes balancing 
and is a way to avoid the need to balance reflects significant confusion41 
 
38Although the language of less restrictive alternatives is commonly used, it is often said instead 
(or in addition) that the plaintiff can challenge whether the defendant’s allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct is “reasonably necessary” to achieve the procompetitive benefit, suggesting a similar sort of 
inquiry. See, e.g., sources quoted supra note 25. 
39This phrasing reflects the present focus on the structured rule of reason. Under the pure 
balancing version that seems to conform to longstanding Supreme Court precedent, less restrictive 
alternatives analysis, as difficult as it may be to conduct in practice, does not raise the problems 
noted here. See supra subsection I.A.2. 
40For more extensive analyses of less restrictive alternatives under antitrust’s rule of reason, see 
Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 561 (2009), and C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 
COLUM. L. REV. 927 (2016). Prior work has not, however, taken the perspective advanced here that 
emphasizes how the analysis of less restrictive alternatives fits into and is cast in a different light by 
other features of the structured rule of reason. 
41For example, Areeda and Hovenkamp’s reluctance to have courts engage in balancing, see supra 
note 31, leads them to urge, in one of their formulations of a structured rule of reason, that if the 
balancing step is reached, the court should revisit the previous step on less restrictive alternatives to 
see if it can get out of this predicament, apparently not appreciating that proper analysis of such 
alternatives itself requires balancing. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 445 
(“Nevertheless, any court faced with the prospect of balancing [in step 6] must go back to step 5 and 
look hard for workable less restrictive alternatives.”); see also 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
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(although sometimes less restrictive alternatives analysis is easy, particularly 
when the anticompetitive effect results from an essentially naked restraint on 
competition attached to something that is procompetitive but unrelated).42 
The failure to appreciate the analytical connection between less restrictive 
alternatives analysis and balancing43 may be attributable to never writing 
down the simple algebra of what less restrictive alternatives analysis means, a 
task that was central in framing the exploration in subsection I.A.2. 
Additional questions were already noted in connection with step 2: In 
what sense should a plaintiff be seen as required to advance less restrictive 
alternatives when the defendant’s procompetitive effect (B) was not taken to 
be proved, might be directly rebutted, and in any event was not shown to be 
greater than the anticompetitive effect (H)? It is also sometimes suggested 
that the proffered alternative must be equally effective in achieving B, 
although many formulations of antitrust’s structured rule of reason do not 
sharply address the matter.44 It may often be as hard or harder to determine 
whether the alternative is equally effective—the conceptually wrong 
question—than whether it warrants liability under the second balancing or 
delta/delta test—the right question. 
Most of the foregoing discussion of the structured rule of reason considers 
it as a final decision rule because, beyond the plaintiff ’s step 1 hurdle (which 
may or may not differ much from that under balancing), the requirements 
matter only after trial, in reaching a conclusion on whether to assign liability. 
As noted, this suggests that few economization benefits can be realized. 
Moreover, subsection I.B.1’s analysis of information gathering explains how, 
if litigation was shaped more in line with the structured rule of reason’s 
separate steps rather than guided by unconstrained balancing, most principles 
of optimal information collection would be sharply violated. 
Among them was the point that, often, evidence will bear simultaneously 
on H and on B and, indeed, its relevance may be explicitly comparative, in 
 
ANTITRUST LAW 55 (3d ed. 2012) (“[T]here is no way that a court can ‘balance’ the competitive 
benefits of apparently valuable information exchanges with the magnitude of the competitive threat. 
First and foremost, the antitrust decision maker must look for less restrictive alternatives.”). Note 
further that urging a court to keep revisiting less restrictive alternatives until it finds one implicitly 
encourages it to ultimately find for the plaintiff rather than being guided by its best attempt to 
balance harm and benefit. 
42This example can be viewed as an application of the ancillary restraint test of United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff ’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
43It is often noted and sometimes emphasized that less restrictive alternatives analysis does 
involve balancing, but I have not seen attempts to combine a precise statement of the requisite 
balancing, how it relates to the basic balancing of anti- and procompetitive effects required in step 
3, and how that interaction renders bizarre any sense that less restrictive alternatives analysis can be 
separate from and prior to the core balancing test of the rule of reason. 
44See, e.g., sources quoted supra note 25. 
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which case even thinking in separate buckets may be counterproductive. This 
point proves to be powerful in many antitrust settings because 
characterization is often a central challenge. Moreover, the most common 
definition of what counts as an exclusionary, anticompetitive practice is one 
that excludes other than by “competition on the merits.”45 When 
anticompetitive effects (H) are understood as ones that operate other than 
through procompetitive channels (B), the notion that one would either gather 
or process evidence in a sequentially siloed fashion, reaching a conclusion 
about H before even considering what B might be about, is counterproductive 
if not incoherent.46 Another major consideration is market power, central in 
many antitrust inquiries but often relevant precisely because of how it 
illuminates the relative plausibility of anti- and procompetitive 
explanations.47 Also important are some of the other principles considered in 
subsection I.B.1, such as that some of the high diagnosticity/cost evidence 
may bear particularly on B48 and that having some sense of the likely 
magnitude of B feeds back on how demanding we should be with H. 
 
45See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 166 n.6 (“All jurisdictions agree that 
unilateral conduct laws address specific conduct and its anticompetitive effects, rather than the mere 
possession of dominance/substantial market power or its creation through competition on the 
merits.”); MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 26, at C-26 to C-27; 3B PHILLIP E. AREEDA 
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 423 (4th ed. 2015); Guidance on Article 82, supra note 
23, ¶ 1 (“Article 82 . . . prohibits abuses of a dominant position. In accordance with the case-law, it 
is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant position and such a dominant 
undertaking is entitled to compete on the merits. However, the undertaking concerned has a special 
responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common 
market.”). Similarly, the test for monopolization under Section 2 defines the second element as “the 
willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development 
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (emphasis added). 
46Consider, for example, the situation in which there is a dispute about the meaning of some of the 
defendant’s internal documents, which the plaintiff claims indicate a motive to disadvantage competitors 
and thus injure competition and the defendant argues show a plan to outperform rivals, which promotes 
competition. Such disputes about interpretation, which depend on context, can only be understood by 
reference to the alternative hypotheses that each side advances. Similar analysis is applicable to inquiries 
into intent for the purposes of illuminating effects. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 
231, 238 (1918) (“The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the 
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a 
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because knowledge of 
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”). 
47Indeed, another central shortcoming in the antitrust setting is that, in addition to the sequential 
siloing of anti- and procompetitive explanations, market power analysis is in turn separated from (and 
precedes) the analysis of either H or B. See Kaplow, Market Power, supra note 28. 
48For example, in analyzing a joint venture that includes arguably ancillary restrictions on 
competition between the venturers, it may often make sense early on to consider the nature of the 
B that the venture may generate. Determining whether the competitive restrictions bear a strong 
nexus with the procompetitive benefits typically requires an appreciation of what those benefits are. 
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Law.—Consider three further angles that pertain to the state of the law. 
The first concerns the sense in which the structured rule of reason under 
discussion correctly states existing doctrine. Despite some form of the 
structured rule being articulated by every circuit court (and leading 
commentators),49 these statements are usually dicta that is rather far removed 
from the decision at hand. Most of these decisions regard motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment, where the question is whether the plaintiff has 
alleged or offered evidence to create a genuine dispute about some level of 
anticompetitive effects—step 1, period. (This may help to explain both the 
variation in formulations across cases and internal inconsistencies.50) Recall 
as well that, under a pure balancing test, the plaintiff must likewise allege 
plausible anticompetitive harm to survive a motion to dismiss or present 
sufficient evidence thereof to create a genuine dispute at summary judgment.  
Moreover, some of these statements of structured decision protocols are 
in any event followed by possibly superseding language that presents an 
unconstrained balancing test, often quoting or at least citing the Supreme 
Court. Indeed, Supreme Court precedent spanning a century presents the 
rule of reason using Chicago Board’s famous statement: “The true test of 
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress 
or even destroy competition.”51 As subsection I.A.1 explains, a structured rule 
 
49Areeda and Hovenkamp argue that, under one of their proffered formulations for a structured 
rule of reason, “the staged inquiry is particularly conducive to summary judgment motions or 
motions on the pleadings.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 445. How this is true beyond 
their preliminary steps that address the plaintiff ’s allegations, however, is mysterious. Their next 
step declares the defendant’s action illegal absent strong evidence of efficiencies, see id. at 444, but 
this, as usual, ignores that a factfinder would have to have concluded that the plaintiff ’s allegations 
of harm were true, not just that its allegations were plausible or that there was sufficient evidence to 
create a genuine dispute. 
50On the latter, it is commonly stated that step 2 places only a production burden on the 
defendant and, moreover, it is not even stated that the defendant must put forth a B as large as H, 
yet subsequent language on less restrictive alternatives or on step 3 seems to suggest that the plaintiff 
(having actually proved H) will necessarily lose if it does not meet these further obligations. See 
supra note 25. 
51246 U.S. at 238. Although this statement is a century old, it is routinely cited and quoted by 
the Supreme Court as authoritative, and modern formulations are much more consistent with it 
than with a structured rule. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 
n.10 (2010) (referring to Brandeis’s “classic formulation” of the rule of reason in Chicago Board); Cal. 
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (“[I]t seems to us that the CDA’s advertising restrictions 
might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on 
competition.”); id. at 774 (“[I]t does not obviously follow that such a ban would have a net 
anticompetitive effect here.”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992) 
(“We need not decide whether Kodak’s behavior has any procompetitive effects and, if so, whether 
they outweigh the anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak’s service and parts policy is simply 
not one that appears always or almost always to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal 
presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact. In this case, when we weigh the risk 
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of reason with real bite (one with an H* or a B* nontrivially above zero) would 
change outcomes from those under balancing, which has been consistently 
commanded by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, some skepticism seems 
applicable in attributing weight to seemingly contrary dicta, which itself is 
often accompanied by citations and quotations of the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the balancing test.52 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the 
U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies seem to follow the Supreme Court’s 
open-ended formulation rather than the structured rule of reason.53 On the 
other hand, once similar dicta appears consistently in circuit court decisions 
and is asserted by some leading commentators to state the law, it can readily 
take on a life of its own, even if it is contrary to a century of Supreme Court 
precedent and contravenes basic principles of decisionmaking and 
 
of deterring procompetitive behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior will 
go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.”); id. at 486 (“It may be that its parts, 
service, and equipment are components of one unified market, or that the equipment market does 
discipline the aftermarkets so that all three are priced competitively overall, or that any anti-
competitive effects of Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects.”); NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) (“But whether the ultimate finding is the product 
of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not 
the challenged restraint enhances competition. Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used in 
judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its impact on competition.” (footnotes omitted)); Nat’l 
Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (“From Mr. Justice Brandeis’ opinion 
for the Court in Chicago Board of Trade to the Court opinion written by Mr. Justice Powell in 
Continental T. V., Inc., the Court has adhered to the position that the inquiry mandated by the Rule of 
Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses 
competition.”). Note also that none of the leading cases associated with truncated rule of reason 
analysis, cited in note 61—one after a full trial and two after proceedings at the FTC—indicate that 
anything like the structured rule of reason has refined or supplanted Chicago Board’s balancing test. 
52See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.) 
(concluding its presentation of what appears to be a structured rule of reason with the statement: 
“Ultimately, it remains for the factfinder to weigh the harms and benefits of the challenged behavior. 
The classic articulation of how the rule of reason analysis should be undertaken is found in [Chicago 
Board], where Justice Brandeis speaking for the Supreme Court said ‘The true test . . . [quoting the 
classic statement].’ . . . It at least seems clear that the factfinder must decide the overarching question 
of whether the challenged action purports to promote or to destroy competition.”), cert. denied, 510 
U.S. 947 (1993). 
53See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 10 (2000) [hereinafter U.S. COLLABORATIONS 
GUIDELINES] (“Rule of reason analysis entails a flexible inquiry and varies in focus and detail 
depending on the nature of the agreement and market circumstances.”); id. (“Under the rule of reason, 
the Agencies’ analysis begins with an examination of the nature of the relevant agreement, since the 
nature of the agreement determines the types of anticompetitive harms that may be of concern. As 
part of this examination, the Agencies ask about the business purpose of the agreement and examine whether 
the agreement, if already in operation, has caused anticompetitive harm.” (citing Chicago Board) 
(emphasis added)). Other parts of these guidelines, however, do indicate some inclination to sequence 
the analysis. See, e.g., id. at 12 (“The Agencies do not undertake a full analysis of procompetitive 
benefits pursuant to Section 3.36 below, however, unless an anticompetitive harm appears likely.”). 
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information collection. Indeed, the Court’s recent decision in American 
Express may reflect and reinforce this transformation.54 
A second point concerns another aspect of the law in action that also relates 
to the procedural posture of decisions that purport to take place under the 
auspices of a structured rule of reason. Let’s call this the “balancing myth” 
myth: more precisely, the confusion behind the commonly advanced claim that 
balancing under the rule of reason is a myth. The core rationale for believing 
that balancing is rare is the dearth of reported cases in which balancing 
occurs.55 As mentioned, most antitrust opinions (just as in many areas of law) 
are on motions to dismiss and at summary judgment. A basic teaching of civil 
procedure is that balancing cannot occur at these stages. Under unconstrained 
balancing, one would have had to resolve factual disputes regarding both H 
and B in order to compare them, and this can only be done at the end of a trial. 
 
54See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). Three observations are in order: (1) Both 
the majority and dissent explicitly stated that both parties had agreed that the structured rule 
governed the case. See id. at 2284; id. at 2290 (Breyer, J., dissenting). (The majority, before noting 
the parties’ agreement on this framework, offers its own characterization of the rule of reason: “The 
goal is to ‘distinguis[h] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the 
consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.’” Id. at 
2284 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)).) (2) 
The formulations offered in the two opinions were subject to the various infirmities noted previously 
in this section (and in detail in various footnotes), inconsistent with each other in multiple ways, 
inconsistent with subsequent use in the opinions, and inconsistent with the authorities cited (by the 
majority) for the structured rule. (3) Much of the disagreement between the majority and dissent—
giving a two-ships-passing-in-the-night flavor to the opinions—relates to the majority invoking 
justifications for the restraint as part of step 1, which the dissent argued were properly assessed at 
later steps. See id. at 2303 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But the Court of Appeals would properly consider 
procompetitive justifications not at step 1, but at steps 2 and 3 of the ‘rule of reason’ inquiry. . . . The 
majority charts a different path. Notwithstanding its purported acceptance of the three-step, 
burden-shifting framework I have described . . . the majority addresses American Express’ 
procompetitive justifications now, at step 1 of the analysis . . . .”). Both views are puzzling since there 
had been a full trial covering all of the issues, rendering it unclear why it mattered what factors were 
part of which steps. (Relatedly, some of the dispute on whether the proper market definition 
encompassed both sides of the market or only the merchants’ side concerned whether various of the 
defendant’s arguments, referring to the cardholders’ side, had to be considered as part of step 1 rather 
than deferred to later. If American Express’s statements under the rubric of market definition are 
tantamount to requiring procompetitive features of a restraint to be assessed at step 1, the central 
holding might be restated as rejecting the essence of the structured rule of reason that the majority 
purported to follow.) To this reader, attempts to shoehorn arguments and facts into the structured 
protocol confused rather than clarified both the majority’s and the dissent’s analysis. 
55See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 40, at 951 (“Although it is commonplace to understand the rule 
of reason as a fact-intensive search for net effects, cases are seldom decided on that explicit basis. 
An extensive survey of rule of reason final judgments [referring to the articles by Carrier discussed 
in note 57] concluded that very few are decided on net-effect balancing grounds. . . . Careful 
observers have gone so far as to declare that explicit balancing is a ‘myth.’” (quoting Gavil, supra 
note 25, at 147) (footnotes omitted)); Allensworth, supra note 31, at 47-48 (similarly discussing Gavil 
and Carrier); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 38 (“[S]everal panelists and 
commentators have pointed out that, in practice, courts do not engage in the precise balancing called 
for by the effects-balancing test.”). 
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Likewise under a structured rule of reason at step 3. By contrast, these 
procedural decisions are by nature confined to step 1. 
Now, it may or may not be true that many cases would ultimately involve 
balancing (under either approach) if they reached the end of trial and 
produced complete opinions at that point. For those in which defendants 
indeed win on dispositive motions, balancing would not have occurred. For 
the rest—in which such motions are not filed or such motions are denied—we 
know that most cases settle. And for those that reach the end of trial, rule of 
reason cases are often tried to a jury and thus do not produce written opinions. 
A judicial opinion properly balancing anti- and procompetitive effects can only 
arise in the tiny—and probably quite unrepresentative—sample of completed 
bench trials that generate opinions.56 Yet commentators’ beliefs—and the 
leading studies of the question—concentrate on dispositive court opinions, 
which are almost entirely granted motions and hence, by nature, cannot have 
involved balancing; even worse, any motions that were denied are excluded 
from the sample,57 including motions that are denied because balancing seems 
 
56Even then, a judge may well reach a conclusion through explicit or implicit balancing but craft 
an opinion that suggests that the outweighed factor (say, the anticompetitive effect) was not established. 
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, in HEARINGS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT AND ANTITRUST LAW 201 (Nov. 15, 2006) (“I mean, I think [the courts] go 
backwards, and they figure out—you know, they do some kind of implicit balancing, and then they 
say—they make it easy and they say it was not an anticompetitive effect or there is no procompetitive 
efficiency rationale . . . .”); William J. Kolasky, in HEARINGS, supra, at 60 (May 1, 2007) (“But, in fact, 
when you look at the decisions, the courts never reach that final balancing stage, because they obviate 
the need for that by adjusting the degree of scrutiny that they engage in with respect to steps two and 
three [regarding procompetitive justifications and less restrictive alternatives], depending on how 
strong a showing the plaintiff makes in step one [regarding anticompetitive effects], an inquiry meet 
for the case . . . .”); Allensworth, supra note 31, at 48-50; Hemphill, supra note 40, at 951. That is, the 
extent of actual balancing can exceed what is explicit in written opinions. 
57Notably, Michael Carrier’s two studies, Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging 
the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1269 n.13, and Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An 
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (2009) [hereinafter, Carrier, 
Second Study], explicitly omit from the sample all motions that are denied. He also fails to report 
separately on the (presumably quite small) portion of his sample of dispositive opinions that are on 
the merits after a bench trial. (Carrier also drops difficult-to-categorize cases from his sample, which 
is worrisome because murkier cases may be precisely those in which competing effects are alive and 
well, thus requiring balancing.) 
Suppose, for example, that 400 cases enter the legal system. From there, 200 are subjected to 
dispositive motions of which 100 are granted. 275 (including many of the 100 denied motions) leave 
the system via settlements. Of course, many that survived motions (particularly for summary 
judgment) may have been cases that were thought likely to require balancing, and many cases may 
not have had motions (or a judge may have deferred deciding them) because there was a serious 
contest, suggesting the possibility that balancing would have been required. Now, of the remaining 
25, suppose that 20 are tried to a jury and 5 to a judge, the latter producing 5 opinions, 3 with 
balancing. By Carrier’s method, only 3 of our 105 opinions that are dispositive—just under 3%—would 
involve balancing. The conclusion reached (and accepted by others) is that balancing is rare, a myth. 
Compare this hypothetical to the introductory summary that Carrier offers in his 2009 update 
of his original study: 
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to be required.58 (It is like concluding that rain in the United States is rare 
based on an examination of measurements taken only at weather stations 
located in desserts.) 
Third—and on a different tack—under the auspices of Section 1’s rule of 
reason the Supreme Court has, over time, made some important refinements. 
Some types of acts—most importantly, horizontal price fixing—are per se 
illegal,59 and some others may be subject to a more truncated or “quick look” 
analysis60 under which anticompetitive effects may be presumed unless 
defendants can come forward with plausible procompetitive effects, which may 
then trigger a more complete (and more standard) inquiry.61 The core rationale 
 
In the first stage, the plaintiff must show a significant anticompetitive effect. The 
plaintiff ’s failure to make such a showing led to the courts’ dismissal [apparently 
counting granted summary judgments as “dismissals” and possibly some opinions at 
the end of trial] of 84% of the cases. In the second stage, the defendant must 
demonstrate a legitimate procompetitive justification; its failure to do so led to 
invalidation of the restraint in 3% of the cases. [A reader wonders if these are all at the 
end of trial, or some were on plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, with the 
defendant failing to successfully oppose regarding step 1 and also failing in its proffer 
on step 2.] If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff can show that the 
restraint is not reasonably necessary or that the defendant’s objectives could be 
achieved by less restrictive alternatives. At most, 1% of the cases were dismissed 
because the plaintiff made this showing [presumably “dismissed” here refers both to 
the end of a trial and to a finding of liability]. Only after the completion of these three 
stages does the court balance anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. Balancing 
occurred in 4% of the cases [with no indication of what percentage they were of the 
presumably few cases yielding opinions at the end of trials]. 
Carrier, Second Study, supra, at 827. 
58The latter would be atypical because, as explained earlier in this section, even motions for 
summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law most often will focus on step 1. Hence, B 
will not be on the table, making balancing even further removed. Moreover, under unconstrained 
balancing, it is likewise true that balancing can only be done at the end of a trial. 
59See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
60The initial mode of analysis is often determined by categorical rules, a type considered briefly 
in the application to constitutional law in Part IV. On the optimal design of rules of this type in 
general, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992), 
and for different views on appropriate categorization in this antitrust application, see C. Frederick 
Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999); 
Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead 
of “Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason,” 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215 (2006); Daniel A. Crane, Rules 
Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007); Yannis Katsoulacos 
& David Ulph, On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy: A General Welfare-Based Analysis, 
57 J. INDUS. ECON. 410 (2009); and Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis 
in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008). 
61See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999) (“As the 
circumstances here demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints 
that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more 
detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the 
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”). 
 
1408 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1375 
is that, for categories of activity that are nearly always anticompetitive overall, 
it saves resources simply to deem the act illegal or to presume illegality but 
allow rebuttal. Such rules and reasoning fit well with both balancing and the 
structured rule of reason. In either case, if there is a basis for presuming both 
the presence of H and the absence of B, liability would follow. 
An interesting feature of these rules for present purposes is that, if a 
presumption of liability (however strong) is to be overcome, the primary basis 
for doing so involves an assessment of whether the procompetitive benefit (B) 
might be significant rather than negligible or nonexistent.62 Under 
unconstrained balancing, subsection I.B.1 instructs that one should examine 
information in whatever order makes sense in light of what is currently known 
and the diagnosticity/cost ratio of further clumps of information that one 
might examine. In a realm where preliminary indications are that H is 
significant and B is likely to be zero or nearly so, expecting the defendant to 
offer something substantial on B to warrant further analysis would often 
appear sensible. Relatedly, merely questioning H would seem insufficient to 
change the decision in most cases given a strong presumption that H is 
present, as long as no B is visible on the horizon. It is also notable that, if a 
significant B does appear in the offing, the underlying basis for H is then open 
to reconsideration.63 Thus, it appears that courts, when deciding whether a 
 
62See, e.g., U.S. COLLABORATIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 53, at 10-11 (“Alternatively, where 
the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the agreement, or anticompetitive 
harm has resulted from an agreement already in operation, then, absent overriding benefits that could 
offset the anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed market 
analysis.” (footnotes omitted)); Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859, 
861 (1989) (“The first issue to address is whether the conduct is inherently suspect. . . . If the conduct 
is inherently suspect, then the issue becomes the existence of efficiency justifications.”). The nature 
of the defendant’s burden regarding B under various formulations is not entirely clear. It matters, of 
course, how large a B must be advanced (perhaps compared to the presumed or typical H, the actual 
H not having been assessed) and how strong the demonstration thereof must be (plausibly alleged? 
meeting a production burden?) to trigger a full(er) rule of reason analysis under a quick look. Part of 
the difficulty in this regard reflects the heterogeneity of practices. Sometimes procompetitive 
justifications may be fairly apparent given the nature of a restraint, but other times it may require 
significant evidence to overcome the presumption concerning an absence of much B. 
63On one hand, to the extent that a strong initial presumption, supposedly drawn from 
experience, simply vanishes once a prospective B is advanced with some force seems hard to justify, 
although one should consider evidence bearing on H in the case at hand in light of that preexisting 
knowledge regarding what H is normally like in such cases. There is an important, particular reason 
that stronger belief in a significant B may erode confidence in H, concerning the aforementioned 
frequent interdependency between the two. If a practice usually causes only H and no B, then the 
absence of any evidence establishing B reinforces the presumption about H, whereas if we are 
convinced that a defendant’s action is profitable to it because of the large B that it generates, we are 
accordingly less suspicious that the reason for its action must have been H, here, the anticompetitive 
effects. This reasoning underlies part of the Supreme Court’s rationale in Cal. Dental. See 526 U.S. 
at 771-73 (“The case before us, however, fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious. . . . Whereas [Justice Breyer in his dissent] accepts, 
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practice should be deemed illegal with only a limited inquiry, do 
appropriately take a more flexible approach regarding the order in which 
information on H and on B is considered.64 A broader lesson of subsection 
I.B.1 is that such flexibility is often quite valuable, but tends to be stifled if 
structured information protocols guide the conduct of litigation (which, as 
subsection I.B.2 explains, they largely do not).65 
Before leaving this subject, it must be noted that much of what is 
described here, and in the next section, reflects understandable challenges in 
resolving antitrust cases that often involve highly complex factual disputes, 
including battles of experts, often regarding practices and industries with 
which the courts have little experience. Moreover, a federal district judge will 
often have never heard such a case before, so the task of deciding motions, 
managing discovery, conducting a trial, and reaching a decision (if it is a 
bench trial) will be daunting. And the challenges facing lay juries are even 
larger, which in turn motivates greater judicial control that itself is fraught. 
The comparative advantage of specialized agencies and possibilities for 
reform of the litigation process seem particularly apposite.66 
 
as the Ninth Circuit seems to have done, that the restrictions here were like restrictions on 
advertisement of price and quality generally . . . , it seems to us that the CDA’s advertising 
restrictions might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at 
all on competition. The restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising are, at least on 
their face, designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking 
disparities between the information available to the professional and the patient. . . . The existence 
of such significant challenges to informed decisionmaking by the customer for professional services 
immediately suggests that advertising restrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading or 
irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic 
horizontal agreements to limit output or price competition.” (footnotes omitted)). 
64Another dimension of flexibility concerns how much inquiry is required before concluding 
that a per se or “quick look” mode of analysis is appropriate, in lieu of a full rule of reason assessment. 
See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26 (“Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market 
conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
65A central question under these related doctrines concerns the procedural stage and the 
structuring of litigation. For example, if it is only determined at the end of trial whether the 
defendant’s evidence on B is sufficient to warrant a full rule of reason analysis, does the plaintiff 
then lose unless, from the complaint through discovery and expert reports and trial, it had 
undertaken to do everything necessary to prevail under a full rule of reason? Or do we then start 
again, beginning with an amended complaint or, if the allegations were present in the alternative 
(which they often are), with a new round of discovery and so forth? Some commentators have 
recognized this problem and suggested a form of bifurcation to address it. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 31, ¶ 1914d2. 
66See, e.g. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION 
REPORT: THE STATE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 17-19 (2017) (suggesting that the 
enforcement agencies consider innovation in the conduct of adjudication in federal court, such as 
through restructuring litigation and using court-appointed magistrates and experts); F.M. Scherer, 
Making the Rule of Reason Analysis More Manageable, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (1987) (calling for the 
restructuring of litigation, such as through limitations on discovery and the use of preliminary expert 
reports to narrow issues). 
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B. Mergers 
A significant domain of antitrust law involves the review of horizontal 
mergers, which are governed by a similar framework in much of the world.67 
On its face, the law states a straightforward balancing test, asking whether a 
proposed merger would substantially lessen competition (focusing in this 
section on the formulation in the United States).68 As implemented by antitrust 
agencies and courts, however, the law in action can usefully be understood, at 
least in some respects, as a structured decision procedure. In particular, both 
agency guidelines and court opinions examine H and B sequentially, and it 
often appears that this is more than merely for the convenience of presentation: 
the consideration of H seems to be undertaken without regard to what might 
be thought about the level of B in a particular case. 
More specifically, one can view merger analysis as adhering to the sort of 
three-step regimen outlined in subsection I.A.1. At step 1, even though 
horizontal mergers generally create at least some incentive to raise prices by 
eliminating the direct competition between the merging parties, most 
mergers are not challenged because the predicted price increase is not 
regarded to be large enough.69 That is, even though H > 0, H ≤ H*. One of 
the rationales for this hurdle is that most mergers are regarded to generate at 
least some efficiency benefits.70 
 
67See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010) [hereinafter U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES]; Guidelines on the Assessment of 
Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 
2004 O.J. (C 31) 5. 
68Clayton Act Section 7 refers to cases in which “the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. Sherman Act 
Section 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1, also formally covers mergers and does not have a specific demand that effects 
be “substantial.” See supra Section A (discussing Sherman Act Section 1, where the rule of reason is 
the governing principle and varying specifications of a structured version may but do not always 
mention that anticompetitive effects need to be substantial or that they substantially outweigh 
procompetitive ones). Language in the U.S. Merger Guidelines is inconsistent as to whether there 
is a substantiality requirement. Compare U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 1 (“The 
Agencies seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary 
interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral.” (emphasis added)), 
with id. at 2 (“The Agencies consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the 
central question of whether a merger may substantially lessen competition.” (emphasis added)). 
69For example, from 2003 to 2012, among mergers sizeable enough to require reporting in the 
United States, second requests were issued in 3.1% of the cases and 60% of those generated some 
form of opposition. See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 9-10 (2015). 
70See, e.g., U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 29 (“[A] primary benefit of mergers to 
the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s 
ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced 
service, or new products.”). Relatedly, if efficiency benefits are at least in part passed on to 
customers, then the net effect of the merger may not be to increase price. 
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Yet at step 2 efficiency defenses are rarely deemed adequate. This, in turn, 
suggests that, at least de facto, there is a B* that substantially exceeds zero. 
Finally, at step 3, which is only reached if there are cognizable efficiencies, a 
balancing test is conducted to determine whether to permit or prohibit71 the 
merger.72 Even when step 3 is not stated as distinct from step 2, as long as 
there is a significant threshold, B*, we have in essence a three-step protocol 
(depending on the manner in which B* is set, as elaborated below). 
This section will examine the basis for setting H* and B* as high as they 
seem to be and the apparent sequential siloing of the analysis of 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. As we should expect from the 
analysis in Part I, these questions are intimately related from the perspective 
of optimal system design. 
More recently, an explicit rationale for step 1 of the current structure 
(which has been present much longer) has emerged. Because many proposed 
mergers are filed and they are generally regarded to generate nontrivial 
efficiencies—but these efficiencies are thought to be hard to quantify in 
individual cases73—it is suggested to be convenient to essentially assign 
prospective mergers an “efficiency credit,” that is, a sort of presumptive B.74 
 
71“Prohibit”—a term used loosely in the text—actually means, in many jurisdictions including 
the United States, for an agency, a decision to seek an injunction in court to stop the merger or, for 
the court, to grant the injunction. 
72The common denominator is often taken to be consumer welfare. See, e.g., U.S. MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 2 (“Regardless of how enhanced market power likely would be 
manifested, the Agencies normally evaluate mergers based on their impact on customers.”); id. at 
30-31 (“The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and 
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. To make 
the requisite determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be 
sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by 
preventing price increases in that market.” (footnotes omitted)). 
73See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An 
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., Jan. 2010, art. 9, 1, 10 
(“[M]erger-specific efficiencies are often very hard to predict, even for the firms themselves but 
especially for antitrust agencies and courts . . . .”); Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, 
Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies 
Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23 (1993). For work addressing the incorporation of efficiencies into 
merger analysis, see, for example, William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines 
and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207 
(2003); Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years, 
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729 (1999); Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years 
After, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485 (1999). 
74This idea was articulated in Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Merger Policy and Enforcement at the 
Antitrust Division: The Economist’s View, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 109, 112 (1985) (“I should preface this 
discussion by saying that the very existence of ‘safe harbor’ Herfindahls in the Guidelines already 
implies a ‘standard deduction’ for efficiencies. Such a standard deduction is implicit in a policy that 
allows mergers that increase concentration to some extent, even without a showing of any efficiency 
gains. Alternatively, the parties can choose to itemize efficiencies, rather than just take the standard 
deduction, by presenting an explicit efficiency defense.”). Much later, it was elaborated in Louis 
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Once that is done, the step 1 examination of H considers not whether it 
exceeds zero but whether it exceeds the level of that credit. If we call that 
credit H*, the step 1 test becomes H > H*. 
Under this rationale, if a case passes step 1 it would not make sense in step 
2 to ask merely whether B > 0, because the merging parties have already been 
credited with a B that substantially exceeds zero. So we instead ask whether 
B > B*. Moreover, given the stated rationale, it might seem that B* should 
equal H*. Or one might set B* somewhat above H* on the ground that, unless 
efficiencies are nontrivially greater than the credit, it is not worth the effort 
to assess them.75 
Note that, even though efficiencies are regarded to be important and 
commonplace, the implication of the efficiency credit at step 1 is that step 2 
will often fail to find efficiencies because the search is for above-average 
efficiencies, not just any efficiencies. Yet this observation alone seems 
insufficient to explain why efficiencies are rarely said to be found (even 
though routinely proffered by the merging parties). After all, if B* measures, 
say, average efficiencies, one might have thought that we would have B > B* 
in roughly half the cases.76 Furthermore, in order to avoid too many false 
 
Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1162-69 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007), and applied, notably, in Farrell & Shapiro, supra 
note 73, at 9-11; see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss 
Analysis: Response, CPI ANTITRUST J., Feb. 2010, at 1, 5-6 (further elaborating the ideas in a spirit 
suggestive of some of the analysis that follows here). Due to the latter writings (and reflecting in 
part that Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro were, respectively, the chief economists at the FTC and 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice at the time of the 2010 revisions to the U.S. 
Merger Guidelines), this way of thinking about the issue has become more widespread. See, e.g., 
Hovenkamp, supra note 31, at 379-81. Nevertheless, it remains an unofficial rationale, not articulated 
as such in the cases or the Guidelines as a central explanation for why such a high demand is placed 
on the demonstration of H even though horizontal mergers, particularly larger ones (most of which 
are not prohibited), generate at least some nontrivial unilateral incentive to increase prices due to 
diminished competitive pressure (as well as sometimes making coordinated price elevation more 
likely). More relevant for present purposes, prior examination of the efficiency credit idea has not 
fully elaborated its connection to the underlying structured decision procedure nor related it to the 
analysis of optimal information collection, which are the focuses here. 
75For elaboration, see note 76. 
76Due to administrative costs, it may be optimal in such a framework to ignore further 
demonstrations of efficiencies by the merging parties unless they exceed the credited level by more 
than a small amount. (Likewise, anticipating an argument later in this section, it may be optimal to 
ignore demonstrations by the government that efficiencies are below this level unless they fall short 
by some notable degree.) See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount 
of Losses Is Costly, 19 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 139 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 195-98, 206-09 (1996). However, 
particularly for large mergers, where the costs of collecting and analyzing information may be fairly 
small relative to the stakes, this sort of adjustment may be secondary. More broadly, the optimal 
setting of an efficiency credit is not the correct framing; rather, the principles of optimal information 
collection sketched in subsection I.B.1 should, from the outset, guide how decisions are made both 
on whether and what information to collect next and how to decide the case, as elaborated below. 
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negatives—failures to prohibit mergers for which H > B—it might be thought 
optimal to set H*, and thus B*, at a below-average level, in which case step 2 
findings of B > B* would be even more common. 
In any event, the appropriate magnitude of what is referred to here as B* 
has not been as fully elaborated as the general notion of an efficiency credit, 
which focuses on step 1. Regarding the optimal setting of B*, the analysis in 
subsection I.A.1, focusing on structured decision procedures as final decision 
rules, suggests that equating B* and H* has some appeal. But it was seen to 
be even more sensible to set B* equal to the H determined in step 1, which 
converts step 2 into the ultimate balancing test.77 
The analysis in Part I as a whole should lead us to be skeptical of this 
protocol, both the setting of significant thresholds, H* and B*, and the 
sequencing that involves first examining H and then, only if it exceeds some 
H*, turning to B. In addition to infirmities as a final decision rule taking the 
information set as given, information is not in general optimally collected in 
this fashion. We also saw that there is an intimate interrelationship between 
optimal information collection and optimal decisionmaking. 
One way to see these points is to consider how high to set H* and B*. 
Should the efficiency credit be the same in all cases? (And is it, say, $1,000,000 
or $100,000,000? Or is it a common percentage, perhaps of sales? What 
percentage?) Should it vary by industry? (Perhaps different for hospital 
mergers and mergers of wireless communication systems?) Or more specifically 
by the merger itself? (Perhaps some horizontal mergers in a given industry have 
partial overlap but also substantial complementarity compared to others?) 
In light of such questions, it seems difficult not to look at least somewhat 
at the particular merger under review. At this point, however, a reviewing 
agency would be examining some information about B in order to set the 
efficiency credit, H*—before examining H. This, in turn, leads naturally to 
the question of how much information on B should be collected in the first 
pass. The answer should depend in rough terms on the diagnosticity/cost ratio 
of what additional information on B might be gathered, so in some cases the 
best answer might be very little and in others much more. Note also that, the 
more one sets an H* based on actual case information about B, the more the 
 
Of central relevance to efficiencies in particular is the diagnosticity/cost ratio of the best information 
not yet collected. The greater the value of that information, the greater is the range over which the 
information should be collected. If instead one is constrained to a structured decision protocol, a 
lower efficiency credit would tend to be desirable the smaller are typical efficiencies and the less 
costly they are to learn more about. 
77In any case, considered solely as a decision rule, it is not optimal to set B* above H and, 
relatedly, above H* (because then there is a range of H, H* < H < B*, in which it is possible that the 
wrong decision will be made—in particular, prohibiting the merger when H* < H < B ≤ B*). 
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three-step protocol dissolves into unconstrained balancing, as will be 
elaborated below.78 
But one should also compare the value of further information on B to that 
regarding H. That is, there is no optimal stopping point on B, in a vacuum. 
Instead, as described in subsection I.B.1, the diagnosticity/cost ratio of the 
next best available information on B should be compared to that on H. When 
the latter is higher, we should switch to H. And we should not then proceed, 
until some endpoint, on H, but rather switch back to B when that is the 
subject of the next most valuable clump of information that we might collect. 
We also learned to be skeptical of the implicit assumption that 
information on H and on B is distinct. First, some information pertains to 
both. Second, when one accounts for information collection synergies, it 
usually makes sense to clump information by source rather than by issue. 
Also, it will often make sense to proceed in parallel in light of time limits for 
agency review. 
Interestingly, for horizontal mergers, more of the information separates 
into H and B than is true in some other settings. The reason is that 
anticompetitive effects are concerned with the merging parties’ competitive 
interactions, the nature of consumer demand, and so forth, whereas 
countervailing efficiencies often involve production technology and how well 
the two firms’ operations might mesh. That said, there may be overlap 
between H and B because combining the firms’ operations may have 
implications for how customers are served, which may influence competitive 
interaction,79 and because considerations of entry that are relevant to 
anticompetitive effects often depend on the sorts of technological 
considerations that may inform the analysis of efficiencies.80 
And there are other reasons that the two issues can be interdependent, 
including the important generic point regarding motivation: the parties are 
ordinarily presumed to expect to profit by their proposed merger, so much 
information seemingly on only H or only B relates to both. If anticompetitive 
effects seem large, they can motivate a merger that generates few, if any 
efficiencies (or even generates diseconomies), whereas if they seem low, then 
 
78Relatedly, it does not seem sensible to expend substantial effort, within an agency or in court, to 
engage in an elaborate contest about the correct level of B to impute, without regard to the facts of the 
case, rather than simply to do the best one can to assess what facts exist about the actual level of B. 
79Consider, for example, a merger of two hospitals in the same region. Often, the closer they 
are geographically, the greater will be the diminution in competition but the more plausible will be 
productive synergies. For example, if they plan to combine two departments—eliminating one and 
expanding the other—this suggests that patients at the former may now use the latter, which may 
more broadly indicate that the two hospitals are close competitors for other services as well. 
80For example, if two large firms claim that their merger will generate significant economies of 
scale that would tend to suggest that their increased incentive to raise prices will not readily be 
countered by new entrants that may need to start small for a substantial period of time. 
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the merger is more likely to be motivated by proffered efficiencies. 
Conversely, if efficiencies seem large, they readily motivate a merger without 
anticompetitive effects, whereas if they seem negligible (or there are 
diseconomies), then the merger is more likely to be motivated by 
anticompetitive effects.81 
Taking all of these considerations together, it appears that it would often 
be optimal to analyze a prospective merger in a flexible manner that 
sometimes alternated the collection of information about H and about B and 
often collected information that bears both on H and on B. And, following 
the analysis of subsection I.B.1, all of the information in hand, at each point—
whether on H or on B or on both—should be used in deciding what to do 
next: collect more information (and what that would be) or make a decision 
(to permit or prohibit the merger). 
When this is done, there is obviously no sequential siloing of H and B. 
Nor are there distinct thresholds, H* and B*. Rather, along the way, an 
agency’s estimates of both H and B are continually revised, and those 
estimates, the information in hand, and what can be expected to be learned 
from further investigation, all determine whether and how to proceed. If at 
some point it seems fairly certain that H substantially exceeds B, a decision 
not likely to be altered in light of additional information that might be 
collected, it is optimal to stop and prohibit the merger. If instead B clearly 
exceeds H, then the agency should stop and allow the merger. If the matter is 
closer and, in particular, any tentative view may plausibly be overturned by 
what one may learn from further investigation at a reasonable cost, then 
information collection should continue. 
One suspects that, despite declarations in formal agency guidance 
documents or by courts to the contrary, this more flexible approach is closer 
to what agencies actually do.82 In particular, if they become convinced that 
 
81Put more precisely, the domain of possible mergers involves some joint distribution of the H 
and B that they would generate. Even if those distributions were independent, we are also supposing 
that only mergers that generate positive expected profits would be proposed, which in general would 
create dependence because H (anticompetitive effects, generally resulting from the ability to charge 
higher prices) and B (efficiencies) are both sources of profit. Furthermore, even if we incorporated 
possible managerial (agency) and behavioral phenomena, such jointness would plausibly exist and 
have the character presented in the text. 
82See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES 
COMMENTARY] (“The ordering of these elements in the Guidelines, however, is not itself 
analytically significant, because the Agencies do not apply the Guidelines as a linear, step-by-step 
progression that invariably starts with market definition and ends with efficiencies or failing assets. 
Analysis of efficiencies, for example, does not occur ‘after’ competitive effects or market definition 
in the Agencies’ analysis of proposed mergers, but rather is part of an integrated approach.”). The 
Commentary’s general description appears to be borne out in its extensive section on efficiencies. 
See id. at 49-59. 
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H ≤ B, they are likely to stop and allow the merger. Note also that firms 
seeking to merge provide substantial information to the agencies up front, 
more than is formally required, and include significant information on 
efficiencies in mergers that the proponents fear might be challenged. That is, 
the decisionmaker has some information on B to begin with. In addition, 
through formal and informal means, agencies press on these proffers and 
gather further information on whatever fronts they expect to be helpful. 
Return now to the notion of an efficiency credit. The foregoing indicates 
that this may best be viewed less as a prespecified H* than as something more 
like a stand-in for the current estimate (guesstimate) of the actual B in the 
merger at hand. Under this interpretation, however, the step 1 test of whether 
H > H* (with H* as the efficiency credit) has morphed into a running inquiry 
into whether H > B, the unconstrained balancing test. 
Suppose instead that one has not yet looked at B, or not very much, so 
that H* more comports with the original credit notion. Another question to 
ask is why—in addition to allowing the merging parties in step 2 to establish 
that B is unusually high (greater than the credit)—we should not also let the 
agency establish that B is unusually low (much smaller than the credit). As 
mentioned, merging parties often make proffers at the outset regarding 
efficiencies. When this information directly suggests that efficiencies are 
smaller than average or when the parties claim otherwise but are not credible, 
such a downward adjustment is natural. For example, if most of the proffered 
efficiencies can fairly obviously be achieved without the merger, why not 
impute a very low degree of efficiencies, that is, set a low H*, thereby reducing 
the burden regarding the demonstration of H? In addition, as explained, an 
optimally designed information gathering process will, at points, collect 
further information on B along the way—either because that is the next best 
information to collect or because B is illuminated by information that bears 
jointly on H and B. That information should then be employed, including the 
possibility that it suggests an unusually low B and hence does not require as 
high of an H to justify a challenge. 
This approach would not help the agency if H* is set high initially, the 
H > H* test fails, and it never gets to step 2. Instead it would wish, 
preemptively, to be able to show that B is probably low, which would lower 
H*, making step 1 easier to pass. In practice, an agency, internally, is free to 
do so. In court, if it was thought that the structured decision procedure stated 
the law, there may be a greater problem, although the agency could urge the 
court to appropriately set H* at a low level, using the evidence on the low B 
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to influence that calibration (keeping in mind that the magnitude of H* is not 
actually specified in the merger guidelines or in court decisions).83 
A final point to consider is the tendency of merger guidelines and practice 
to be highly skeptical of claimed efficiencies. For example, the U.S. Merger 
Guidelines relegate efficiencies to a modest section near the end, and the 
topic sentences introducing three key points begin as follows: “The Agencies 
credit only those efficiencies . . . .” “Efficiencies are difficult to verify and 
quantify . . . .” “Efficiency claims will not be considered if . . . .”84 This 
skepticism might to some extent rationalize the efficiency credit, which, in 
the form described above, requires both the belief that efficiencies are 
commonplace and often significant85 and also that this belief should be 
embodied in a large credit that usually sticks (in the sense that it is not 
superseded in step 2). 
Recall that a key feature of the value of information noted in subsection 
I.B.1 concerns diagnosticity: the ability of additional information to resolve 
 
83The U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, § 5.3, employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (“HHI”), a derivative of market shares, which requires market definition, presented in id., 
§ 4. For the courts, the most relevant case is Philadelphia Bank, known for its so-called structural 
presumption. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (“[A] merger which 
produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a 
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen 
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that 
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”). This presumption likewise speaks of 
market shares, which require market definition. These market share threshold tests, however, do not 
speak to the pertinent competitive effects. See Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the 
Conflation of Empirical Assessments and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 243 
(2011). Moreover, the market definition concept on which they rely is incoherent. See Kaplow, Market 
Definition, supra note 28; Louis Kaplow, Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS. 
ORG. 107 (2011). As explained in those sources, the only plausible way to even think about choosing 
a market definition requires having in hand an estimate of the effects, the very thing that the market 
definition and resulting market shares were meant to be a partial proxy for in the first place. Another 
difficulty with Philadelphia Bank’s structural presumption is that it is, as commonly understood, only 
a presumption. Its strength, when faced with inevitable attempts at rebuttal, is obscure. 
Nevertheless, all of this apparatus, to varying degrees, appears to influence courts, particularly in 
light of their self-perceived limitations in attempting to ascertain the pertinent effects. 
84See, e.g., U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 30. 
85This view is controversial. Compare Sandra Betton, B. Espen Eckbo & Karin S. Thorburn, 
Corporate Takeovers, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 289 (B. Espen Eckbo 
ed., 2008) (survey indicating that the combined value of merging firms increases), id. at 296 (“[W]e 
show that the value-weighted sum of announcement-induced three-day abnormal stock return to 
bidders and targets is significantly positive. This conclusion holds for the entire sample period 1980–
2005 as well as for each of the five-year subperiods.”), and id. at 389-99 (explaining how a number 
of types of evidence are inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis), with Lars-Hendrik Röller, Johan 
Stennek & Frank Verboven, Efficiency Gains from Mergers, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: DO 
WE NEED AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE? 84, 112 (Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn eds., 
2006) (concluding that “there seems to be no support for a general presumption that mergers create 
efficiency gains”). See also Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 1152-57 (surveying empirical evidence 
on the effects of mergers). 
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uncertainty about a matter. High diagnosticity has two prerequisites: that 
there is significant uncertainty to begin with, and that the information that 
might be collected would materially reduce that uncertainty. For merger 
efficiencies, the former is often regarded to be true but the latter might be 
doubted, at least in many settings. When that is so, it may be that agencies 
and courts can do little better than positing a guesstimate and, typically, 
sticking with it. 
That said, it is not clear how universal this inscrutability problem is, that 
it justifies a significant credit that should rarely be questioned and then in 
only one direction (upward, as advocated by the merging parties), or that 
efficiencies are nearly always so much harder to estimate than are 
anticompetitive effects. Starting with the first two points, certainly some 
assessment is possible in many cases.86 For example, there is often significant 
attention to whether efficiencies are “merger-specific,” the term used for those 
that cannot readily be achieved by the less restrictive alternative of forgoing 
the merger and instead making other arrangements, often contractual.87 
There are significant difficulties, many relating to subtleties in the analysis in 
the field that economists refer to as contract theory and its particular 
application to the theory of the firm.88 To suggest part of the problem, it is 
easy to imagine that just about anything done by merger might be 
accomplished by sufficiently elaborate contracting, but by similar logic it is 
not clear why firms as such need to exist in the first place. Relatedly, firms 
are sometimes described as a nexus of contracts,89 further blurring the 
distinction between a firm and mere contracting. 
 
86Indeed, the U.S. Merger Guidelines themselves suggest that this is so. See U.S. MERGER 
GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 31 (“The Agencies have found that certain types of efficiencies are 
more likely to be cognizable and substantial than others. For example, efficiencies resulting from 
shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the merging firms to 
reduce the incremental cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verification and are 
less likely to result from anticompetitive reductions in output. Other efficiencies, such as those 
relating to research and development, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible 
to verification and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those 
relating to procurement, management, or capital cost, are less likely to be merger-specific or 
substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons.”). The agencies’ commentary offers a number 
of examples from past cases. See U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES COMMENTARY, supra note 82, at 49-
59. 
87See U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 30 & n. 13. 
88For elaboration and citations, see Kaplow & Shapiro, supra note 74, at 1164. The Nobel Prize 
in economics was recently awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström for work in this domain. 
See PRIZE COMM. OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACAD. OF SCI., CONTRACT THEORY: SCIENTIFIC 
BACKGROUND ON THE SVERIGES RIKSBANK PRIZE IN ECONOMIC SCIENCES IN MEMORY OF 
ALFRED NOBEL 2016 (2016). 
89See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976). 
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Another part of the challenge is practical, which also relates to the third 
point. To the extent that antitrust agencies, over time, have been staffed with 
teams of industrial organization economists who specialize in the analysis of 
anticompetitive effects, and not with teams of experts in business 
organization, operations, and the like, they might find it easier to assess H 
than B. Perhaps greater diversification of in-house staff and expanded use of 
industry experts to analyze particular cases would be helpful in this regard.90 
Moreover, as is familiar, even with existing expertise it is quite difficult to 
predict H in any event, further calling into question the view that it should 
pretty much always be assumed that H is more readily illuminated through 
further investigation than is B.91 Finally, there is the potential (at least 
sometimes, and often enough to be worthwhile) to illuminate merger effects 
through the examination of the parties’ internal documents, not only relating 
to the merger process itself but also, and perhaps less subject to manipulation, 
previous analysis and planning (documents prepared in the ordinary course 
of business). Such information may bear on H, on B, or on both. 
In sum, it seems hard to rationalize a fairly rigid structured decision 
procedure for the assessment of horizontal mergers of the sort that appears on 
the surface to govern merger review. One suspects that, in practice, agencies 
are more flexible, and perhaps they could be even more so. Their professed 
skepticism about establishing efficiencies may in part be strategically 
motivated: once the agency concludes that H > B in a particular case, when it 
goes to court it may hope that the tribunal will be skeptical of the parties’ 
 
90Some say that a difficulty arises “because much of the information relating to efficiencies is 
uniquely in the possession of the merging firms.” U.S. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 30. 
This feature may justify demands that the merging parties produce such information, but in many 
areas of law (such as negligence in torts) this is true but is not seen either to justify a large credit or 
to then be reluctant to adjust it. Moreover, many sorts of efficiencies might best be gauged by broader 
industry experience, which might be understood by industry consultants outside the merging firms. 
Ironically, much of the information on anticompetitive effects is also in the merging firms’ possession, 
but we do not deem this to be a reason to refrain from analyzing them as best we can. 
91The U.S. Merger Guidelines most explicit methodology, which uses the hypothetical 
monopolist test to define markets and then make inferences from the market shares therein, is 
extremely problematic. See sources cited supra note 83. Merger simulation techniques have become 
increasingly more sophisticated but require data that is not always available and may be sensitive to 
structural assumptions that are difficult to confirm. Internal documents and opinions of industry 
participants and experts can often be illuminating but, as noted in the text, these sources may often 
clarify efficiencies as well. The main qualification is that large buyers may have a good sense of 
pricing incentives but not of the internal operations of the merging parties. 
Interestingly, concerns about coordinated effects (that a merger may facilitate coordinated 
oligopolistic price elevation) that once dominated merger analysis have receded to a substantial 
degree, reflecting in no small part the difficulty of predicting them in convincing ways. It is not 
obvious that the result is desirable, and it is ironic to reject most or all of such challenges because of 
an implicit imputation of a significant efficiency credit that is in large part justified (and made largely 
immune from refutation by the agencies) by the difficulty of determining the actual magnitude of 
efficiencies in a given case. 
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claims that B is much larger. Of course, it also hopes that the tribunal will be 
skeptical of the defendants’ suggestion that H is much smaller.92 
As discussed in the preceding section on antitrust’s rule of reason, non-
expert judges,93 some of whom may be hearing the first (and last) merger case 
of their careers, face steep challenges in deciding these complex matters. 
Strong presumptions are thus appealing to them, both in reaching decisions 
and in justifying their conclusions in written opinions. Ideally, we would like 
judges to be skeptical of but thoughtful about both sides’ claims about H and 
B, enjoining the truly undesirable mergers but not others. That is a tall order, 
but, as the present analysis suggests, it is hardly obvious that it is aided rather 
than confounded by a structured decision procedure, particularly when 
neither H* nor B* is articulated and hence must implicitly be set by the judge 
in the course of deciding the case. 
III. TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT 
The structured decision rule for Title VII disparate impact cases94 is in 
§ 703(k), added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established 
under this subchapter only if—(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a 
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate 
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the 
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or (ii) the 
 
92See supra note 83 (discussing Philadelphia Bank’s structural presumption, the U.S. Merger 
Guidelines, and problems with the use of market definition and market share to assess 
anticompetitive effects). Outsiders to antitrust may wonder why the agencies’ guidelines (which are 
not regulations and do not even purport to bind the agencies themselves) are so influential on courts. 
Among the central reasons are judges’ appreciation of their need for guidance, the absence of 
substantive Supreme Court merger decisions for nearly a half century (during which time the 
Court’s direction in other areas of antitrust has shifted, casting doubt on the extent to which the old 
merger cases should be regarded as good law), and the broad respect the U.S. Merger Guidelines 
have commanded among antitrust practitioners and academics. 
93Merger cases involve the government seeking an injunction (usually a preliminary injunction 
that, if granted, may lead the parties to abandon the merger) and thus are decided by judges. 
94This Part focuses exclusively on the structured decision procedure for disparate impact cases. 
Disparate treatment cases also have a structured protocol, and one that bears some similarities while 
also having notable differences. Although some of the analysis developed here may well have 
implications for disparate treatment doctrine, the differences are substantial enough that the matter 
will not be pursued further. More broadly, some other areas of discrimination law feature disparate 
impact tests. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (holding that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act); Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11460 
(Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014)) (implementing a three-step burden-shifting 
framework for disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act). Again, some of the present 
analysis may be illuminating in these other contexts. 
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complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) 
with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent 
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.95 
Recasting this provision in the language of this Article, step 1 requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that a challenged employment practice causes a 
disparate impact (H), which, if done, shifts the burden in step 2 to the 
defendant to demonstrate that the practice is job related and consistent with 
business necessity (B), which the plaintiff may attempt to rebut or, in what 
might be viewed as a third step, demonstrate the existence of a less restrictive 
alternative, referred to here as an alternative employment practice. On its 
face, there is no balancing step. Let us now examine each of these steps more 
closely, including refinements in existing doctrine, to see how they relate to 
this Article’s analysis. 
Step 1 requires the plaintiff to “demonstrate” H, which is understood to 
indicate a persuasion burden.96 Accordingly, this structured decision 
procedure entails the sequential siloing of H and B that has been addressed 
throughout this Article.  
It is not apparent on its face whether step 1 requires H > H*, or stated 
another way, whether H* > 0 and, if so, by how much. Although the statute is 
silent,97 which might be interpreted as erecting no threshold, three 
considerations suggest that H* is nontrivial. First, treatises and some cases 
state that the disparate impact that a plaintiff must demonstrate needs to be 
substantial or significant.98 Second, reference is sometimes made to the Equal 
 
9542 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2012). Subparagraph (C) states: “The demonstration referred 
to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with 
respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’” Id. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(C); see infra note 
123 (elaborating this facially opaque statement). 
96See, e.g., 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN, PAUL GROSSMAN & C. GEOFFREY WEIRICH, 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-12 to -13 (5th ed. 2012) (“A court will consider statistical 
evidence offered by both the plaintiff and the defendant to determine whether, on the basis of the 
most probative evidence, the challenged practice or selection device has a substantial disparate impact 
on a protected group. The burdens of production and persuasion at this stage are on the plaintiff.”). 
97See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 494, 518 (2003) (“[S]ection 703(k) leaves a great deal unsettled about the nature of disparate 
impact actions. The statute does not describe the degree of disparity needed to trigger disparate 
impact liability . . . .”). 
98See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-13 (stating that the 
challenged action must have “a substantial disparate impact”); 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN 
M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 269 (4th ed. 2009) (heading 
their section “Markedly Disproportionate Impact”); id. (“But precisely how disparate the impact 
must be shown has never been determined.”); Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact 
Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 570-74 (1991) (discussing competing perspectives by 
commentators and differing statements by courts regarding whether a quantitatively substantial 
impact should be required in addition to statistical significance). The basis for such statements is 
unclear. For example, Barbara Lindemann, Paul Grossman, and Geoffrey Weirich claim support 
from the statute itself (which is silent) and from Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-28 
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Employment Opportunity Commission Uniform Guidelines’s “four-fifths” 
“working rule,” under which the disadvantaged group must be treated at least 
twenty percent worse than others are to prompt action.99 Although not 
binding on the agency or on courts, this rule of thumb seems to have had 
 
(1975), a case that predates and thus is arguably superseded by the (ambiguous) statute. Albemarle’s 
most on-point language is: “This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining party or class 
has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select 
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of 
applicants. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).” Id. at 425 (emphasis 
added). Interestingly, McDonnell Douglas, the source of support, is a disparate treatment case, and 
the context of the discussion in Albemarle is defenses, which arise at step 2 (and the passage that is 
cited in McDonnell Douglas does not itself haven any language pertaining to whether a plaintiff must 
demonstrate the “significance” of anything). See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 
U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (indicating that demonstration of “gross statistical disparities” can, alone, in 
a proper case, establish a prima facie case, but not commenting on whether some minimal degree of 
disparity is always required); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (similarly 
suggesting that significant disproportions can establish a prima facie case); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (referring, at the outset of the opinion, to the question before the Court 
as involving “requirements [that] operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than 
white applicants,” but failing later to repeat any variant of “substantial” or to address the matter in 
other ways). Later, LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-19, states that “[t]he 
lower courts . . . have not fashioned a uniform rule” to fill in the gap due to “[t]he Supreme Court 
. . . [having] given no definitive guidance,” and they also cite the (also pre-1991-Act) plurality opinion 
in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.), which states: 
Once the employment practice at issue has been identified, causation must be proved; 
that is, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to 
show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or 
promotions because of their membership in a protected group. Our formulations, which 
have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathematical formula, have consistently 
stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an 
inference of causation. . . . Later cases have framed the test in similar terms. 
Id. at 994-95 (emphasis added) (quotations of the previously noted language from Griggs and 
Albemarle omitted). Rather confusingly, LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 
3-24 to -26, concludes its discussion of the issue by, in sequence: discussing a circuit court case 
finding that statistical significance can be insufficient when the disparity is “of limited magnitude”; 
citing a later circuit court case asserting that no circuit court has ever held that practical significance 
was required; and stating that courts do assess whether any differences are “substantial” (and citing 
a large number of cases to support that proposition). 
9929 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (“D. Adverse impact and the ‘four-fifths rule.’ A selection rate for any race, 
sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group 
with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of 
adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal 
enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection rate may 
nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical 
terms or where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, 
sex, or ethnic group. Greater differences in selection rate may not constitute adverse impact where 
the differences are based on small numbers and are not statistically significant, or where special 
recruiting or other programs cause the pool of minority or female candidates to be atypical of the 
normal pool of applicants from that group.”). 
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some influence, although it is unclear how much so in more recent cases.100 
Third, it is typically required that the plaintiff demonstrate a statistically 
significant effect,101 and, even if a showing of statistical significance is alone 
 
100See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-22 to -24; SULLIVAN 
& WALTER, supra note 98, at 278 (“The Supreme Court has neither adopted nor rejected the 
four-fifths rule. It has generally described the Uniform Guidelines in terms of a mechanism for 
allocating scarce enforcement resources, rather than as a rule of law.”). Some courts reject the 
four-fifths rule or any independent requirement of substantiality when statistical significance is 
established. See, e.g., Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 48-53 (1st Cir. 2014); see also id. at 46 (“The 
Supreme Court has most recently described a prima facie showing of disparate impact as 
‘essentially a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . and nothing more.’ Ricci 
v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 . . . (2009).”); id. at 51-52 (noting respects in which the four-
fifths rule is arbitrary depending on selection rates and whether the differential is defined by 
reference to those who pass or those who fail the test). The Ricci reference cited in Jones 
regarding the requirement in step 1 is made in passing (the Court’s emphasis was on the later 
steps); it states: “essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity . . . and 
nothing more.” 557 U.S. at 587. In turn, Ricci’s only authority for this proposition is Connecticut 
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982), which contains no more than a bland statement of a 
requirement of disparate impact, with reference neither to statistical disparities nor to whether 
anything more might be required. In that majority opinion, the only reference to a word having 
“statistics” as a root appears later and as an aside: “See also New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 
440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (“A prima facie violation of the Act may be established by statistical 
evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying members of one race 
equal access to employment opportunities”) (emphasis added).” 457 U.S. at 450. My own 
impression from a number of more recent lower court cases and from discussions with some in 
the field is that the focus is largely on statistical significance. There are exceptions, see, e.g., 
Waisome v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (2d Cir. 1991), and other contrary 
indications, see, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 252 (3d ed. 2011) (“When practical significance is lacking—when the size of the 
disparity is negligible—there is no reason to worry about statistical significance.”). For an earlier 
analysis, see Paul Meier, Jerome Sacks & Sandy L. Zabell, What Happened in Hazelwood: 
Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW 1 (Morris 
H. DeGroot, Stephen E. Fienberg & Joseph B. Kadane eds., 1986). 
101See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-19 to -22; SULLIVAN & 
WALTER, supra note 98, at 276-80; Michael J. Piette, Module IV: Reference Guide for Analyzing Allegations 
of Employment Discrimination: An Economist’s View, in EXPERT ECONOMIC TESTIMONY: REFERENCE 
GUIDE FOR JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS 221, 237 (Thomas R. Ireland et. al eds., 1998) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court in a landmark case involving the selection of minorities to serve on grand juries, Castaneda v. 
Partida[, 430 U.S. 482, 486 n.17] (1977), stated ‘ . . . if the difference between the expected value and 
the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations,’ then the process we are observing 
is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone. This ‘rule’ was quickly applied to the employment 
discrimination area in Hazelwood School District vs. U.S.[, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17] (1977)[,] and became 
known as the ‘Hazelwood Standard.’” (emphasis omitted)); see also Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 
366 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Although courts have considered both the four-fifths rule and standard deviation 
calculations in deciding whether a disparity is sufficiently substantial to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact, there is no one test that always answers the question. Instead, the substantiality of a 
disparity is judged on a case-by-case basis.”); SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 276 (“[H]ow 
much impact is needed for a claim to exist . . . is addressed here, but it is complicated by the continuing 
confusion between statistical significance and quantum of impact.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a 
Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 775 (2009) (describing lower courts’ 
mixed use of a statistical significance requirement and the four-fifths rule and stating that “none of the 
circuits have a uniform standard for evaluating disparate impact cases”). 
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sufficient, it is a familiar property of significance tests that, for a given sample 
size, larger substantive effects are more likely to be found statistically 
significant.102 In all, it seems that we may well have H* > 0, although (aside from 
the four-fifths rule) there is little indication of the actual magnitude of H*. 
Regarding Title VII’s structured protocol as a final decision rule, we know 
from the analysis in subsection I.A.1 that setting H* significantly above zero 
can result in erroneous outcomes: failures to assign liability even though 
H > B, which arises when B < H ≤ H*. The extent of this problem depends, of 
course, on how high H* is set, which is unclear. One should also keep in mind 
the possible screening function of setting H* > 0, recalling as well subsection 
I.B.1’s discussion of how screening may best be accomplished in a more 
flexible manner that is more in line with balancing. 
Another important question in this domain is whether H* in practice is 
set in a vacuum, which most statements seem to envision, or is instead set 
contextually, with an (at least implicit) eye toward the likely level of B in the 
case at hand. Step 1’s demand is most likely to have bite at the summary 
judgment stage, in assessing whether a plaintiff ’s statistical demonstration 
(contained in an expert report) is sufficient to create a genuine dispute, and 
at the end of a trial (or after a plaintiff has presented its full case). In these 
settings, the judge103 will have had some, or even complete, exposure to the 
 
102See, e.g., Jones, 752 F.3d at 53 (“First, the very need to show statistical significance will 
eliminate small impacts as fodder for litigation in many instances because proving that a small 
impact is statistically significant generally requires large sample sizes, which are often unavailable.”); 
Piette, supra note 101, at 246. The centrality of tests of statistical significance in this (and other) legal 
settings, although reflecting an understandable borrowing from its use in the social sciences and 
medicine in particular, is also puzzling in two respects. First, there is the distinction related to the 
point in the text, between statistical significance and practical significance (effect size). Second, legal 
proof burdens, including in the Title VII setting, are typically formulated as probabilities, with the 
preponderance rule requiring that something be more likely than not. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE 484 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) (“The most acceptable meaning to be given 
to the expression, proof by a preponderance, seems to be proof which leads the jury to find that the 
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” (citing MODEL CODE OF 
EVIDENCE R. 1(3))). Such a probability is a Bayesian posterior probability regarding the truth of a 
proposition, whereas statistical significance tests ask a qualitatively different question. See, e.g., 
David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Autumn 1983, at 13. In addition, when the concern is with ex ante behavior (here, the deterrence of 
discriminatory employment practices), none of these notions is apt. See Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 
supra note 5; Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests, supra note 5. 
103Title VII disparate impact claims are tried to a judge—the 1991 amendments allowing for 
damages, and therefore a jury, being applicable only to disparate treatment cases. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(a)(1) (“In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5, 2000e–16] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful 
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate 
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, 2000e–3, 2000e–
16] . . . , the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in 
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defendant’s case when making a decision on step 1, so such an implicit 
violation of the structured decision rule is plausible. To that extent, the de 
jure decision rule, which is both sequential and does not purport to involve 
balancing, may operate somewhat like a de facto balancing test of sorts (on 
which more in a moment). 
If the plaintiff meets its burden on H, step 2 then requires the defendant 
to “demonstrate” B, also indicating a persuasion burden.104 The major 
question concerns, in the parlance of this Article, the magnitude of B*. The 
statutory language is that, to avoid liability, a challenged employment practice 
shown to have a disparate impact must be “job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity,” drawn from a statement in 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.105 that, in context, seems to have been casually crafted 
with no precise meaning in mind.106 On its face, this language is subject to 
many interpretations that span a broad range of possibilities107 and may be 
associated with different conceptions of disparate impact law.108 This 
ambiguity is often noted and does not appear to be fully resolved.109 
 
subsection (b) . . . .”); id. § 1981a(c)(1) (“If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive 
damages under this section—(1) any party may demand a trial by jury . . . .”). 
104See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-13 (“If impact is 
established, the inquiry becomes whether the practice or selection device is ‘job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity.’ The burdens of production and 
persuasion at this stage are on the defendant . . . .”). 
105401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
106See id. at 431 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are 
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment 
practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited.”). This language seems to state “business necessity” as the test, but then in 
essence to define it as whether a practice is “related to job performance.” The discussion in Griggs 
that follows this announcement can readily be understood as suggesting that the defendant had made 
no demonstration of any job relatedness, so even a minimal requirement was sufficient to support 
liability. But the language is not sufficiently sharp to command such a reading or to show that it 
would have been enough for the defendant to persuasively demonstrate some relationship, even a 
minimal one. Subsequent language arguably suggests a minimal threshold. See id. at 436 (“What 
Congress has forbidden is giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are 
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded that the less 
qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from 
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, 
so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that 
any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”). 
107The failure of the statutory language to resolve this core ambiguity was intentional, reflecting 
the need for compromise in passing the 1991 Act. See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, 
supra note 96, at 3-38; SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 284-85. 
108It is hoped that the discussion to follow makes clear that this Article neither takes any stand 
on which view best comports with existing case law nor advances a position on the normative force 
of any view regarding the purpose of disparate impact law. 
109See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-13 (“[T]he precise 
meaning of the substantive standard is not defined in the statute, and continues to be litigated 
. . . .”); SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 283-91; Primus, supra note 97, at 518 (“At the same 
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One interpretation, emphasizing “job related” (which seems to get more 
attention than does “business necessity”110), takes that phrase literally and 
minimally, corresponding to B* = 0 (or perhaps slightly more). One can, 
moreover, understand a way of thinking that would support such a view. 
Specifically, if a practice is at all job related, then its use enhances 
productivity111 at least somewhat. Hence, a profit-motivated employer (or 
cost-minimizing nonprofit organization) would use the practice if it 
entertained no thoughts about discrimination. We can compare the case in 
which an organization procures its paperclips from whatever company 
charges the lowest price, preferring one brand to another even if the savings 
are mere pennies—without giving a second’s thought as to which company 
might employ fewer minorities, have its headquarters in an even-numbered 
zip code, or be headed by a CEO born under a favored sign of the zodiac. 
 
time, section 703(k) leaves a great deal unsettled about the nature of disparate impact actions. The 
statute does not . . . describe how ‘necessary’ a practice must be for an employer to defend itself 
successfully on the ground of ‘business necessity.’ The concepts of business necessity and alternative 
employment device are taken from pre-1991 cases, and section 703(k) codifies that common law with 
all of its attendant uncertainties.”); see also id. (“[T]here has long been a dispute over whether 
disparate impact doctrine is an evidentiary dragnet designed to discover hidden instances of 
intentional discrimination or a more aggressive attempt to dismantle racial hierarchies regardless of 
whether anything like intentional discrimination is present.”); id. (“Nor do the 1991 amendments 
resolve ambiguities concerning the purpose of disparate impact law. Instead, they reflect the lack of 
consensus among those who passed the amendments about the rationale for and contours of the 
disparate impact standard.”). In examining the cases, there seems to be more emphasis on what type 
of validation is required for different types of business justifications in different settings than on the 
magnitude of the claimed productivity boost that must be shown. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Disparate 
Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 631-35 (2011). 
110See, e.g., SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 286 (“These opinions, therefore, seem to 
emphasize job-relatedness over business necessity; indeed, the two terms may mean the same 
thing.”). Consider the mixed depictions of step 2’s requirement in a recent case in which the matter 
was the central question being decided: Lopez v. Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]his 
inquiry trains on whether the selection practice—here, the use of the exam—is ‘valid.’ In simple 
terms, a selection practice is valid if it materially enhances the employer’s ability to pick individuals 
who are more likely to perform better than those not picked.” (emphasis added)); id. at 116 (describing 
the question as whether “the practice causing that [disparate] impact serves an important need of the 
employer” (emphasis added)); id. at 116-17 (indicating that the plaintiffs lose the issue because they 
do not “claim that the exams are not materially better predictors of success [on the job] than would be 
achieved by the random selection of those officers to be promoted” (emphasis added)). Other courts as 
well often focus on validity, see, e.g., Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 383-85 (2d Cir. 
2006), which seems to address the stringency of the requisite demonstration rather than what it is 
that must be demonstrated (whether a slight benefit suffices or something larger, perhaps much 
larger, is required). 
111The concept of productivity involves an oversimplification because productivity can rise for 
discriminatory reasons that are disallowed, a complication set to the side here. (Suppose, for 
example, that white workers could be shown to have worse esprit and thus be less productive because 
they would be annoyed by the presence of minorities, or that sales may be lost because customers 
would not like dealing with minority sales personnel.) 
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To elaborate, this perspective might be associated with a view that 
disparate impact doctrine under Title VII is implicitly—despite official 
statements to the contrary112—about a sort of imputed, objective intent to 
discriminate.113 As long as B > 0, a profit-maximizing employer would choose 
the challenged practice, thereby failing to support an inference of intent to 
discriminate.114 Put differently, the practice leads to the hiring (or promotion, 
and so forth) of more qualified employees, even if only slightly more so. This 
would be true even if the disparate impact was large: perhaps the use of a test 
results in hiring 1,000 fewer minority workers and merely saves the employer 
(on average) a few dollars on each hire.115 Note also that, if B < 0, the employer 
 
112See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (“The Act proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . . We do 
not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer’s 
intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures 
or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to 
measuring job capability. . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”). There are several reasons that a focus on 
discriminatory intent may be disclaimed, in addition to the obvious one that the statute does not 
even implicitly invoke intent in any sense: targeting intent may intensify opposition, make judges 
reluctant to find discrimination, or lead to confusion in thinking that subjective intent must be 
demonstrated (which, with organizational defendants, can be problematic, in addition to difficulties 
of proof even when the focus is on a specific individual’s intention). See also Primus, supra note 97, 
at 519 (“The conception of disparate impact doctrine as an evidentiary dragnet is ambiguous about 
whether it seeks to discover hidden deliberate discrimination or hidden subconscious discrimination; 
furthermore, the idea of subconscious discrimination is itself subject to more than one 
interpretation. The alternative idea, that the doctrine aims to dismantle racial hierarchies 
irrespective of present intentional discrimination, might mean that it aims to integrate the 
workplace. But it could also mean, less ambitiously, that it aims to integrate the workplace only to 
the extent that existing hierarchies can be dismantled through the elimination of irrational business 
practices. Moreover, the self-perpetuation of hierarchies is often related to subconscious 
discrimination, such that attempting to separate the two problems risks oversimplification.”). 
113This interpretation, as well as the one offered below involving balancing—both of which are 
sketched here in somewhat caricatured form—correspond to competing understandings that have 
been articulated in prior work. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 97, at 498-99 (“To oversimplify for the 
moment, some readings of the prohibition on disparate impact see it as an evidentiary device aimed 
at ferreting out present discriminatory states of mind, while others see it as concerned with the 
lingering structural consequences of discrimination practiced in the past.” (footnotes omitted)). 
114The analysis in the text implicitly treats the employer as a unified, rational, maximizing actor, 
fully aware of the consequences of its actions. Allowing for realistic deviations—which may be 
particularly important in large organizations—any notion of intent is attenuated, to a degree an 
artificial construct. This Article does not address how such considerations should influence the 
interpretation and application of Title VII—or antitrust law and constitutional law, where related 
factors often are operative. 
115Often this point will not hold as a practical matter, depending on how the statement is 
interpreted. If, say, a job requirement is only slightly job related but very substantially reduces the 
eligible pool, then the employer would lose more from the pool reduction than it gains from the 
productivity advantage. Hence, a profit-maximizing employer would not add a job requirement unless 
it had a significantly greater productivity effect. (This simple point is obvious in any hiring process; 
myriad factors that are plausibly job related are not made requirements for application, only those 
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is leaving money on the table in causing the disparate impact, which is why 
some might refer to this basis for liability as involving, at least implicitly, an 
objective imputation of intent.116 
An implication of this view is that there is no comparison of H and B. Or, 
in the spirit of the implicit rationale, what we have been calling H is not really 
taken to be a measure of social harm as such. Rather, the first step indicates 
whether there is discrimination (a dichotomous inquiry), and, if there is, only 
that which has no productivity justification is deemed to be impermissible. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, one could emphasize “business 
necessity” and interpret this language in a literal fashion that sets B* 
extremely high—how high depending on the business. For example, if some 
huge corporation has billions of dollars in annual profits, then any practice 
that did not reduce productivity by more than that—pushing the company 
into bankruptcy, let’s say—is not strictly “necessary” and hence does not meet 
the dictates of step 2. So in this example, billions might have to be spent to 
hire one additional minority employee. Of course, at smaller and less 
profitable entities, the demand would be lighter, but still possibly large. 
Although linguistically plausible, this interpretation does not seem to have 
gained traction, either in particular statements or in practice. 
There is a great chasm between this “necessity” interpretation under which 
B* may be huge and the preceding “job related” interpretation under which 
B* = 0. For any B* > 0, the analysis in subsection I.A.1 is applicable. Of particular 
interest is how B* relates to H* and, even more so, how it relates to the H 
established in step 1. Although renditions of disparate impact’s second step do 
not ordinarily refer to step 1, it is entirely imaginable that, when reaching step 
2, a judge who has heard evidence on H and already reached a decision on step 
1 will have that H in mind when applying step 2’s ambiguous standard. Such a 
linkage, in turn, might result in a mode of decisionmaking that involves at least 
an implicit comparison of H and B, tantamount to balancing. 
More precisely, if B* = H, then step 2’s test of whether B > B* is equivalent 
to asking whether B > H. And if H is taken to constitute a measure of social 
harm, this would make sense. As we know from subsection I.A.1, if B* is 
 
that are particularly significant.) These points are better viewed from the perspective presented below, 
wherein one can imagine an employer running a regression that takes into account all relevant factors 
and assigns each factor a weight that corresponds to its influence on marginal productivity. 
116Employers may often be unaware of the actual consequences, particularly if both B and H are 
small but also for many other reasons. See supra note 114. And the case in which B = 0 is unresolved, 
in that it suggests employer indifference. But when there is a nontrivial negative impact on the size 
of the pool, there usually would be a cost to the employer (although a proper notion of B would be 
defined net of such effects). See supra note 115. Relatedly, if an employer is unwilling to substitute 
an alternative employment practice that is as or more effective and also reduces or eliminates the 
disparate impact (often further benefitting the employer by expanding the pool), an intent to 
discriminate may be imputed. 
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instead taken to exceed H, then we may (under this view) mistakenly assign 
liability in some cases: specifically, when H < B ≤ B*. And if B* is taken to be 
less than H, then we may mistakenly fail to assign liability in some cases: 
when H > B > B*. Interestingly, this latter sort of error at step 2 did not arise 
in subsection I.A.1’s examination of our stylized structured decision 
procedure because step 3 came to the rescue. That is, when step 2 passed in 
such a case, the result was not to assign no liability and stop, but rather to 
proceed to step 3’s balancing; in that instance, step 2 was rendered redundant. 
Here (setting aside for now consideration of less restrictive alternatives), we 
do not have that saving feature, so setting B* < H is problematic under the 
currently contemplated view of the law’s purpose. 
Let us now reflect on what this interpretation of step 2—wherein B* is 
implicitly set equal to H (or at least is positively related to H 117)—means with 
regard to the purpose of Title VII disparate impact doctrine. Here, society is 
willing to incur some cost in order to avoid disparate impact as such. Under 
the first view noted above, productivity gains of a few dollars per employee 
would be seen as sufficient justification for hiring 1,000 fewer minority 
workers. Under the “necessity” view, even billions of dollars might have to be 
sacrificed in order to hire one more. Now, we are contemplating an 
intermediate position, which posits a tradeoff between avoiding disparate 
impact and requiring employers to incur costs in terms of reduced 
productivity. Such a view of the doctrine’s purpose might be associated with 
language in Griggs about barriers that “‘freeze’ the status quo”118 by creating 
“‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups.”119 Note that, even if the doctrine 
does not formally admit any dependence of the stringency of step 2 (here, 
taken to be embodied in B*) on the magnitude of what is found in step 1 
(regarding H), it seems plausible that a judge who embraced this view would 
at least to some degree be influenced by H, being more inclined to find that 
step 2 passed when step 1 was a close call and less inclined to find step 2 
satisfied when the disparate impact found in step 1 was large.120 And it also 
 
117To elaborate, much of what is discussed in the text to follow applies to any B* > 0, because then 
there is some tradeoff admitted between productivity costs to the employer and avoiding disparate 
impact on minority employees. Moreover, any comparison between H and B allows a balancing 
interpretation. Because the units of H and B are not, on their face, comparable, some translation is 
required. In this respect, the key question is whether the (implicit) B* is increasing in the court’s 
estimate of H from step 1. If it is, then “as if ” balancing is involved. See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1049-
55. As noted, on its face step 2’s test makes no reference to the degree of disparate impact, H, so a 
literal interpretation, even supposing that we do not take B* to be 0 or huge, is that it is at some 
intermediate level, independent of H, which possibility was considered in the preceding paragraph. 
118Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (emphasis omitted). 
119Id. at 432; see, e.g., Primus, supra note 97, at 523-25. 
120See, e.g., LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-41 (“Some courts have 
suggested that the degree of disparate impact caused by the challenged practice can affect the 
 
1430 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1375 
suggests, as mentioned above, that a judge deciding a close case at step 1 may 
be influenced by a sense of the B that would be shown at step 2, particularly 
to the extent that information on B is already in hand. 
In examining different possibilities for the magnitude of the B* threshold 
in step 2, we can see that quite different notions of the purposes of disparate 
impact doctrine are brought into focus. Perhaps part of the ambiguity on the 
meaning of the enigmatic requirement of job relatedness and business 
necessity reflects a reluctance to address contentious issues openly. If step 2 
really does embody balancing, then the need to make statements about how 
much B must be sacrificed to reduce H may be quite uncomfortable. In any 
event, whatever may be the conceptual, practical, and political challenges,121 
once any tradeoff is admitted, consistency in decisionmaking requires that 
decisions be made as if balancing is undertaken.122 
Turn now to the final step, under which a defendant who has met its 
burden under step 2 (whatever that may be) may still lose if there exist 
alternative employment practices, understood to refer to less restrictive 
alternatives that have less (or no) disparate impact but nevertheless generate 
B. Current doctrine seems unclear on whether equal effectiveness is 
required.123 In this context, the appropriate understanding of this step in 
 
sufficiency of the employer’s proof of justification.”); id. at 4-37 (“Courts have held that the greater 
the disparate impact of a test, the higher the correlation required, and vice versa. Similarly, as the 
disparate impact increases, a stronger showing is necessary of the importance of the criterion to 
successful job performance.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 4-70 (“[I]f the employer’s practices result 
in a high degree of exclusion and have a low degree of business utility, they are more likely to be 
found unlawful; if they result in a low degree of exclusion and have a high degree of business utility, 
they are likely to be found lawful.”). 
121See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1047-55 (elaborating many of the challenges and how they are best 
understood and addressed). The latter reference is meant to suggest a possible reluctance to 
articulate balancing explicitly even when undertaken. In that regard, there is the further possibility 
that the balancing interpretation of disparate impact law may raise constitutional problems of the 
sort associated with affirmative action, which is the focus of Primus, supra note 97. 
122See supra note 117 (discussing how this perspective applies to any intermediate choice of B* as 
long as the critical level rises with the H found at step 1). There is also a cost-effectiveness 
interpretation of balancing: for a given aggregate cost to employers, consistent decisionmaking 
embodied in “as if ” balancing maximizes the hiring of minorities; conversely, a given reduction in 
aggregate disparate impact will be implemented at the lowest cost to overall productivity under a 
consistent balancing framework. 
123For example, LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, states: “To rebut the 
employer’s proof of business necessity, a plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer refused to 
implement an effective alternative practice or selection device that would have a lesser disparate 
impact.” Id. at 3-13 (emphasis added). The question is how “effective” the practice must be. See also 
id. at 3-45 (“Plaintiffs may also have to show that the proposed alternative is substantially equally 
valid.” (emphasis added)). The treatise SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 98, at 294, states that 
“courts that have addressed the issue have required equal efficacy,” but the offered support, see id. at 
294 n.236, consists of two cases, the first a dissenting opinion (a feature not noted) that uses the 
language “equally effective” in passing (and in turn cites for support a case that does not contain 
such language), and a second that offers dicta that merely says that the practice “would also serve 
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principle depends on B* in step 2 and the associated rationale for disparate 
impact doctrine. Put conversely, a stand on whether equal effectiveness is 
required has implications for step 2’s content and the doctrine’s purpose. 
Suppose first that B* = 0, associated with the view that step 2’s job-relatedness 
requirement is satisfied by any, even fairly minimal, productivity boost associated 
with the challenged employment practice. In this case, consistency seems to 
imply that an alternative employment practice must be equally effective. If it is 
not, then its adoption would be associated with a reduction in B. Put another way, 
suppose that an employer had initially used the proffered alternative employment 
practice and subsequently switched to the practice being challenged in the case 
at hand. By hypothesis, this switch would generate a positive B and hence, if 
B* = 0, the new practice would be justified given the underlying standard. 
Now suppose instead that B* = H, associated with the implicit balancing view. 
In that event, subsection I.A.2 tells us that the less restrictive alternative is 
properly analyzed under the second balancing test or, equivalently, the delta/delta 
test. Accordingly, equal effectiveness is a sufficient condition for the plaintiff to 
prevail at this step but not a necessary one. Indeed, the case of equal effectiveness 
has no special significance except that in some situations it may be clear that such 
a requirement is met, making the decision (to assign liability) easy. 
 
the employer’s legitimate business interest” (and cites in support Albemarle, which language likewise 
does not specifically indicate whether the alternative must be equally effective). Nevertheless, 
several courts require equal effectiveness, although a small additional cost or inconvenience is often 
ignored in undertaking this assessment, and the “equality” demand is sometimes relaxed or modified 
in other ways. See, e.g., Lopez v. Lawrence, 823 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2016) (stating step 3 as: “do the 
plaintiffs show that the employer has refused to adopt an alternative practice that equally or better 
serves the employer’s legitimate business needs, yet has a lesser disparate impact?” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 119 (referring to “equal or greater validity” and an “equally or more valid test”); Jones 
v. Boston, 845 F.3d 28, 35 n.3 (1st Cir. 2016) (“Similarly, while it may be within the scope of inquiry 
to consider the putative costs of the Officers’ proposed alternative, . . . a reasonable jury could find 
that there would have been no material cost differential . . . .” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. 
Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the availability 
of alternative procedures that serve the employer’s legitimate interests and (2) produce ‘substantially 
equally valid’ results, but with (3) less discriminatory outcomes.” (emphasis added)) (citing the 1978 
EEOC Guidelines, the source of the aforementioned four-fifths rule, for the quoted language); 
Allen v. Chicago, 351 F.3d 306, 314 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring that those promoted under the 
proposed alternative be “substantially equally qualified” (emphasis added)). The Supreme Court’s 
fairly recent statement of this requirement in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009), however, 
is more murky, referring to “an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate 
impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.” This ambiguity in the 1991 Act is attributed to 
the unusual legislative history in which compromise required an explicit refusal to address key issues. 
As indicated at the outset of this part, see supra note 95, the Act specifically refers to preexisting case 
law on the question, but it was understood that those cases did not address the matter. See, e.g., 
LINDEMANN, GROSSMAN & WEIRICH, supra note 96, at 3-42 to -46; SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra 
note 98, at 292 (emphasizing that “the phrase alternative employment practice did not exist in any 
Supreme Court case before it was used in Wards Cove,” making it odd that the statute limits 
interpretation of the term to pre–Wards Cove case law). 
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The focus thus far has been on the disparate impact structured decision 
procedure as a final decision rule. Turn now to how it performs with regard 
to the collection and analysis of information, supposing that it actually were 
to serve as the information protocol, largely bracketing for the moment the 
actual conduct of U.S. civil litigation. That is, let us apply the analysis 
developed in subsection I.B.1 to this context. 
Here, we again have a sequentially siloed regimen that first considers all 
information on H, only then turning to B. As always, even if information did 
naturally clump separately by issue, this sequencing tends not to be optimal. 
Most obviously, under the first view of step 2, under which B* = 0, evidence 
that B > 0 would suggest that efforts can be terminated early—subject to both 
confirmation and the possibility that the defense might be negated by an 
equally effective alternative employment practice. (Otherwise, one might 
struggle interminably and needlessly about the plaintiff ’s statistical 
demonstration at step 1.) Under the balancing view, it is by now familiar that 
the appropriate means of gathering and analyzing information may well 
involve alternation, depending on the diagnosticity/cost ratio of the 
information that remains to be collected.124 This point was alluded to above 
in discussing the decision rule, when noting that a judge assessing step 1 might 
naturally peek ahead at B and that one deciding step 2 may have H in mind 
when considering the appropriate threshold. 
In addition, information often clumps by source rather than by issue, so 
there can be significant synergy loss in sequencing—or, if information is 
collected by source, decision precision is needlessly sacrificed if information 
 
124Paralleling the discussion in Section II.B on the difficulty of proving efficiencies that may be 
generated by mergers, in the employment context it is often difficult—and, of relevance, more 
difficult than showing disparate impact—to assess the contribution of various traits to productivity. 
For example, what evidence could an employer who failed even to interview a mere high school 
graduate for a position as a research scientist point to in demonstrating job relatedness? A prior 
randomized controlled trial in which it hired a large sample of such individuals who then failed to 
produce substantial results? Even considering less extreme examples, suppose that a factor in 
determining bonuses or promotions is an employee’s degree of cooperation with others. Validating 
the contribution to productivity of different degrees of cooperativeness surely is not easy. A great 
challenge with disparate impact cases concerns the question of what should count as sufficient 
validation. On one hand, myriad factors that plausibly relate to productivity are routinely considered 
in screening resumes, interviewing employees, setting bonuses, and making promotion decisions. If 
any that were not rigorously validated were impermissible (that is, if they had disparate impact, 
which many probably do), the costs to productivity could be serious. On the other hand, it is well 
known that “we’ve always done it that way” can be a conscious or subconscious cover for 
discrimination and, in any event, longstanding practices with no discriminatory motivation can 
survive despite possibly substantial contradictory evidence that could readily be collected but is not. 
Consider MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003). 
Related lessons also appear throughout PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, 
SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (2015), and in the chapter on 
when we can trust experts in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW, ch. 22 (2011). 
 
2019] Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures 1433 
on B is in hand but ignored. Moreover, much information by its nature 
pertains to both H and B, rendering separation incoherent. Consider some 
illustrations of these general points. 
To begin, whether or not view one prevails (under which there is a sort of 
implicit, objective intent inquiry), intent will be probative and inevitably 
links the two issues in a now-familiar manner.125 The more it appears that 
B = 0, the more suspicious we may be that a discriminatory purpose motivates 
the employment practice, making step 1’s H > H* test more likely to be 
satisfied. And a very low H suggests an alternative explanation, which may 
well involve a positive (and larger) B. 
It is also true that much of the evidence and the methodology used in 
establishing a plaintiff ’s statistical demonstration of disparate impact at step 
1 is intertwined with business justifications that are supposedly not reached 
until step 2. Consider the point that a plaintiff in a discriminatory hiring 
challenge needs to make its demonstration regarding H, at step 1, using an 
appropriate definition of the employment pool. Including children would be 
inappropriate, as would including unlicensed individuals for an occupation 
that requires a license (such as an airline pilot).126 Defendants often argue at 
step 1 that the plaintiff ’s pool is too broad, for example, by omitting some 
qualification such as a high school education, whereas the plaintiff ’s challenge 
may be that this very qualification is the cause of the disparate impact. As 
some important literature has explained, adding a variable to the pertinent 
regression equation tends to reduce the coefficient on, say, race—moving the 
disparate impact toward zero and potentially nullifying its statistical 
significance—precisely when the added variable (a high school education, in 
 
125Indeed, in proclaiming that intent is not the test, Griggs stated, “We do not suggest that either 
the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred in examining the employer’s intent . . . .” Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). 
126Compare Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2006) (requiring that the 
plaintiff ’s statistical analysis be “based on data restricted to qualified employees” or that, if such data 
be unavailable, based on a reliable proxy instead), with Stagi v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 391 F. 
App’x 133, 147-48 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring that additional factors that might explain the disparate 
impact be advanced as part of the defendant’s demonstration of business justification, in step 2). See 
generally Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“It is true that in order to eliminate 
the most common nondiscriminatory explanation for a disparity—lack of qualifications—a plaintiff ’s 
prima facie case must take into account the ‘minimum objective qualifications’ for the position at 
issue. . . . But that does not mean a plaintiff must take account of every qualification recited by the 
employer, nor even of every ‘objective’ qualification. Rather, what the case law means by ‘minimum 
objective qualifications’ are those objective qualifications that can be shown to be truly required to do 
the job at issue.”); Wax, supra note 109, at 630-31 (“Threshold requirements of any kind can end up 
screening out minority applicants. Thus using such requirements to define potential candidates is 
itself vulnerable to challenge under the disparate impact rule. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
set no clear standard for identifying the population against which workplace disparate impact should 
be assessed and the lower courts vary in their approach. This aspect of disparate impact doctrine is in 
serious disarray.” (footnote omitted)). 
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our example) itself has a disparate impact on race.127 Adding this variable 
would be correct if it was job related but would actually confirm the plaintiff ’s 
case if it was not. Yet job relatedness (B) is supposed to be deferred to step 2. 
As a heuristic for thinking about step 1’s demonstration regarding H 
(which involves notable oversimplification128), it is helpful to consider a 
regression equation—for hiring, wages, or promotions, as the case may be—
in which all possible explanatory variables are included.129 One can then ask 
how the magnitudes of the resulting coefficients differ—if at all, and in a 
statistically significant way130—from the corresponding magnitudes in a 
similar regression equation where what is “explained” (the dependent 
variable) is workers’ productivity, normally associated with step 2’s 
 
127The most extensive legal treatment of this idea is Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the 
Problem of “Included Variable Bias” (2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/ 
1138-ayresincludedvariablebiaspdf [https://perma.cc/QLW7-EZWB] (featuring the Griggs high school 
diploma requirement as an example). See id. at 14 (heading one section “A ‘Business-Justification’ 
Approach to Disparate-Impact Testing”); id. at 33 (“Regardless of what substantive standard is 
adopted for determining what qualifies as a business justification (and hence what should be included 
in the unjustified [disparate impact regression] specification), the application of the standard will 
turn on facts and or reasoning that are external to the regression itself.”). A preceding line of 
economics literature developing this and related ideas includes Burton G. Malkiel & Judith A. 
Malkiel, Male-Female Pay Differentials in Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 693 (1973); 
David E. Bloom & Mark R. Killingsworth, Pay Discrimination Research and Litigation: The Use of 
Regression, 21 INDUS. REL. 318 (1982); Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing Employment Discrimination: 
From the Seminar Room to the Courtroom, 83 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 67 (1993); John 
Yinger, Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 23, 26-29. 
(This literature features a further subtlety concerning endogeneity: for example, even if men and 
women in a given job classification receive equal pay, if there is differential hiring or promotion into 
that classification, that difference might constitute discrimination.) The interdependency idea is also 
briefly but sharply stated by Michael Piette, supra note 101, at 254 (“[P]erhaps most important under 
the heading of legitimacy, is the problem of tainted independent variables. Suppose a regression 
analysis includes a variable for education that, in a race case, is a key determinant of salary differences 
between black and white employees in a clearly different job group. Regression analysis indicates a 
high t-statistic on education and an insignificant t-statistic on the race coefficient. Given that in 
almost all groups, white employees have received more formal education than black employees, it 
would appear that education goes a long way towards explaining salary differences between black and 
white employees. The burden is on the employer, however, to demonstrate separate from the 
regression, that education was required and affected performance, and hence directly determined 
salary. To the extent that education is not related to job performance, it is an inappropriate variable 
to use in a regression. Excluding key variables and including irrelevant variables have the same 
impact.”) (quoted in Ayres, supra, at 22). 
128Among other things, this presentation sets aside considerations of functional form, 
interactions among independent variables, and endogeneity. 
129The discussion that follows focuses on steps 1 and 2, abstracting from alternative employment 
practices. In principle, they could be incorporated as well, in a manner that reflects the previous 
discussion of this final step and how the analysis depends on the view of the purpose of the doctrine 
and correspondingly the interpretation of step 2. 
130See supra note 102 (discussing issues concerning the role that statistical significance plays in 
disparate impact cases). 
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assessment of B.131 Disparate impact might be said to arise (notably, under 
view one) when a variable is given different weight in the employer’s decision, 
say, on hiring, than its effect on productivity, and in a direction that indicates 
the pertinent disparate impact.132 For example, giving more weight to a high 
school education than is indicated by its contribution to productivity, when 
the disadvantaged class of prospective employees is less likely to have a high 
school education, would indicate a disparate impact. 
In this formulation, disparate impact is indicated by the difference between 
the weight of the challenged practice in predicting employment outcomes 
(such as hiring decisions) and the weight it has in predicting productivity.133 
(The corresponding statement under the balancing view appears in the 
margin.134) We thus have a setting in which the interrelationship between H 
 
131The presentation in the text (a “heuristic”) is strictly a thought experiment. Actually 
implementing the productivity regression in particular would be a daunting task. See supra note 124 
(discussing the challenges of demonstrating various traits’ contributions to productivity). 
132The suggestion in Ayres, supra note 127, at 34-36, that one might “cap” a coefficient in the 
employment regression is in similar spirit. An issue, however, is that Ayres’s suggestions focus on 
the plaintiff ’s prima facie case, at step 1, whereas the evidence required to assess the cap, which is a 
measure of the productivity of the factor, does not formally come up until step 2. Of course, this 
reinforces the broader point, here and in Ayres, that business justification (B) is intertwined with 
disparate impact (H). Relatedly, Ayres argues more broadly that “disparate impact tests should only 
include controls for attributes that are plausibly business justified.” Id. at 5-6 (emphasis omitted); 
see id. at 17. As explained in the text to follow, this sort of suggestion is problematic. The focus is on 
step 1. Suppose that, when the variable in question is added to the regression at this stage of the 
inquiry, it eliminates the impact of race, so the plaintiff ’s demonstration of disparate impact seems 
to fail. If the variable being plausibly job related is sufficient, then the plaintiff loses under the formal 
doctrine, even if it can be shown (and may already have been shown, as noted below) that this 
plausible justification fails when examined closely (including rebuttal evidence). This point suggests 
a correction to Ayres’s formulation, in which the step 1 assessment includes essentially the full step 
2 inquiry as well. Much of Ayres’s analysis suggests that he appreciates this point, but is perhaps 
reluctant to advance an implication that, however logical, seems to sharply conflict with the doctrine. 
Hence, this fudge. (As mentioned in the text to follow, it may well be that judges use a similar fudge, 
but, particularly when deciding a case at the end of a trial, with a full appreciation of what has been 
proved regarding B.) 
133A feature of this regression-based presentation is that it illustrates how, in principle, the 
question should not be understood as whether the employer considers a factor (that has a differential 
incidence on the minority group) that, say, under view one, is entirely unpredictive, but rather whether 
the employer gives more weight to the factor than is appropriate in light of its impact on productivity. 
If a factor is measured, say, by a test, it may be that the test is a sensible way to measure the pertinent 
factor, but that too much weight is placed on the test. One might say that the alternative employment 
practice indicating the appropriateness of assigning liability would be the use of the very same test 
but giving it less weight in the decision. See supra note 114 (discussing how an employer may not be 
a unitary, informed, fully rational actor); supra note 115 (discussing pool size and the weight given to 
various factors in hiring). 
134Under the balancing view, one would be concerned instead with the corresponding ratio. In 
the text’s example, the question would be whether the relative contribution to productivity was 
sufficient to justify the resulting degree of disparate impact, a test that could fail (resulting in 
liability) even if there was no disparate impact under the first view. (If there is disparate impact 
under the first view, there will be under the second, a fortiori. A corresponding way to put this point 
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and B in determining liability is central. One could sequence the analysis of 
the two regression equations, looking first at the employment regression and 
then the productivity regression. But the first, standing alone, indicates 
disparate impact in only the most minimal fashion. Step 1 would be satisfied 
in principle whenever an employer gave weight to any factor correlated with 
the pertinent status in a direction that produces disadvantage: for example, 
an employer requiring a high school diploma for the position of research 
scientist, or work experience to be considered for a managerial position. One 
suspects that, in practice, a judge would likely find such cases unconvincing 
at step 1, which is to say that there may be some sort of implicit look-ahead 
to step 2. The notion that one might exercise judgment in this regard—taking 
into account more or less information (or, when fairly obvious, something 
akin to judicial notice) about B, relying on hunches about what is plausible 
and the ease of assessing the matter (the diagnosticity/cost ratio)—is more in 
the spirit of optimal information collection than is an attempt to adhere 
rigidly to the sequential separation apparently mandated by the doctrine. 
Doing so informally and against the grain of a structured decision procedure 
can generate confusion and error while also reducing transparency. 
To close, consider more explicitly the question raised in subsection I.B.2 
concerning the extent to which litigation conforms either to the dictates of 
optimal information collection or to the protocol reflected in existing 
doctrine.135 Absent explicit bifurcation that begins at the outset of a case, this 
sequenced rule does not economize on discovery costs.136 As already noted, 
step 1 itself is pertinent mainly at summary judgment and at the end of trial 
(or in a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff ’s 
case). And even at summary judgment, the question is only whether there is 
a genuine dispute as to disparate impact, H, although in practice this can still 
generate terminations, notably when a plaintiff expert’s statistical 
 
is that, once we know that H > 0 and, moreover, that B ≤ 0, there can be no doubt that H > B.) Note 
further that, when the relevant test involves, in essence, a ratio, it is incoherent to engage in a 
separate, sequential analysis that asks, first, how large is the numerator, without regard to what the 
denominator might be. 
135Class certification questions, of particular relevance in Title VII disparate impact litigation, 
are set aside here (as they are throughout this Article). 
136For example, in a recent decision reviewing a grant of summary judgement for the defendant 
on step 1, the court made clear that essentially all of the information pertaining to step 2 and step 3 
had already been adduced through the process of discovery. See Jones v. Boston, 752 F.3d 38, 55 & 
n.19 (1st Cir. 2014) (“In view of the size of the record, though, and the fact that the district court 
judge who has presided over this case has not yet parsed that record to assess business necessity or 
its rejoinder, we decline to do so in the first instance. . . . In declining to decide the issues in the 
first instance, we do not suggest that the district court must reopen the record to allow further 
discovery or expert reports. The district court retains its customary discretion to manage the case, 
and we expect that it will give due weight to the fact that each party has already had ample time to 
put its best foot forward.”). 
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demonstration falls notably short.137 In accordance with the foregoing, such 
assessments of step 1, whether at summary judgment or later, are difficult to 
disentangle from step 2’s test regarding B. Furthermore, some or all of the 
information pertaining to the latter may be available when deciding on step 
1. Another interesting feature is that, since disparate impact cases involve 
bench trials, we have the interesting situation in which a judge is being asked 
at summary judgement whether a reasonable factfinder—him- or herself—
might reasonably find for the plaintiff on the issue. It may thus seem less 
surprising, and less inappropriate, for a judge to be more venturesome in 
resolving issues at this stage (including by peeking ahead at information about 
B, which is strictly part of step 2).138 At the end of the plaintiff ’s case at trial, 
the situation is similar.139 
At the conclusion of a trial, the only consequence of adhering to the 
structured rule, if it has nontrivial thresholds, is to sometimes generate the 
wrong outcome even given the evidence before the judge.140 Yet, as 
mentioned, one suspects that a judge would have at least some tendency to 
look ahead, at evidence on B, when thinking about how to decide step 1, 
 
137In disparate impact cases, a defendant can plausibly win at summary judgment on step 2—
and without deciding (or even rejecting) a defendant’s claim that step 1 fails, which is to say, taking 
the issue out of order—particularly when B* is taken to be essentially zero, as it is under the first 
view. The reason is that a defendant’s purported business justification, even when aggressively 
challenged, may clearly survive at least somewhat (that is, even granting the plausible rebuttal). 
When B* = 0, this would be enough (assuming further that there is no genuine dispute about a 
possible alternative employment practice). 
138Suppose, for example, that a judge is unsure whether a plaintiff ’s regression results 
supporting disparate impact should be accepted in light of a defendant’s claim that the equation 
improperly excluded some variable that, when included, eviscerates the result of significant 
discrimination. The prior discussion suggests that such a judge may well be influenced by how 
powerful is the defendant’s showing (and plaintiff ’s rebuttal thereof) regarding whether that variable 
substantially relates to job performance or does not at all—to the extent that much of this material 
on B is already in the record. 
139Confined to the trial itself, the judge will only have heard the plaintiff ’s case and not the 
defendant’s rebuttal (except via cross-examination), whereas, at summary judgment, the judge will 
typically have been presented with the defense expert’s report and other information to provide the 
context for the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff ’s evidence is insufficient to create a genuine 
dispute regarding H, in step 1. 
140In the present context, like those considered earlier in this Article, we can also see that there 
is no real sense in which the burden shifts during the trial (or earlier on); even a ruling for the 
plaintiff on a defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the plaintiff ’s case 
only indicates that the plaintiff has enough evidence on H to create a genuine dispute, not that the 
plaintiff has succeeded on step 1, which determination must await the defendant’s direct rebuttal in 
any event. (One could imagine a defendant beginning its own case by first presenting all of its direct 
rebuttal on H, before introducing its evidence on B, and then requesting a final decision on step 1. 
This, in turn, would suggest that any further rebuttal from the plaintiff be presented at that time. It 
may indeed sometimes be efficient to employ bifurcation, although interdependencies between H 
and B, which as explained can be quite important in the Title VII disparate impact context, militate 
against such bifurcation.) 
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formally limited to H, and to keep H in mind if reaching step 2 and 
contemplating what should implicitly be taken as B* when deciding whether 
the evidence on B is sufficient to satisfy step 2. Even with no explicit 
balancing step, one might expect de facto balancing—that is, if the judge 
implicitly adopts the balancing view rather than view one, under which B > 0 
is sufficient to assign no liability (after accounting for alternative employment 
practices). Given the law’s ambiguity concerning the magnitude of the 
thresholds H* and B*, it does not seem difficult to craft such an opinion in a 
manner that is consistent with the official doctrine and makes no mention of 
balancing. And a judge may be inclined to behave in these ways even without 
thinking explicitly in balancing terms.141 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
Strict scrutiny in U.S. constitutional law employs a structured decision 
procedure that bears some resemblance to those considered in this Article.142 
First, it asks whether the challenged government action infringes a qualifying 
fundamental right or involves a suspect classification. If not, the strict 
scrutiny inquiry ends (although analysis may proceed under lower tiers of 
review, which are not examined here).143 Second, if it does, the government 
must demonstrate that the infringement can be justified by the advancement 
of a compelling interest. If not, the government loses.144 Third, if it can, then 
there is an assessment of whether the government’s action is narrowly tailored 
to the justification. If so, the government action stands, but if not, it is invalid. 
 
141The difference between the conscious construction and the subconscious or implicit 
motivation constitutes another respect in which “as if ” balancing may be said to occur. 
142See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 567 
(5th ed. 2015); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1315-16 (2007) 
(“However the purposes of strict scrutiny are characterized, there are three crucial steps in applying 
the formula: (1) identifying the preferred or fundamental rights the infringement of which triggers 
strict scrutiny; (2) determining which governmental interests count as compelling; and (3) giving 
content to the requirement of narrow tailoring.”). 
143Discussion below of steps 1 and 2 will return to the relationship between tiers of review and 
the interpretation of strict scrutiny’s structured decision procedure. Although this section analyzes 
only strict scrutiny, some of what is said bears on the lower tiers of review. 
144Decades ago, Gerald Gunther famously stated that, in light of the stringency of actual 
application, this test was “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 
1971 Term—Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Subsequent decisions, particularly involving affirmative 
action, suggest a more moderate view. See generally Fallon, supra note 142, at 1303-05 (discussing the 
notion that strict scrutiny may be understood as entailing a prohibition of any infringement short 
of an interest in averting catastrophic consequences). 
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Let us now relate this protocol to this Article’s framework. Step 1 asks 
whether the infringement, which causes an H, qualifies by reference to some 
H*. Step 2 considers whether the government’s interest, B, in pursuing its 
action is sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement: is B > B*? Step 3 
is a species of less restrictive alternatives analysis (and is frequently discussed 
in those terms). On its face, there is no balancing step. In these latter respects, 
this formulation may seem closest to the rule just considered for disparate 
impact cases under Title VII. 
When we examine strict scrutiny’s three steps more closely, further 
similarities with and differences from this Article’s stylized three-step 
decision procedure emerge. Step 1 poses the most striking contrast. Until 
now, the H > H* inquiry involved primarily a quantitative assessment.145 For 
strict scrutiny, at least on its face, step 1 seems to be qualitative and, in 
particular, categorical. That is, there appears to be a gradually evolving list of 
rights or interests, the infringement of which is deemed to count, which is to 
say, to trigger strict scrutiny.146 For them, there seems to be an on/off inquiry 
as to whether they are infringed. For those not on the list, strict scrutiny is 
not triggered, no matter how great the infringement. Under this 
interpretation, H* is not a quantitative threshold but rather constitutes some 
set, and the test is whether the H involves a type of harm that is an element 
in that set.147 Subsection I.A.1 explained how, as a final decision rule, a 
quantitative trigger was undesirable because insisting that H > H* (with H* a 
quantitative threshold) implied that there would be no liability even in some 
cases in which H > B—specifically, those in which H* ≥ H > B. 
Use of a categorical trigger might be motivated by the considerations 
noted in subsection I.A.2 on rules designed to constrain balancing, which, as 
mentioned, are particularly pertinent to some constitutional questions.148 
Specifically, there exist concerns that government actors might undervalue or 
even negatively value certain rights when the actors are motivated to entrench 
themselves or certain minorities are underrepresented or despised.149 There 
 
145Recall that, in Part III on Title VII disparate impact, there was some ambiguity about 
whether this referred to the magnitude of the disparate impact or the degree of confidence with 
which some disparate impact could be established (and it was also noted how the latter, in practice, 
is related to the former). 
146See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 567; Fallon, supra note 142, at 1268-69, 1316-21. 
147One might also interpret step 1 as including not only the task in a typical case of checking 
whether the allegedly infringed right is on the preexisting list but also the larger endeavor of 
deciding which rights are on the list and defining or adjusting various boundaries. 
148For elaboration, see Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1055-61. 
149Analogously, one could ask why it makes sense to have courts review private actors’ decisions 
in antitrust and Title VII. The answer is primarily that private actors are ordinarily trusted to 
advance their own interests, and the laws in question are designed to curb private self-interest when 
it comes at the expense of a greater social interest (that private actors do not credit on account of 
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is an obvious connection with many of strict scrutiny’s triggering rights: 
freedom of speech and the press, particularly for political speech, connect to 
the former concern; many forms of discrimination relate to the latter. 
In this regard, the categorical trigger can be regarded as jurisdictional: 
there is a need for close court review when the government acts in ways that 
raise questions about whether it can be trusted. Although the government 
decisionmakers being second-guessed typically have greater institutional 
competence in many respects, there are concerns that some actions may 
reflect improper motives rather than superior expertise.150 Subsection I.A.2 
notes, however, that this justification for judicial supervision does not 
necessarily imply that, once undertaken, it should proceed other than by 
balancing. If balancing makes sense in principle, and if we trust the courts,151 
then judicial review of other, less trusted government officials may most 
 
externalities; that is, the harm in question is to others, and the market does not operate in a fashion 
that is believed to result in the private actors indirectly bearing the harm). 
150See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 
984-85 (1987) (explaining, despite his generally critical stance toward balancing by courts in 
constitutional cases, that: “A better argument for the balancer is that the Court improves the 
balancing process by giving weight to interests that the legislature tends to ignore or undervalue. . . . 
First, it reinforces representation, ensuring that the interests of unpopular or underrepresented 
groups are counted and counted fairly. Second, it protects constitutional rights and interests that 
are sometimes forgotten in the hurly-burly of politics.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 
1996 Term, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 76 (1997) (“In the face of 
reasonable disagreement among the citizenry and between courts and legislatures, the two-tiered 
framework produced by the conjunction of suspect- and nonsuspect-content tests manifests a 
judicial aspiration to trust institutions of political democracy except in circumstances in which the 
democratic process is manifestly untrustworthy.”). This interpretation is consonant with the use of 
a highly deferential rational basis test in settings in which there is not deemed to be sufficient basis 
for distrust of the primary government decisionmaker’s actions. 
This overall orientation is associated with footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938): 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial 
minorities . . . ; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980) (emphasizing a procedural, representation-based justification for judicial review in 
constitutional cases). 
151Considerations other than mistrust (narrowly construed) might sometimes favor restrictions 
on balancing, such as the possibility that bestowing special status on an interest might help to ensure 
that it is given due weight in light of temptations to sacrifice it to seemingly pressing but less 
important considerations. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional 
Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1994). 
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sensibly be done through balancing once review is triggered.152 The 
consideration of how strict scrutiny’s step 2 and step 3 operate will address 
the extent to which that is done and whether any deviations may be justified 
by the concerns giving rise to judicial review in the first place. 
Even if step 1 is understood in largely categorical terms, we should 
consider whether it might also be taken to have a quantitative dimension (a 
point that will loom large in any event when we consider step 2 and step 3). 
First, the magnitude of the typical level of H could influence the tier of 
scrutiny that is applied.153 To the extent that it does, we have Hs of greater 
magnitude tending to require stronger justifications (levels of B) in order to 
be warranted. Looking ahead to step 2, even if B* were constant within a 
given tier, notably, strict scrutiny, if a higher tier has a larger B*, then it is as 
if higher Hs can only be offset with greater Bs. This phenomenon is akin to a 
crude sort of balancing—more like a step function than a continuous 
tradeoff.154 Note that if one made the further move of taking a sliding-scale 
approach to intermediate scrutiny,155 then that step function might be 
partially smoothed. 
Second, consider some particular realms in which it seems most plausible 
that strict scrutiny would also have a quantitative dimension to its trigger. 
Government actions unduly burdening the free exercise of religion were once 
 
152See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1058 & n.149 (discussing as well when such review may not 
appropriately involve balancing). 
153See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980) (invalidating an 
ordinance regulating charitable solicitation on first amendment grounds due to overbreadth where 
the ordinance imposed a “direct and substantial limitation on protected activity” and did not serve 
a sufficiently strong government interest); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental 
Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency to apply closer 
scrutiny to incidental burdens that are substantial). Many infringements of the freedom of speech 
are subject to strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions receive 
intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 
(1981); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). Consider as well that anti-littering ordinances 
undoubtedly impose some burden on leafleting and newspapers, and recycling regulations (for 
example, those requiring a separate bin for newspapers) may also impose disproportionate burdens 
that do place more than a minuscule even if not a very large burden on the press. 
154The connection is more crude than may be apparent if the B* in step 2—for a given tier of 
scrutiny—is fixed, that is, independent of the magnitude of the infringement. Then, for example, a 
massive infringement of a right subject to intermediate scrutiny may survive because the 
government’s interest barely exceeds a moderate B* (that is far less than the H associated with the 
infringement), and a very slight infringement of a right subject to strict scrutiny may be struck down 
because the government’s interest barely falls short of a huge B* (that is far greater than the H 
associated with the infringement). There could be a much larger H in the former case and a much 
larger B in the latter case, but the former infringement would be held valid and the latter invalid. 
That is, this step-function interpretation of levels of scrutiny, with a particular interpretation of how 
step 2 depends on the level of scrutiny, has some crude properties of balancing but nevertheless 
deviates substantially. 
155See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 568. 
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subject to strict scrutiny (and again are by statute, for federal government 
actions),156 and when that is done it seems difficult to avoid giving some 
quantitative content with respect to what counts as an undue burden.157 And 
a different outcome in Washington v. Davis158 would have made step 1 in 
constitutional disparate impact discrimination cases much like that under 
Title VII. If taking that path, a screening function involving some sort of 
quantitative threshold at step 1 might seem appealing in light of the large 
number of potential cases (and some adjustments at step 2, depending on how 
it is understood, may be required as well).159 By contrast, some qualitative 
triggers—such as content-based regulation of speech, burdens targeted at 
businesses in the news sector, or benefits and burdens targeted by race—
might be seen as involving infringements that are rarely appropriate and thus 
subject to an easily triggered step 1 (no quantification required) accompanied 
by steps 2 and 3 that are tough on the government. 
If step 1 is satisfied, step 2 then permits the government to justify the 
infringement by demonstrating that it advances a compelling interest. In this 
Article’s formulation, we ask whether B > B*. At this point, it is familiar that 
the threshold, B*, lies at the heart of understanding what step 2 really does. In 
this application, B* (and thus B) may be given a quantitative interpretation, a 
qualitative (categorical) interpretation, or both. Regarding the latter 
possibility, we might consider only Bs of a certain type and, if they are present, 
further demand that they exceed some quantitative threshold. If there was only 
a qualitative test, then any B, however small, would justify any infringement, 
however large, as long as the (perhaps minuscule) B was of the right type. 
Let us begin by considering the interpretation that B is purely 
quantitative. Specifically, assume that most160 government interests count and 
 
156Strict scrutiny was ended by Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which in turn 
was superseded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000), and 
in turn was held invalid as applied to the states in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See, e.g., 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 1318-36. 
157The points made in the notes on disparate impact, just below, are also apt for burdens on the 
free exercise of religion. 
158426 U.S. 229 (1976); see, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 740-42. 
159If, as will be discussed, there may be a qualitative limitation on what government interests 
count, and if those excluded (such as cost savings) are the justifications for a huge portion of actions 
that have incidental disparate impact, the implication may be to invalidate much government action. 
So what qualifies at step 1 may bear, under some views, on what interests should be allowed at step 2. 
160In the simplest case, all government interests would count. But presumably there are at least 
some limitations. For example, a restriction on the press could not be justified by the benefit of 
helping incumbents win reelection by stifling dissent, and racial discrimination could not be justified 
by a purported benefit of harming those of the targeted race. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences 
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). This type of limitation is present in the previous 
applications: in antitrust, higher profits from being better able to gouge consumers do not count in 
B, and under Title VII, certain employer benefits are not regarded to count (see supra note 111). 
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the central question is whether, in magnitude, B > B*. This version is now 
familiar. First, suppose that B* is set independently of the H in a given case. 
Then, if B* > H, there will exist cases in which the government’s action is struck 
down even though B > H, specifically, when B* ≥ B > H.161 If B* < H, there will 
be cases in which the government’s action is permitted even though H > B, which 
arises when H > B > B*. Unlike the stylized structured decision procedure in 
subsection I.A.1 and the structured rule of reason in antitrust—but like the 
protocol for disparate impact cases under Title VII—we do not avoid these 
latter errors on account of the more stringent balancing test that comes 
afterwards because there is no such step. (We might still be saved by a less 
restrictive alternative, considered momentarily—but not necessarily, because 
none may exist.) Under our stylized rule, step 2 was merely redundant in this 
case: when B* < H, step 2 imposed a weaker version of the ultimate balancing 
test that must be passed in any event. 
When B* is set independently of H, we will ordinarily be in one of these 
two situations.162 Subsection I.A.1 and subsequent analysis shows how the 
only way to avoid these errors is to set the B* in step 2 equal to the H 
determined in step 1. Then the step 2 test of whether B > B* becomes an 
inquiry into whether B > H, a pure balancing test. Moreover, as long as B* is 
(at least de facto) a positive function of H, step 2 analysis means that decisions 
are made as if balancing is undertaken.163 
Pursuing this matter further, under strict scrutiny we have the feature 
that, if step 1 is interpreted in an entirely categorical fashion—it is triggered 
by any infringement, no matter how small, of a qualifying right—then H was 
not quantified in step 1. Hence, under the presently contemplated 
 
161One might be skeptical about the existence of such cases because of the importance of the 
rights that trigger strict scrutiny. But this is a matter of the proper weights, not whether balancing 
is appropriate. Indeed, the very existence of a step 2 contemplates that sometimes infringements 
will be justified. Relatedly, it is not the case that all infringements of a given right, however 
important, are equal. A law restricting the ability to publically identify who is a spy (whether 
justified or not) is surely less weighty an infringement than one restricting the ability to refer by 
name to any government official. And, taking what many regard to be a sharp example, torture (see, 
e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1304 (discussing Charles Black’s use of this example)), surely there are 
definitional issues concerning matters of degree (including at the low end, in defining at what point 
the infliction of discomfort or fear qualifies as torture) and concerning numbers (is it just an 
individual who is known to have planted a nuclear bomb in a city? or is every citizen to be drawn 
and quartered until a perpetrator is identified?). Or consider a less colorful but nevertheless 
important example of, on one hand, a pollution regulation that raises, in particular, the cost of 
newsprint to one that imposes burdens on the production and disposal of newsprint that are 
sufficiently large that they destroy the newspaper industry. 
162The exception will be when, by happenstance, the H in a particular case just equals the B* that 
is set without regard to the facts of the case. Note, however, that when H happens to be close to B*, 
the resulting potential for error—in one direction or the other—will be small both because errors are 
unlikely and because the magnitude of the mistakes (the difference between H and B) will be small. 
163See Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1049-55. 
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interpretation of step 2, that prior conclusion should be understood merely 
as postponing by a step the need to quantify H. And, except in cases in which 
the government can offer no plausible B of any magnitude, this subsequent 
quantification will indeed be necessary. 
Furthermore, if the B proffered at step 2 purports to justify the action, 
then the ordinary understanding of the notion of justification is that the B 
must be sufficient to render the action appropriate. If “compelling interest” 
means that the interest must be compelling enough to warrant the 
infringement in the case at hand, then we have something akin to balancing 
at step 2. This conclusion is avoided if “compelling” is understood in a 
vacuum—to refer to some B* such that B > B* is necessary and sufficient to 
permit the infringement without regard to H, that is, no matter how massive 
or minuscule the infringement might be. 
Consider next the possibility that B* is qualitative rather than 
quantitative.164 (Implications for the combination case, with categorical 
limitations on what interests count, but a further quantitative requirement 
when the government does advance a qualifying interest, will be apparent.) 
Focusing on the purely qualitative interpretation, we can immediately see the 
difficulties by applying the prior analysis.165 First, when the government’s 
interest is deemed not of a type that counts—say, savings in administrative 
costs—then any infringement that passes step 1, no matter how small, cannot 
be justified by a B of the wrong type, no matter how large. So, if it costs half 
of GDP to administer a non-infringing version of a regulation, and the degree 
of infringement is quite small, there would be a violation, essentially shutting 
down the government and society. Second, when the interest does count, then 
even massive infringements would be justified by the tiniest B, as long as it 
 
164For example, Fallon, supra note 142, at 1316 (emphasis added), states that strict scrutiny’s step 
2 involves “determining which governmental interests count as compelling.” See also id. at 1321 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has frequently adopted an astonishingly casual approach to identifying 
compelling interests.”). 
165An additional, central question concerns the determination of which interests count and why. 
See id. at 1321-25; Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed 
Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932-37 (1988) (“Unfortunately, while 
decisions of the Supreme Court and opinions of various members of the Court have frequently 
described or treated governmental interests as compelling, few have explained why. Several opinions 
have simply denied the existence, relevance, or weight of particular governmental interests without 
further attempts at justification. Many opinions referring with approval to a compelling 
governmental interest have provided no derivation whatsoever of that interest. Other opinions have 
referred only to other cases that themselves provide no derivation. . . . Thus, with few exceptions, the 
Court has failed to explain the basis for finding and deferring to compelling governmental interests.” 
(footnotes omitted)). Richard Fallon further suggests that some Justices may be more or less inclined 
to count the interest advanced by the government based on the extent to which they agree with the 
decision to classify the infringement as one that should trigger strict scrutiny or, in any event, the 
importance of that type of infringement. See Fallon, supra note 142, at 1322-23. One can view this 
flexibility in the qualitative determination of compelling interests as a sort of implicit balancing. 
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was of the right type. (This latter problem is avoided if one combines a 
qualitative, categorical interpretation of step 2 with an appropriately 
fashioned quantitative requirement,166 but the former problem is not.) 
Another, related difficulty concerns whether a qualitative distinction is 
sustainable for most government interests that may be in play. Suppose that 
advancing national security or public safety counts but saving money does 
not. As the preceding example involving half the GDP dramatically 
illustrates, large avoided costs obviously translate into substantial impacts on 
security and safety, among other things. A moment’s reflection indicates that 
this relationship holds for smaller savings. If the national government has to 
spend a mere hundred million dollars a year more, one might expect, over the 
long run, that somewhat smaller funding would be available for security and 
safety. Although the probability and magnitude of budgetary impacts on 
these other government interests undoubtedly scale accordingly, this 
fundamental relationship holds.167 Accordingly, it seems unavoidable to 
suggest that, at least at some point, costs count, but then we would have 
bridged both the qualitative and quantitative divides. 
The permeability of qualitative categories for government interests can also 
be seen in other ways. Suppose that the government bans leafleting because 
some leaflets end up as litter, which must be removed. That interest would 
ordinarily be categorized as involving administrative inconvenience—that is, 
expense, not safety. But what of the fact that some leaflets inevitably blow 
into the street? Their removal (multiplying by the tens of thousands of 
government workers who dispose of litter) involves a small but strictly 
positive statistical risk of injuries. Likewise for traffic officers who need to be 
deployed when there are peaceful demonstrations. 
 
166The universality of the quantitative dimension does not seem to be widely appreciated, 
although it is sometimes recognized in particular instances. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1324 
(“Finally, because diversity is inherently a matter of degree, the question emerges whether the 
government’s interest should be defined as one in achieving diversity per se, or whether, instead, it 
should be regarded as one in attaining particular levels or increments of diversity? In other words, 
is there a compelling interest in moving from one level of diversity (that is more than zero) to 
another, higher level?” (footnote omitted)); Gottlieb, supra note 165, at 950 (in discussing Moore v. 
Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), states: “Given these questions, it is not child abuse in general but the 
specific risk of abuse, if any, that might result from requiring a prompt hearing, that must be weighed 
against the potential for injuries caused by delay during an unjustified removal.”). There is a 
difference between arguing that “[n]ot all compelling interests are equal,” id. at 970, and appreciating 
that, for any particular interest that might be regarded as compelling, there exists the quantitative 
question of the extent to which it is advanced by the infringement. An interest of half the weight is 
still more compelling if it is advanced ten times as much. 
167One could posit that all of the added costs will come from, say, the parks budget, none from 
defense, or that all will be funded by higher taxes. But unless courts will take over the operation of 
all government taxing and spending in perpetuity, the actual impacts will (on an expected basis) be 
more diffuse and spread across all functions with some probability. 
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These types of examples can also be run in reverse. Suppose that the 
government does establish a clear link between an infringement and national 
security or public safety, and suppose further that the magnitude of this 
interest is B. In most instances, there exists a way (and often many ways) to 
spend money to produce an offsetting impact on the same type of B.168 
Perhaps the interest is to keep military movements secret by reducing certain 
types of leaks. In that case, some additional expenditure on cybersecurity or 
other shielding might produce an equivalent enhancement, leaving the overall 
B of this type unaffected. So security and safety—of the magnitudes usually 
invoked—are really just about money after all.169 
Qualitative, categorical distinctions of this sort seem difficult to sustain, 
conceptually and normatively, and a strong quantitative focus, which requires 
consideration of the magnitudes of both B and H (the latter normally seen as 
confined to step 1), seems difficult to avoid. These points raise significant 
questions about the extent to which strict scrutiny cases that reach step 2 may 
involve balancing after all, as well as about the implications if they do not. 
Relatedly, the analysis suggests the possibility that courts often engage in 
balancing, consciously or subconsciously, even while crafting opinions that do 
not suggest that balancing has taken place. Put another way, strict scrutiny 
doctrine may operate as if balancing is undertaken to a greater extent than is 
already recognized.170 This possibility also raises the familiar question of 
 
168This variation may belong better at step 3, as a sort of less restrictive alternative: if the 
government wants to promote security by B, then instead of infringing the right, it could instead 
have raised the budget. What matters is that the outcome would be the same, and the qualitative, 
categorical boundary would have been crossed. 
169To take another example, suppose that Medicare—categorically or through a multi-factor risk 
assessment—made coverage for routine screening for melanoma a function of race, recognizing the 
starkly higher incidence on whites. Suppose further that this decision was made unanimously by a 
multi-racial panel of experts, applying the normal criteria used for other features of Medicare 
coverage. One might deem there to be a compelling public health interest in providing costly, 
routine screening for whites. But, of course, one could have screened everyone (perhaps an 
additional five million a year, at a cost of, say, $50 per screening, for an annual cost of $250,000,000). 
At that point, the benefit is no longer health but merely money. And, cycling back to where we 
began, one might counter-argue that, if all had to be covered, the budgetary impact would require 
trimming other coverage, which would translate the money back into a public health cost. (Note: 
superficial research by the author identified an undated source on an NIH website indicating that 
such screening is not covered by Medicare. Google searches and using the search function on 
Medicare’s website (the “is my test covered” search box) yielded no prompt, dispositive answer.) 
170See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1306-08; id. at 1307-08 (“In maintaining that strict scrutiny 
is sometimes applied as a balancing test, I do not mean to imply that it is always so applied or will 
bear no other interpretation. On the contrary, by juxtaposing the weighted balancing version of the 
test with the nearly categorical prohibition and illicit motive versions, I mean to suggest that a 
balancing interpretation is discordant with what the Court or its Justices have said and done in 
numerous cases. In addition, balancing applications frequently draw outraged protests from 
dissenting Justices who contend that the Court has betrayed the staunch commitment to preserve 
individual rights that the strict scrutiny test rightly embodies. My limited claim is that the Court 
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whether greater explicitness, which focuses analysis and enhances 
transparency, would be preferable. 
If the government does offer a sufficiently compelling interest, we move 
to step 3 on narrow tailoring, which involves a species of less restrictive 
alternatives analysis.171 A central question, the answer to which remains 
somewhat murky,172 is whether a qualifying alternative—notably, a more 
narrowly tailored regulation—must be equally effective (or very close) and, if 
not, how one then determines the outcome at step 3. Paralleling the 
discussion of this step in Title VII disparate impact cases, it would seem that 
the requisite analysis would depend on the underlying conception of the 
overall test and, in particular, the nature of step 2. 
If step 2 is taken to have no quantitative element, such that any B (no 
matter how small) of a qualifying type suffices to justify any infringement, 
then the corresponding analysis of less restrictive alternatives would seem to 
require equal effectiveness. As explained before, if an alternative is less 
effective, then, relative to that baseline, the original action boosts B. And if 
any positive B is enough to justify an infringement, then the original action 
would appear to be justified from this perspective. (Relatedly, like with Title 
 
sometimes applies a version of strict scrutiny that is little more than a balancing test.” (footnote 
omitted)); id. at 1336 (“[T]he catastrophe-avoidance and weighted balancing versions of the [strict 
scrutiny] test frequently require a seldom acknowledged proportionality-like judgment of whether 
marginal increments in the avoidance of risks or marginal reductions in the incidence of harms 
sufficiently justify infringements of fundamental rights in light of available, but typically less 
efficacious, alternatives.”); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 150, at 963-72 (emphasizing the degree of 
balancing employed in constitutional law); Fallon, supra note 150, at 77-83 (describing balancing tests 
in constitutional law); Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights 
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799 n.4 (2011) (discussing the majority and 
dissent’s strong disagreement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 478 F.3d 370 (2008), about whether 
balancing is frequent or rare). 
171The choice of the term “narrow tailoring” is naturally understood as byproduct of objections 
to overbreadth: if a restriction is overly broad, the solution is the particular less restrictive alternative 
of a more narrowly tailored version. But it is not clear that step 3 really means to be limited by this 
label. Consider a restriction that passes steps 1 and 2 and is not overly broad in the literal sense: 
perhaps it requires all individuals in domain X to do act Y, where Y is dichotomous and, moreover, 
the government interest from making an X do Y is the same for each individual (and not subject to 
economies of scale). But suppose that the government could instead require each X to do Z and that 
this alternative generates the same B but much less H. Taken literally, the original restriction passes 
step 3’s narrow tailoring requirement and thus is valid, but if step 3 is understood more broadly as a 
less restrictive alternatives inquiry, then step 3 fails, so the original restriction is invalid. 
172See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3118 
(2015) (“Not surprisingly, the U.S. case law on ‘less restrictive means’ sometimes obscures the distinction 
between ‘less restrictive means’ that are as effective and those that are not, in part because of the absence 
of any separate analysis of ‘proportionality as such.’”); id. at 3118 n.11 (citing conflicting cases). 
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VII disparate impact, if step 3 does require equal effectiveness, this carries 
the implication that step 2 must not have a quantitative dimension.173) 
It is familiar that courts and commentators, when speaking of equal 
effectiveness, often invoke the notion in rough terms, that is, contemplating that 
the less restrictive alternative may be a bit less effective but still close enough to 
equally effective to warrant striking down the restriction. For example, narrow 
tailoring may involve some loss, perhaps due to the forgone prophylactic effect 
of a broader restriction174 or because it may be harder in practice to prove that 
the narrower restriction has been violated (even when it truly was). To that 
extent, then, some tradeoffs are being made. And, as usual, once that is 
contemplated, it is natural to ask why we would not tolerate somewhat more 
sacrifice in B, as long as the concomitant reduction in H was even larger.175 
If step 2 does have a quantitative dimension, then the second balance—
or, equivalently, the delta/delta test—is appropriate for assessing less 
restrictive alternatives. (Accordingly, the inputs are H and B, and also H ′ and 
B ′.) The intuition is that, for an alternative to be less restrictive, it must 
reduce H (from H to H ′), and whether we should require this depends on 
whether the reduction in B (from B to B ′) is smaller, making the sacrifice in 
the government’s interest (ΔB) worth the reduction in the degree of 
infringement (ΔH). A closely analogous statement can be made using the 
language of narrow tailoring, as elaborated in the margin.176 Put more sharply, 
 
173And similar logic applies to the next case: if step 3 does involve balancing, this suggests that, 
if part of a coherent whole, then step 2 must involve balancing. 
174Cf. Fallon, supra note 142, at 1272 (“The Court’s employment of the terms ‘necessity’ and 
‘narrow tailoring’ conceals a further ambiguity: If a challenged statute is necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest in the sense that nothing else would do as well, should the statute 
still be invalidated if it is not narrowly tailored in the sense that it employs admittedly overbroad, 
prophylactic restrictions? An example . . . would come from a prophylactic measure designed to 
protect national security in a context in which no more narrowly tailored restrictions on individual 
rights would so effectively reduce the risk of a calamitous terrorist strike. Astonishingly, after 
roughly forty years of experience with the strict scrutiny formula, the Court seems never to have 
resolved the question of when, if ever, overinclusive prophylactic statutes could be upheld on the 
ground that they are necessary to promote compelling interests.”). 
175It is hard to avoid the interpretation that, at least sometimes, judges will describe an 
alternative as equally effective when they know full well that it is not, in order to avoid speaking in 
explicitly quantitative terms about H and B, as well as H ′  and B ′ . 
176Taking the sometimes metaphorical invocation of narrow tailoring quite literally, we can 
imagine a restriction that, when maximal, involves the largest H and B. As the restriction is gradually 
narrowed—in an optimal fashion so that the initial narrowing eliminates from the restriction’s reach 
the part of its domain with the greatest ratio of H incurred to B generated (equivalently, the greatest 
difference between ΔH and ΔB)—at first the combined effect is advantageous, but as the coverage 
shrinks ever further, the marginal tradeoff becomes worse and worse, until at some point it is optimal 
to stop. (Of course, if the restriction has little value even at its core, the optimal stopping point would 
involve no restriction whatsoever.) In this sense, narrow tailoring—or less restrictive alternatives 
analysis more broadly—can be understood as explicitly posing a marginal, delta/delta type of inquiry 
with respect to the design—and court review—of restrictions. Cf. Fallon, supra note 142, at 1330-31 
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this view holds that, on one hand, we would prefer a less restrictive alternative 
that eliminated most or all of the original H, even at some (perhaps slight) 
sacrifice in B, but we would prefer the original restriction if the best 
alternative reduces H modestly but eliminates most or all of B (where, 
moreover, we know from step 2 that B > H for the enacted version). It is 
recognized that, accordingly, some balancing may occur under strict scrutiny 
at this step,177 but it is less often appreciated that this phenomenon is 
derivative of step 2 having balanced the H and B from the original restriction 
(even if that balance was submerged). 
Viewed in its particulars and as a whole, strict scrutiny doctrine does 
depart importantly from the stylized structured decision procedure 
introduced in subsection I.A.1 and, in varying degrees, from the other 
applications considered earlier in this Article. Nevertheless, this Article’s 
framework sharpens our understanding of strict scrutiny’s three-part test, 
often in the same way that the analysis illuminated other structured protocols. 
In addition, each of the issues identified in subsection I.A.2’s discussion 
of queasiness about balancing seems particularly apt with respect to strict 
scrutiny. Because of the nature of the interests involved, regarding both the 
character of the infringements and of the government’s interests, it is hardly 
surprising that courts are reluctant to engage in either quantification178 or 
direct comparisons179—at least explicitly, for we have seen that, particularly 
 
(“In determining whether a particular degree of statutory under- or overinclusiveness is tolerable, a 
court must judge whether the damage or wrong attending an infringement on protected rights is 
constitutionally acceptable in light of the government’s compelling aims, the probability that the 
challenged policy will achieve them, and available alternative means of pursuing the same goals. . . . 
In assessing whether this consideration should be controlling, it may therefore be important to take 
note of whether a less restrictive alternative exists that would achieve almost as much risk reduction 
while infringing less on protected rights. Once again, it thus seems impossible to think sensibly about 
compelling governmental interests and the narrow tailoring requirement as if they were sequentially 
isolated components of a bifurcated two-step inquiry—or as if every compelling interest were equally 
compelling or every infringement of a triggering right equally disturbing.”); Jackson, supra note 172, 
at 3117-18 (discussing a case in which the Israeli High Court of Justice, in undertaking proportionality 
analysis, seemed to require that a less restrictive alternative be equally effective but then reintroduced 
more of a delta/delta framework in the final, proportionality step). 
177See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 142, at 1325 (“To put the question this way might seem to collapse the 
narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny into the compelling interest element of the test. As reformulated, 
the question essentially becomes whether there is a compelling governmental interest in achieving as 
much reduction in the risk or incidence of harm as a challenged regulation is likely to achieve.”). 
178Consider the sort of factfinding that would be required if a court were to take seriously the 
challenge of quantifying risks to public safety or national security, rather than retreating to dichotomous 
pronouncements about whether the pertinent threats in a particular case are “compelling,” which 
judgments in turn seem to be predicated on something akin to de facto judicial notice. 
179See, e.g., Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“This process is ordinarily called ‘balancing,’ . . . but the scale analogy 
is not really appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging 
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”); Fallon, supra note 142, at 1270 
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at step 2 and step 3, both are hard to avoid and may not actually be eschewed, 
at least at some level. The decisions are made as if balancing is undertaken.180 
As well, categorical rules sometimes play a role when review is predicated on 
mistrust of other government actors, including in a constitutional context, 
and step 1 seems to reflect such considerations. 
Furthermore, subsection I.B.1’s lessons on optimal information gathering, 
which have not been the focus in this section, also have some relevance. A 
familiar point is that, when there is an obvious less restrictive alternative, it 
may be helpful to start, and end, the analysis there rather than exert excessive 
effort in making hard calls at step 2. Although strict scrutiny is often stated 
as a sequential inquiry, there seems to be some tolerance for flexibility when 
appropriate.181 Other features of strict scrutiny can be viewed through this 
lens, notably, when some infringements are deemed, at step 1, not to be 
infringements for reasons that have more to do with the government’s 
compelling interests that are supposedly deferred to step 2. For example, the 
speech involved in undertaking bribery or other forms of criminal conspiracy, 
 
(stating, in reference to strict scrutiny: “To count as a solution to the problem, a doctrinal structure 
needed, among other things, to impose discipline, or at least the appearance of discipline, on judicial 
decisionmaking and thus to escape the taint both of Lochneresque second-guessing of legislative 
judgments and of flaccid judicial ‘balancing.’” (emphasis added)). Relatedly, some commentators 
strongly question the extent to which such constitutional decisions should be made through 
balancing. See, e.g., BERNHARD SCHLINK, ABWÄGUNG IM VERFASSUNGSRECHT (1976); 
Aleinikoff, supra note 150. 
180See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 150, at 80 (“This strong criticism is quite mistaken if ‘balancing’ is 
conceived, as it should be, as a metaphor for (rather than a literal description of) decision processes 
that call for consideration of the relative significance of a diverse array of potentially relevant factors. 
Understood in this way, the term ‘balancing’ does not signify that decisionmaking necessarily proceeds 
by reducing all relevant considerations to a single metric, assigning them quantitative values, and then 
weighing them against one another with the precision of a scale. If this misleading picture is rejected 
and ‘balancing’ is viewed as a metaphor for multifactor decisionmaking, the ‘incommensurability’ 
objection becomes either too strong or too weak. It is too strong to be credited at all—because too 
inconsistent with the deepest assumptions of practical reasoning—if it suggests that, when different 
kinds of considerations bear on a decision, there can be ‘no basis in our knowledge of value’ to say 
that one decision is rationally preferable to another.” (footnotes omitted)); Jackson, supra note 172, at 
3156-57 (“Even absent a common metric, however, judgments about the relative priority of two values 
can be rational. An example is ‘large-small trade-offs’ involving a small sacrifice of one value for a 
large gain in another. It is a mistake to understand balancing in mathematical terms: rather, 
‘proportionality as such’ balancing should entail a reasoning process about the priority of one 
constitutional value as it relates to another in a particular setting.” (footnote omitted)); Kaplow, supra 
note 1, at 1049-55; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 150, at 972 (“We rarely hear objections that legislatures 
are unable to value and compare competing social interests. Furthermore, we expect courts to make 
exactly these kinds of judgments in crafting common law doctrine.”). 
181Cf. Fallon, supra note 142, at 1333 (“In contrast with this bifurcated sequence, I have suggested 
that the effort to identify compelling interests and to determine the adequacy of regulatory tailoring is 
likely to involve fluid, two-way traffic in which assessments of ends and means occur simultaneously—
at least in cases in which challenged governmental regulations, viewed realistically, will at best merely 
reduce risks or incidences of harm more or less effectively than would other regulations.”). 
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such as price-fixing, may be regarded as unprotected even though the legal 
prohibitions are unquestionably content-based.182 
Potential interactions among the steps are even greater to the extent that 
intent is made part of the inquiry. Notably, the nature of the government’s 
purported justification and the plausibility of proffered less restrictive 
alternatives may illuminate intent, which for facially neutral laws that 
discriminate may be part of the requisite analysis at step 1. Likewise, if instead 
disparate impact were sufficient, then as we saw in Part III there would be 
additional ways that attempts to sequentially silo step 1 and step 2 would be 
counterproductive. 
B. Proportionality Analysis 
Proportionality analysis is employed in varying ways in a number of 
jurisdictions and is proposed by some as a replacement for strict scrutiny—
and the other tiers of review—in the United States.183 These approaches are 
united in that they have a core (and a name) that focuses explicitly on 
balancing in some sense.184 The brief treatment here will focus on 
 
182See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). Of course, these domain restrictions might 
be justified not only by looking ahead to step 2’s B but also, at step 1, on the ground that they do not 
involve the type of H that counts, or, indeed, any H. It is also natural to consider the reverse: perhaps 
a significant reason that some infringements have been deemed to trigger strict scrutiny (including 
many forms of facial discrimination and content-based regulation of speech) is that a look ahead to 
step 2’s consideration of government justifications suggests that they will rarely be sufficient and 
often nonexistent (confining attention to legitimate interests, that is). Such thinking, for example, 
underlies the per se illegality of price-fixing under antitrust law and helps to explain why even small 
infringements trigger strict scrutiny (which is often fatal), notably, when they are blatant. 
183See, e.g., AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., 2012); NIELS PETERSEN, PROPORTIONALITY AND JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN CANADA, GERMANY AND SOUTH 
AFRICA, ch. 1 (2017); Jackson, supra note 172; Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170; see also 
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 44-110, 394-414 (Julian Rivers trans., 
2002) (discussing respects in which German constitutional rights norms are amenable to balancing 
that takes the form of proportionality analysis). 
184Note that the term “proportionality,” if applied literally to an infringement of degree H and 
a government interest of magnitude B, means that the restriction will be approved if and only if B 
exceeds some constant multiplied by H, which is the constant of proportionality. If this constant is 
not 1, we could restate the units of H (or of B) to convert the balancing-like formulation into a pure 
H > B test. For example, if the factor is 5, so that the literal proportionality requirement is that a 
restriction is upheld if and only if B > 5H, we can transform our measure of H so that each original 
unit equals 5 converted units. (One could perform nonlinear transformations, so that if the concept 
of proportionality means more loosely that the minimally requisite B is increasing in H, but perhaps 
more or less steeply at different levels of H, one could, through a monotonic but nonlinear 
transformation, convert the units of H to conform to a simple balancing test.) To this reader, 
discussions of proportionality analysis do not clearly indicate whether “proportional” literally means 
proportional or is used in a looser sense that merely indicates this positive relationship that is 
associated with some manner of making tradeoffs. (My best guess is the latter.) 
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instantiations of proportionality analysis that, at least on their surface, involve 
a structured inquiry.185 These typically conclude with a final step involving 
proportionality (balancing186) as such, but precede it with other steps that, if 
they have independent bite, would generate some outcomes that differ from 
those under unconstrained balancing. Under another interpretation, the 
stated steps may be more of a checklist that reminds judges and 
communicates to primary actors certain features involved in balancing that 
might otherwise be given insufficient attention. Under that interpretation—
or for proportionality analysis that has no structure and simply asks the 
bottom-line question of whether the government’s interest, B, is large enough 
to justify the magnitude of the infringement, H—we have pure balancing, an 
approach that has already been considered at length and was implicitly 
compared to strict scrutiny in the preceding section. 
For concreteness, consider the following five-step structured protocol, 
which seems close to depictions of constitutional review in Canada187 as well 
as to some other formulations.188 For brevity, this statement will combine a 
 
185Not all do. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 172, at 3098-99. 
186See, e.g., R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 139 (Can.) (“Although the nature of the 
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case courts will be required 
to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups.”); id. at 140 (“Even if an 
objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two elements of the proportionality test are 
satisfied, it is still possible that, because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on 
individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The 
more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the 
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”). Although 
this final step is not always described as literally involving the act of balancing the competing 
interests—see, e.g., Jackson, supra note 172, at 3099-100 (“While this step is sometimes referred to as 
involving ‘balancing,’ the ‘proportionality as such’ question in structured proportionality doctrine 
differs from ‘balancing’ tests that tend to focus primarily on quantification of net social good . . . .”); 
cf. Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 803 (“Most judges . . . would not characterize 
balancing in such blunt, utilitarian terms.”)—it is difficult to see what difference is intended, that is, 
other than the presence of the preceding, structured decision procedure, which is the focus of the 
present analysis. (Keep in mind that placing a high weight on one side of the balance does not change 
the qualitative character of balancing. See supra note 184.) 
187See Oakes, 1. S.C.R. at 134-40; Jackson, supra note 172, at 3099-101, 3111-14. 
188See, e.g., PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 2 (describing the German Constitutional Court’s first 
step as determining whether a right has been restricted and the second step as determining whether 
there is adequate justification, with the latter step having four components: whether the purpose is 
legitimate, the measure is rationally connected to the purpose, there exists no less restrictive 
alternative that is equally effective, and finally proportionality in the strict sense); Mathews & Stone 
Sweet, supra note 170, at 802-03 (“[There is a preliminary (unnumbered) stage in which] the judge 
considers whether a prima facie case has been made to the effect that a government act burdens the 
exercise of a right”; “The first stage . . . mandates inquiry into the ‘suitability’ of the measure under 
review. The government must demonstrate that the relationship between the means chosen and the 
ends pursued is rational and appropriate, given a stated policy purpose.”; “The second step—
‘necessity’—embodies what Americans know as a ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement. At the core of 
necessity analysis is a least-restrictive-means (LRM) test, through which the judge ensures that the 
measure at issue does not curtail the right more than is necessary for the government to achieve its 
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description of the rule on its own terms with an unapologetic translation into 
the parlance of this Article. Step 1 asks if the infringement, causing H, is 
sufficient to trigger review, by reference to some H* (which, as will be 
discussed, might be interpreted to be categorical in whole or in part). If not, 
the challenger loses. If it is, step 2 asks the government to show a legitimate 
purpose. As usual, this may be viewed as a test of whether B > B* (which also 
raises the qualitative/quantitative question, and in particular we will be 
interested in the possibility that B* = 0). If not, the government loses. If it 
succeeds, step 3 asks if the connection between the infringement, H, and the 
government interest, B, is rational. Again, if not, the government loses. If it 
is, step 4 asks if the interest is advanced in a manner that involves minimal 
impairment (or various other phrasings that suggest an inquiry into less 
restrictive alternatives).189 If not (that is, if there does exist a less restrictive 
alternative), the government loses. If the impairment is minimal, we then 
proceed to step 5, which involves proportionality (balancing) as such. 
As a preliminary comparison with strict scrutiny—which suggests much 
of the analysis to follow—observe the following: The first steps of each may 
be regarded to be similar. (The main difference may be that proportionality 
analysis sweeps more broadly, covering, for example, infringements that 
would be subject to intermediate scrutiny in the United States, but if the 
subsequent demands for justification would be correspondingly lower in such 
cases, substantial correspondence would remain.) The second step (perhaps 
combined with the third) might be seen as similar to step 2 under strict 
scrutiny. The fourth step of proportionality analysis, on minimal impairment, 
would be matched to step 3’s less restrictive alternatives inquiry under strict 
scrutiny. Finally, proportionality’s fifth step, balancing, is absent under strict 
scrutiny—although, as we have seen, under some interpretations it may be 
understood to arise under that rule’s step 2 and step 3. 
Now let us consider explicitly the five steps of proportionality analysis, which 
will allow us to see the extent to which this rough characterization may be apt 
and what other interpretations are possible. Proportionality analysis’s step 1 
seems to be an on/off categorical test, in which case the earlier discussion under 
 
goals.”; “The third step—balancing stricto sensu—is also known as ‘proportionality in the narrow 
sense.’ In the balancing phase, the judge weighs, in light of the facts, the benefits of the act (already 
found to have been narrowly tailored) against the costs incurred by infringement of the right, in 
order to decide which side shall prevail.” (footnotes omitted)). 
189For example, Germany’s formulation refers to the less restrictive alternatives inquiry using 
the language of whether the restriction is “necessary,” see, e.g., Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence and 
Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?, 78 IND. L.J. 
567, 582 (2003), which is reminiscent of the “reasonably necessary” language sometimes used under 
antitrust’s rule of reason, but has the potential drawback that literal interpretations of “necessary” 
can be extreme and thus potentially misleading, a point discussed with regard to the business 
necessity formulation of an employer’s justification in Title VII disparate impact cases. 
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strict scrutiny would be applicable. However, it appears that in many jurisdictions 
the list is longer and, in particular, at least some alleged infringements are 
assessed quantitatively as well. This possibility was also addressed above, for 
example, when noting the previous application of strict scrutiny to burdens on 
the free exercise of religion caused by facially neutral regulations and also the 
possibility that disparate impact claims would have been allowed in cases of 
discrimination allegedly caused by facially neutral restrictions. 
Step 2, which involves some sort of B > B* inquiry, raises a number of 
now-familiar issues. Under one view, this is a purely qualitative test—whether 
the government’s purpose is legitimate or otherwise of a nature that counts 
at all and, if it is, we only require B > 0.190 Problems under this interpretation 
were discussed at length with respect to strict scrutiny, but a key difference 
here is that there will be balancing later, in step 5. As a consequence, step 2 
may have little bite but practices with B < H will be struck down in step 5. 
However, as explained previously, if the interests that count, qualitatively, are 
substantially circumscribed, then many laws may be struck down even though 
B > H, where the B here interprets the notion of acceptable interests more 
broadly. Recall also the troubles associated with advancing significant 
categorical limitations on government interests. 
Suppose instead (or in addition) that step 2 is quantitative. This 
possibility is suggested by statements familiar in Canadian law that the 
infringement must be “demonstrably justified” and that it must serve a 
“pressing and substantial” government interest.191 It is difficult to see how one 
can assess whether the government’s proffered purpose is pressing or 
substantial without engaging in any quantification. Likewise, the requirement 
that the infringement be justified seems to indicate that it be, well, justified. 
As explained, justification ordinary denotes a reason sufficient to warrant the 
act in question.192 Regardless of what may be the best interpretation in 
Canada or elsewhere, let us consider this case explicitly. 
When step 2 is indeed quantitative, we have a similar (but not identical) 
diagnosis as with strict scrutiny. If B* > H, then some restrictions will be 
condemned even though B > H. On the other hand, if B* < H, we do not have 
(as with strict scrutiny or Title VII disparate impact) that some restrictions 
 
190This characterization is more consistent with that offered in PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 74 
(suggesting that the inquiry is confined to whether the purpose advanced is “legitimate”), than that 
described earlier in the text here and in the next paragraph, which refers to the formulation that 
seems to be used in Canada (although this is one of the jurisdictions that Petersen considers). 
191See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135, 138-39 (Can.). 
192Consider one of the interpretations of Canada’s step 2 offered in Jackson, supra note 172, at 3100 
(emphasis added): the step is said to ask “whether the government’s purpose is sufficiently important to 
serve as a basis for limiting the right at all.” If one focuses on “sufficiently important,” a quantitative 
interpretation is suggested, but if one focuses on “at all,” one might regard B* to equal zero. 
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will be permitted even though H > B because, at step 5, that very question 
will be asked and, if the answer is affirmative, the restriction will be 
condemned at that point. As explained previously, this case in which step 2 is 
nonbinding may be regarded as irrelevant. But it would be pointless—if 
proceeding sequentially—to struggle over whether B > B* if that is a close call 
whereas it is obvious that B < H in any event. That is, we will sometimes end 
up avoiding an easy balance at step 5 by performing a more difficult 
comparison at step 2. 
Finally, once B* is viewed as having a quantitative dimension, it makes the 
most sense to set B* = H because doing so uniquely avoids the preceding two 
problems. But when that is done, step 2 amounts to asking whether B > H,193 
which is precisely the balancing that purports to be located in step 5.194 Note 
further that the government will only fail with any frequency at step 2 if B* is 
nontrivial (or if, under the other interpretation, there is a significant 
categorical limitation on what types of Bs count), which means that, if step 2 
is being done sensibly, we have indeed balanced, just without admitting it.195 
(This point is consequential for the additional reason that sometimes 
proportionality analysis is advanced on the ground that it makes 
decisionmaking more transparent.196) As mentioned, this point would be moot 
if B* = 0 (or nearly so) and, moreover, there are no significant categorical 
limitations on B. But then step 2 simply does not matter very often. 
 
193This assessment, just as under strict scrutiny, means that H must be quantified at step 2—
well before step 5—even if it did not have to be quantified at step 1. 
194More broadly, as discussed in connection with strict scrutiny, once B* is, at least implicitly, made 
a positive function of H, we again have an instance in which decisions are made as if under balancing. 
195It is also possible, as noted, to set B* < H. The lower B* is, the less often step 2 strikes down 
a government action, but the more often we do a subsequent comparison, ultimately (if step 5 is 
reached), but with B* in essence elevated to H. 
196See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 172, at 3142-44; Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 804 
(Proportionality analysis (PA) “is a highly formalized argumentation framework, the basic function 
of which is to organize a systematic assessment of justifications for government measures that would 
burden the exercise of a right. A government must explain such acts, which PA subjects to the 
highest standard of judicial scrutiny. In doing so, PA enhances the transparency of rights review, not 
least by making explicit the justifications for limiting rights the court has either accepted or rejected 
and at precisely what stage of the analysis.”); but see id. at 807 (stating that, through the use of 
proportionality analysis, “judges can bring a semblance of determinacy to balancing by subjecting it 
to a fixed procedure” (emphasis added), suggesting perhaps that it is through deception rather than 
transparency that this mode of judicial decisionmaking would be legitimated); id. (“PA bestows a 
sheen of politico-ideological neutrality on a court” (emphasis added)); id. at 810 (“An opponent of 
PA may well conclude that, at best, PA is little more than fancy, doctrinal window dressing for what 
is, in fact, generic law making by any other name.”); see also PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 68 (arguing 
that when a court engages in explicit balancing, in the final step of the proportionality inquiry, 
transparency is at its greatest, a point that suggests that courts wishing to disguise their balancing 
may undertake it implicitly at earlier steps in the analysis); id. at 189 (same); id. at 150-53 (arguing 
that two prominent German constitutional decisions that invoked categorical prohibitions merely 
disguised important balancing and failed to examine competing considerations carefully). 
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Step 3 will be passed over quickly here because of the suggestion that, in 
at least some proportionality jurisdictions, this step rarely binds.197 Note that, 
to the extent it is quite undemanding but does sometimes bind, the need for 
balancing in step 5 will have been avoided198 only when the balance would 
have been easy.199 
Step 4, the inquiry into minimal impairment, raises many of the issues 
regarding inquiries into less restrictive alternatives that were developed in 
subsection I.A.2—and, in this instance, the analysis may more resemble the 
application to antitrust’s rule of reason than that for strict scrutiny, just above. 
Suppose, for present purposes, that balancing has not taken place at step 2, taking 
the five-step rubric on its face and setting to the side the analysis just offered. (If 
step 2 does involve full balancing, then the analysis offered for strict scrutiny, 
under the quantitative understanding of its step 2, would be applicable.) 
Because proportionality analysis is, at the core, a balancing regime, it seems 
natural to focus on the quantitative version of less restrictive alternatives 
analysis,200 which involves the second balance or, equivalently, the delta/delta 
test.201 Under the presently maintained assumptions, we have the strange 
predicament considered previously: to answer step 4’s question, we need to 
 
197See also PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 168 (“According to the German interpretation, a 
measure is already rationally connected to a purpose if it marginally contributes to the promotion 
of the latter. A severe restriction of an individual right would thus pass the rational connection stage 
even if it has only a minimal positive impact. However, the low effectiveness has to be taken into 
account at the balancing stage.” (footnote omitted)); Jackson, supra note 172, at 3117 (“Canadian cases 
rarely turn on this third step . . . .”). Alternatively, sometimes an action may be regarded as lacking 
a rational connection to a purpose because of the clear availability of a less restrictive means, in 
which case one might usefully combine consideration of these two steps. See PETERSEN, supra note 
183, at 74. However, my impression from reading the literature on proportionality analysis that 
examines particular cases is that this step binds more often than is acknowledged (as suggested, for 
example, by the reference in the next footnote). 
198See, e.g., PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 105 (describing two recent cases in which the Canadian 
Supreme Court invalidated laws for lack of a rational connection where there is some suggestion 
that balancing was implicitly undertaken). 
199It could only be difficult if the infringement was likewise small. But, repeating a refrain begun 
in subsection I.A.1, when difficult balances are avoided by short-circuiting the process, the inevitable 
result is that sometimes the final outcomes will be erroneous. 
200That said, this step is often described as requiring that the alternative means be “equally 
effective,” PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 2 (describing the protocol in the German Constitutional 
Court), although in practice (as we have seen elsewhere) this may be relaxed. See id. at 11 (“Often, 
these alternative measures are not quite as effective as the adopted measure. However, the court 
does not deem the difference in effectiveness sufficiently important to justify the more severe 
restriction of the individual right.”). 
201If not—and if, in particular, any B > 0 was sufficient at step 2—then step 4 could be seen as 
requiring equal effectiveness. Under that view, when step 5 is reached, either less restrictive 
alternatives analysis would be repeated, but at that point using the balancing version, or less 
restrictive alternatives would be off the table (step 4 having been passed by the government), so an 
infringement would be valid as long as B > H, even though there exists a less restrictive alternative 
that would be superior under the balancing version of that inquiry. 
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know H, B, H ′ , and B ′  and to undertake analysis that involves the full richness 
of the basic balancing test (whether H > B), but we have not yet reached the 
balancing stage. Of course, one could and naturally would incorporate the core 
balancing inquiry, but then stating step 5 as a final step would be a 
misnomer,202 and any suggestion that step 4 may avoid the need for balancing 
would be substantially misleading.203 In addition, sometimes the less 
restrictive alternatives analysis will be difficult—because it is a close call or 
because collecting information on H ′  or B ′   is particularly challenging—yet 
the underlying balance (supposedly deferred to step 5) may lead to clear 
condemnation, notably, when B is obviously less than H to begin with. (Recall 
that we are supposing here that this core balancing was not performed 
previously, at step 2.204) 
Step 5, proportionality as such, has already been discussed at the outset of 
this segment, explaining that it seems akin to balancing, and explicitly so. A 
central observation about step 5 involves elaboration of some of the previous 
framing comments on proportionality analysis. On one hand, it is often 
suggested that the intermediate steps—steps 2 and 4 in particular—have bite, 
deciding many cases and, as a consequence, avoiding the need to undertake 
balancing very often. As we have seen, the former (that many cases are decided, 
against the government, at steps 2 or 4) can arise in two ways. First, one or both 
of those steps may implicitly involve the full balancing test, asking whether 
H > B. Then, even though step 5 is not reached, balancing has occurred. 
Second, step 2 may often be decisive (against the government) but 
without having balanced H against B. In that event, some balancing is 
avoided. But this involves three situations: H exceeds B substantially, in 
which case the avoided balance would have been easy; B exceeds H 
 
202These points raise questions about observations like Vicki Jackson’s that “Canadian cases 
rarely turn on this [final proportionality] step, generally finding laws unconstitutional on minimal 
impairment grounds.” Jackson, supra note 172, at 3117. If the minimal impairment inquiry, as 
suggested in the text, itself involves a form of balancing and requires the court to determine all that 
is necessary to undertake the final step’s balancing, this suggestion seems curious. The alternative is 
that Canadian courts require equally effective alternatives (which would be inconsistent with the 
foundation of proportionality analysis) and, moreover, find them routinely to be so (which may 
involve wishful thinking or dissembling). Some recognize that the analysis of less restrictive 
alternatives under proportionality analysis may well involve some implicit balancing, see, e.g., 
PETERSEN, supra note 183, at 130-34, but such comments do not suggest the degree of potential 
entanglement of the two steps indicated in the text here. 
203As explained previously, sometimes difficult balances will indeed be avoided, notably, when 
the second balance (or delta/delta test) is easy but the underlying balance is a close call. But there are 
also the opposite cases, noted in the text. If the steps were regarded as combined (collapsed), then 
one could do whichever was easiest in a given case, which one suspects tends to occur in any event. 
204Under this set of interpretations, neither H nor B may have had to be quantified previously. 
(If step 2 sets B* > 0, but B* does not depend on H, then B will have had to be quantified there.) 
But, to perform the second balance (or the delta/delta test), we do need to know both H and B (and 
more), so to forgo asking whether B is obviously less than H at this step seems senseless. 
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substantially, in which case we have avoided an easy balance and reached the 
wrong outcome (this can arise when B* is significantly above H); and H and 
B are closer together, so a difficult balance is avoided, but this is done by 
assigning liability even though this may well involve an incorrect outcome. If 
this is how proportionality analysis operates, and it often avoids reaching step 
5, the results are quite problematic, indeed, from the core perspective 
embodied in the proportionality framework itself. 
On the other hand, it may be that one or both of steps 2 and 4 are rarely 
binding. If we set B* = 0 at step 2, or close to that, then step 2 only takes out 
cases in which step 5’s balance would have been easy and come out the same 
way.205 The presence of step 2 may nevertheless be regarded as valuable in a 
different manner (other than in how it affects outcomes) by reminding courts 
and signaling to government actors the importance of justifying serious 
infringements. Although conceivable, this view is difficult to reconcile with 
setting B* = 0, because then the message sent by this step is that virtually 
anything that advances a legitimate purpose justifies serious infringements 
(with any stiffer message relegated to the balancing step, which would exist 
even without the preceding structured inquiries).206 
In reflecting on my own modest exposure to the literature on 
proportionality analysis, I am sometimes left with the impression that some 
proponents implicitly wish to have their cake and eat it too.207 They wish to 
claim that various of the steps are important—they bind, and may help avoid 
difficult balances—and also that the framework is really, at its core, all about 
proportionality.208 The analysis is disciplined, suggesting that it is often 
 
205As discussed, it may be immaterial whether the underlying H > B test is conducted in step 4 
or in step 5, or is undertaken by one who notices an obvious violation at step 4 and then skips ahead 
to step 5. Nevertheless, as suggested, this entanglement of the steps despite insistence on their 
separation may generate confusion and undermine transparency. 
206Courts adopting this view may, on one hand, set B* = 0—or perhaps really engage in balancing 
at step 2—but nevertheless announce through their opinions that infringements must be 
“demonstrably justified,” by advancing “pressing and substantial” interests, which government actors 
(who read the words but do not understand the actual operation of proportionality analysis) take to 
impose a heftier step 2 requirement. Alternatively, there may be less disconnect if infringements 
ordinarily survive balancing only when B is large, and the only mismatch is that such language is 
attached to step 2 when it really operates through balancing, nominally at step 5 but perhaps often 
implicitly being undertaken at step 2. 
207Regarding not only those who write about proportionality analysis but also scholars of strict 
scrutiny, Title VII disparate impact, and antitrust, I also frequently get the sense that it is believed 
that less restrictive alternatives analysis rescues us from the need to engage in difficult balancing. 
See, e.g., supra note 41 (discussing this phenomenon in connection with antitrust’s rule of reason). As 
explained, however, proper analysis of less restrictive alternatives requires knowing not only H and 
B but also H ′  and B ′, and itself involves a balancing test—which sometimes, to be sure, may be 
easier than determining whether H > B, but it may as often be harder. 
208For example, Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet argue that proportionality analysis 
“comprises a multi-stage balancing framework; that is, judicial balancing is not restricted to the final 
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decisive, but it is not discussed that it may accordingly deviate from the 
outcomes that would be reached under a direct inquiry into proportionality 
as such. Regardless of what is actually true of various proponents’ intentions 
and understandings, the suggestion here is that the attempt to define each 
step’s requirements more explicitly—by matching them against the stylized 
structured decision procedure outlined in subsection I.A.1 and analyzed from 
a number of angles in Part I—greatly illuminates different possibilities and 
sharpens our appreciation of what turns on different interpretations. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article compares unconstrained balancing to structured decision 
procedures. Viewed abstractly and generally,209 structured decision procedures 
suffer from two sets of infirmities. As final decision rules, they sometimes fail 
to assign liability even though the harm (H) of the defendant’s action exceeds 
the benefit (B), and they sometimes assign liability even though B exceeds H. 
As guides to information gathering, they significantly violate every central 
principle of optimal information collection and rest on key predicates—that 
information on harm and benefit are conceptually and practically distinct—
that are false in many applications. 
The core of the Article uses the general framework to examine three areas 
of law: antitrust (rule of reason and mergers), Title VII disparate impact, and 
strict scrutiny (and proportionality analysis) in constitutional law. In each 
instance, this methodology casts new light on each step of these doctrines’ 
 
balancing-in-the-strict-sense stage, but takes place within each of the tests. And the tests are 
sequenced in order of increasing stringency, so that courts insert themselves into the legislative 
process no more than is necessary to defend rights.” Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 170, at 805; 
see also Jackson, supra note 172, at 3100-01 (“In this way, if the means chosen are not suitable or 
necessary to advance the government’s interest, the case can be resolved at one of these stages: the 
courts need not reach the ‘proportionality as such’ question unless there is a genuine conflict between 
the government’s interest and the interests protected by the right. . . . In this way, courts are not 
‘substituting’ their judgment for that of the legislature.”). Many aspects of such statements are 
mysterious. Their structured framework might be caricatured as asking: Is the restriction a slam-dunk 
loser? If not, is it a clear loser nevertheless? If not, is it a loser on-balance? First, whenever one of 
the former questions is answered affirmatively, the last question would be easy. Second, as explained, 
one of the former questions could be quite difficult even though the last one is easy. Third, it is 
unclear how it is less intrusive into the legislative process to invalidate based on one of the earlier 
questions—both in light of the foregoing points and because doing so (that is, in an earlier step) is 
surely more insulting to the legislature. Some authors also claim that the rigor of this process offers 
a stark contrast to open-ended, unprincipled balancing. See, e.g., Mathews & Stone Sweet, supra note 
170, at 804. But it is hard to see how this is so. (Their multi-step framework does call for analysis of 
less restrictive alternatives, but so do most proposed tests, including unconstrained balancing, 
properly understood, as explained in subsection I.A.2.) 
209This more conceptual perspective is developed extensively in Kaplow, supra note 1. 
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structured protocols, even though they differ from each other and from the 
stylized template. 
Regarding step 1’s requirement that H > H*, in every application there 
was significant uncertainty about the magnitude of the H* threshold. Since 
that threshold is one of the two features that defines structured decision rules 
and distinguishes them from balancing, this ambiguity is telling. If H* is 
indeed significant, the general problem that step 1 results in no liability in 
cases in which H is nevertheless greater than B is indeed present. And if H* 
is negligible, then step 1 is largely irrelevant (other than perhaps as a 
screening device). The only setting with a plausible justification for the 
existence of a weighty step 1 was in constitutional law, regarding the 
qualitative dimension that circumscribes a reviewing court’s jurisdiction to 
domains in which review seems appropriate because of the degree to which 
the government actors being challenged might be untrustworthy. 
Step 2’s requirement that B > B* likewise exhibits tremendous ambiguity 
regarding the magnitude of B*, the other central defining feature of these 
structured rules, and also creates the possibility of errors if B* is set above H. 
Interestingly, for those structured decision rules that do not include a final 
balancing inquiry, the fuzziness surrounding the requisite B* makes it possible 
for implicit balancing to take place at this step, and this is precisely so if B* 
is determined contextually, so as to equal H in the case at hand. And under 
doctrines that do have an explicit balancing step, it may not be reached or be 
largely moot because balancing has already occurred at this point. 
Less restrictive alternatives requirements have proven to be confusing and 
problematic in many of the doctrines considered here, and in very similar 
ways. This Article’s core framework indicates how such analysis should, in 
principle, be conducted and clarifies many issues regarding these applications. 
Proper consideration of less restrictive alternatives on its face subsumes the 
very balancing that is deferred or omitted under these doctrines. In addition, 
puzzlement in some areas of the law about whether a less restrictive 
alternative must be equally effective is addressed by relating this question to 
the underlying legal test, notably, the degree of B that is otherwise required 
to justify a practice. Considering the analysis of less restrictive alternatives as 
an integral part of the overall decision rule (which, under structured rules has 
been highly obscure, often in unappreciated ways), rather than in a vacuum, 
is the best way forward. 
If and when a decisionmaker reaches the final, balancing step of those 
structured decision rules that have one, the analysis is the same as under 
unconstrained balancing. Of course, one may well not reach this stage due to 
a prior, erroneous decision along the way or because balancing has implicitly 
occurred at an earlier step. In addition, the often-advanced notion that 
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difficult balances are avoided by structured decision rules is revealed to be 
misleading. Many avoided balances would have been easy, indeed, often easier 
than the decisions that must be made at earlier steps but are unnecessary 
under unconstrained balancing. Moreover, whenever difficult balances are 
avoided, this is because of early, dispositive decisions that are as likely to be 
erroneous as correct. Decisionmakers who are particularly concerned about 
correct outcomes may consciously or subconsciously breach structured 
protocols, including by reverse engineering, to reach outcomes more in 
accordance with those under unconstrained balancing. 
To the extent that information gathering is taken to be guided by 
structured decision procedures, the general infirmities of such methods are 
indeed evident. This dimension was elaborated particularly with regard to 
merger analysis in antitrust law and the assessment of disparate impact under 
Title VII. To varying degrees, all of the defects of the structured approach 
were manifest, and some recognized challenges in the doctrine came into 
better focus by applying this Article’s framework. More broadly, U.S. civil 
litigation conforms neither to optimal protocols nor to structured ones, 
although judges attempting to improve case management could make 
headway by drawing on the principles of optimal information collection that 
are elucidated here. 
Stepping back, we can see that systematic application of this Article’s 
stylized structured decision procedure to each of the areas of law that employs 
a structured protocol pays off. When the match is close, the lessons carry over 
directly. When there are differences, their potential significance becomes 
apparent. And when it is hard to tell because of doctrinal ambiguity, the 
stylized template highlights the uncertainties and identifies the implications 
of different possible interpretations. 
In each area of law, it is remarkable how much has been overlooked or 
underappreciated due to the failure of precision regarding the central features 
of existing structured decision procedures. It is not that courts and 
commentators disagree with the important criticisms advanced in this Article 
but rather that they do not seem to be aware of the questions. At the most 
fundamental level, each existing or proposed protocol expressly deviates from 
unconstrained balancing—an entirely familiar notion—yet it has not been 
thought necessary to articulate just what the differences are and why, in light 
of them, one should favor any element of these structured substitutes. 
In the applications examined here, the difficulties of quantifying the 
pertinent harms and benefits and, often, comparing them to each other, are 
substantial. The resulting queasiness about quantification and comparison 
may well motivate existing doctrine and help to explain why it is that some 
areas of law employ these structured decision procedures whereas others 
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(such as the negligence test in tort law) do not. Nevertheless, the challenges 
are hidden rather than avoided, and much mischief with regard to procedure 
and outcomes results. Although some may view opacity as a feature rather 
than a bug, transparency generally promotes the quality of decisionmaking, 
the accountability of decisionmakers, and the sound development of the law. 
